

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4577/01

O 221201Z MAY 79
FM USDAO/TEHRAN
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC IMMEDIATE
RUEPRC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEPTRA/TTC BOEHRFINK MTE GE
RUEHQHA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHQA/COMINTAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHQA/USDAO KARUL
RUEHQA/CINCSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEHQA/COMIDEASTFOR MANAMA BA
RUEHQA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
RUEHQA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHQA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUEHQA/USCINCTUR WASHINGTON GE
RUEHQA/TAC LANGLEY AFB VA
RUEHQA/FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHQA/EUDAC WASHINGTON GE
RUEHQA/CINCSARREUS HEIDELBERG OF
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USDAO/TEHRAN 24577

INFO: DAO 250276
APPRO: DATT: L.J. HOLLAND
ACT
CRAFT: OPS: ABBRAZINI
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: DAO
CRU
SRP
MAAG
RF
POL

FOR:
DC-4A/DN-2E1/AN-8
J2
J23
J25
IFAC
G-2

CONFIDENTIAL 240 MAY 79

THIS IS 112 5 245 1150 79

1. COUNTRY: IRAN (IR)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 845 0180 79
3. TITLE: SITUATION REPORT ON IRAN (U)
4. OMITTED
5. DATE OF INFO: 790521-790502
6. DATE OF REPORT: 790502
7. DATE/PLACE OF ACQ: 790501-790502, TEHRAN, IRAN
8. REFERENCE: ICRS U-RED-4921A, M-2E1-15016
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE B, INFO
10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO (OPS), TEHRAN, IRAN
11. REQUEST EVAL: ICR
12. PREPARING OFF: A.B. GRAZINI, ISC, USN, INTELL SPAC
13. APPROVING AUTH: L.J. HOLLAND, COL, USA, ACT DATT
14. SOURCE: LOCAL NEWS MEDIA, EMBASSY OFFICIALS, USDAO PERSONNEL, FOREIGN ATTACHE
15. SPECIAL INST: DIRC: NO.
16. SUMMARY (C) REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN IRAN. INFORMATION CONCERNS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SEVERENCE OF EGYPTIAN RELATIONS; LABOR DAY CELEBRATIONS HELD IN IRAN; ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON LABOR DAY; SHOTS FIRED AT U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND; AND ASSASSINATION OF AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI.
17. REFU 21. OMITTED.
22. DETAILS: (C) A. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SEVERENCE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4577/81

EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. FOLLOWING EMAM KHOMEINI'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUED A STATEMENT EMPHASIZING THAT BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT DOES NOT IMPLY ANY ACTION AGAINST THE BROTHERLY AND FRIENDLY NATION OF EGYPT. KHOMEINI'S LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, DR. EBRAHIM YAZDI READS AS FOLLOWS: "IN VIEW OF THE DECEITFUL TREATY SIGNED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND THE TOTAL SURRENDER OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ZIONISM, THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IS REQUIRED TO BREAK ITS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT." THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE CRISIS WHICH HAS PLUNGED THE MIDDLE EAST REGION INTO FOUR BLOODY WARS IS THE NEGLECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE AND TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THEIR EXISTENCE. EVIDENTLY NO SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN TRAGEDY WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT KNOWING ITS ROOTS AND CAUSES. THEREFORE, AN URGENT MEASURE CAN BRING ABOUT PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING TO THIS REGION AND THE WORLD. THE DECEITFUL TREATY WITH ISRAEL CONCLUDES WITHOUT ANY REGARD FOR THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE INTEREST OF THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY, CONFIRMS THE AGGRESSION BY INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM AND TRAMPLES UPON THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARAB BROTHERS WHOSE TERRITORIES HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. THE TREATY SIGNED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT WITH THE USURPER GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL UNDER THE LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION OF THE U.S. SERVES NO PURPOSE BUT TO CONSOLIDATE ISRAEL IN THE ARAB OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS A FORTRESS OF IMPERIALIST POLICIES IN THE REGION AND TO BRING SUBJUGATION AND SLAVERY TO THE MOSLEMS. THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ONCE AGAIN EXERTS ITS FULL AND ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE AND ITS APPROVAL FOR THE MOSLEM ARAB BROTHERS WHO HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THIS SUPERIMPOSED PEACE AND IN THE LIGHT OF ASPIRATIONS OF THE MOSLEM PEOPLE OF IRAN REGARDING THE LIBERATION OF JERUSALEM FROM THE ISRAELI

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4577/81

5

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAD/TEHRAN

CONGRESSORS, IT CANNOT REMAIN SILENT AT THE TIME WHEN THE VIOLATED RIGHTS OF OUR ARAB BROTHERS, EGYPTIANS, IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF EGYPT ON MONDAY, APRIL 30, THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PUNCHED OUT HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS REGARDING ANTI-ISLAMIC AND ANTI-ARABIC POLICIES OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AND NOTIFIED THE AMBASSADOR OF ITS DECISION TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT. THIS DECISION WHICH DEEMS ITS ASPIRATIONS FROM THE GREAT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAN, IS HARMONIOUS WITH THE MOST BASIC IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF ISLAM AND CONFORMS WITH EMAM KHOMEINI'S VIEWS COMMUNICATED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THROUGH A DECREE. THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT OF IRAN DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO STRESS THAT THE BREAKING OF RELATIONS WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CONSTITUTE AN ACTION AGAINST THE FRIENDLY AND BROTHERLY PEOPLE OF EGYPT. WHILE EXPRESSING SYMPATHY WITH THE ZEALOUS AND MILITANT PATRIOTIC PEOPLE OF EGYPT THE IRANIAN NATION ONCE AGAIN REITERATES ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHTEOUS STRUGGLE OF THE PALESTINIANS, HOPING THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, IN STEP WITH OTHER MUSLIM AND ARAB BROTHERS, MAY PAVE THE WAY FOR THE CREATION OF A TRUE AND PERMANENT PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE REGION.

B. LABOR DAY CELEBRATIONS HELD IN IRAN. IN TEHRAN, ABOUT 8,000 WORKERS FROM DIFFERENT FACTORIES GATHERED IN REVOLUTION SQUARE AND MARCHED TOWARD EMAM MOSSERI SQUARE. MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY WERE OBSERVED IN THIS MARCH. DURING THE GATHERING, ABDOLHASAN ANBI-SADE ANALYZED ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES OF THE COUNTRY AND SAID THAT THE IRANIAN WORKERS, WHO MATERIALIZED THE REVOLUTION, SHOULD PRESERVE IT AND SHOULD NOT ALLOW ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES AND REMNANTS OF THE FORMER REGIME TO PENETRATE THE WORKERS UNITY. HE ALSO SAID THAT IN THE PAST, IRANIAN INDUSTRY DEPENDED ON WESTERN RAW MATERIALS, TECHNICIANS AND EXPERTS BUT THE WORKERS SHOULD MAKE EFFORTS TO CREATE INDEPENDENT INDUSTRIES IN THE COUNTRY. FLO REPRESENTATIVE IN TEHRAN, HANI AL-HABAN, SPOKE TO THE DEMONSTRATORS. HE SAID "TODAY IS THE CELEBRATION OF LABOR DAY. WORKERS MUST PROTECT THEIR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. OUR ENEMIES, THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION TRY TO PREVENT WORKERS FROM PRODUCING, BUT YOU SHOULD PROTECT PRODUCTION. HE THEN REFERRED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORKERS OF PALESTINE AND SOUTH LEBANON AND SAID THAT THE BEST GIFT WHICH WAS GIVEN TO THE WORKERS BY EMAM KHOMEINI WAS IRAN'S BREAKING OFF RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. SIMILAR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE HELD IN OTHER STREETS IN TEHRAN YESTERDAY, THERE WERE MANY SLOGANS PRESENT AND SOME OF THEM ARE AS FOLLOWS:

"WE, THE WORKERS CONDEMN ANY KIND OF TROUBLE MAKING; ISLAM IS OUR PROTECTOR.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY IS THE PROTECTOR OF ALL HARD WORKERS.

"IN ISLAM, TYRANNY TOWARD A WORKER IS NOT POSSIBLE."

"WORKERS CONDEMN EXPLOITATION IN ANY FORM."

"DISCORD AND DISUNITY ARE VOICES OF THE TREACHEROUS."

"AMERICA IS THE ENEMY OF OUR PEOPLE AND MISCHIEFMAKERS ARE THE COLLEAGUES OF AMERICA."

WORKERS AND FARMERS ARE ALL ALERT.

IN PARIS A MARCH BY THE LEFTIST WORKERS WAS NOT HELD DUE

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAD/TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4577/82

TO THE ATTACK ON THEM BY A NUMBER OF PEOPLE. NO REPORTS CONCERNING CASUALTIES WAS SEEN. IN KERMANSHAR THE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE NOT HELD PEACEFULLY AND FOLLOWING CLASHES BETWEEN THE DEMONSTRATORS, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WERE INJURED. TWO OF THE INJURED WERE IN CRITICAL CONDITION. IN BUSHERR OVER 10,000 WORKERS MARCHED THROUGH THE STREETS OF THE CITY. THE WORKERS ISSUED AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN WHICH THEY CONFIRMED THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND ASKED FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE LABOR LAW, THE REOPENING OF WORKSHOPS AND PAYMENT OF 12 MILLION RIALS OWED TO THE WORKERS BY THE OTHER PARTNERS TO THE IRAN ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (C) NUMEROUS RUMORS HAVE BEEN HEARD THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE IN THE CITY DURING THE LABOR DAY DEMONSTRATIONS BUT SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING IN THE PRESS CONCERNING ANY INJURIES. TONIGHTS PRESS AND TOMORROW MORNING'S PRESS WILL BE SCANNED FOR FURTHER

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4577/82

INFORMATION.

C. ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS. IT WAS NOT ALL POSITIVE AND PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS YESTERDAY. AMONG THE CROWDS OF MARCHERS THERE WERE SOME SMALL GROUPS OF OUT-OF-WORK LABORERS WHO DEMANDED "GIVE US WORK, NOW!" ON ONE STREET NEAR THE UNIVERSITY A FOREIGN REPORTER HEARD A BAGGEL-TAG GROUP OF YOUNGSTERS CARRYING FLAGS MARKED WITH RED SICKLES SHOUTING DEFIANTLY "MARG BAR KHOMEINI" (DEATH TO KHOMEINI) AS THEY MARCHED ALONG. UNABLE TO BELIEVE HER EARS, SHE ASKED A CIGARETTE VENDOR WHO REPLIED SUCCINCTLY: "THEY ARE ONLY COMMUNISTS." THERE WERE NUMBERS OF WOMEN MARCHERS, MOSTLY WEARING CHADORS OR SCARVES AND SEVERAL YOUNGER WOMEN WEARING JEANS. THEY WERE FROM THE LEFTIST FEDAYAN. SEVERAL WERE IN PRAISE OF KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTION. OTHERS DEMANDED MORE WORK AND MORE WORKERS RIGHTS. ONE WAS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOSLEM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY SUPPORTED BY AYATOLLAH KAZEM SHARIAT-MADARI. PORTRAITS OF SHARIAT-MADARI AND AYATO-LAR MAHMUD TALUSHANI WERE ALMOST AS NUMEROUS AS THOSE OF KHOMEINI. THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL GROUPS CARRYING PICTURES OF IMAM MOUSA SADEH AND ONE STUDENT WAS CARRYING SEVERAL POSTCARD-SIZE PICTURES OF THE BLUE EYED CLERGYMAN WHICH HE SAID WERE ON SALE ALL OVER TEHRAN.

D. SHOTS FIRED AT U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND. SHOOTING AROUND THE EMBASSY COMPOUND LAST NIGHT WAS HEARD BY MANY PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. THERE WAS SHOOTING AT APPROXIMATELY 2130 HOURS NEAR THE COMPOUND BUT NO REPORTS OF INSIDE FIRING WAS HEARD. AT APPROXIMATELY 0230 HOURS, NUMEROUS SHOTS WERE FIRED AT THE WALLS AROUND THE EMBASSY COMPOUND MOSTLY ON THE ROOSEVELT WALL AND THE WALL SURROUNDING THE CO-OP AREA. ONE OF THE LIGHTS IN THE CO-OP AREA WAS SHOT OUT. THE EMBASSY REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS PURSUED THE PERSONS DOING THE FIRING AND CAPTURED THREE OF THEM. IN THEIR HASTE TO GET AWAY, SOME OF THE ATTACKERS G-3 WEAPONS WERE LEFT BEHIND WHICH WERE CONFISCATED BY THE GUARDS. ONE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS REPORTED THAT THE THREE THAT WERE CAPTURED BELONGED TO THE FEDAYAN. ALL PERSONS WERE REPORTED TO BE ON FOOT AND NO VEHICLES WERE SIGHTED.

ORIGINATOR COMMENT: (C) A LATER SOURCE HAS STATED THAT THERE WAS APPROXIMATELY SIX PERSONS WHO SHOT UP THE WALLS OF THE EMBASSY, BUT NO CONFIRMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED ON THIS. IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED THAT SIX G-3 WEAPONS WERE RECOVERED.

E. AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI ASSASSINATED. AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI WAS ASSASSINATED LAST NIGHT BY UNKNOWN ASSASSINS. IT WAS REPORTED THAT HE WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD THREE TIMES. THE ASSASSIN WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS EVEN THOUGH MOTAHARI HAD VERY TIGHT SECURITY. MOTAHARI WAS THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND A VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (C) A SOURCE HAS REPORTED TO RO THAT THE ASSASSINATION WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE SAME GROUP THAT ASSASSINATED GENERAL QAPANI. ~~THIS SECRET GROUP IS CALLED "FORGHAN"~~ (DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRUTH AND FALSHOOD). THE GROUP HAD EARLIER, AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF THE GENERAL, ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO CARRY OUT OTHER ASSASSINATIONS. RO BELIEVES THAT THIS MAY BE THE SAME GROUP. FURTHER INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN OBTAINED.

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4577/83

PL MISCELLANEOUS: (1) TWO MILLION PEOPLE HAVE APPLIED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY SINCE ITS ESTABLISHMENT IN FEBRUARY. A PARTY OFFICIALS SAYS. IN TEHRAN ALONE, 400,000 APPLICATIONS HAVE BEEN FILED.

(2) THE TOTAL EXECUTED IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS WAS ANNOUNCED IN TODAY'S NEWS SOURCE AS 161.

(3) TEHRAN RADIO HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT THREE MORE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. NAMES AND POSITIONS WILL BE PROVIDED IN TOMORROW'S REPORT.

ORIGINATOR COMMENT: (C) REGARDING THE REPORT IN PARAGRAPH A OF THIS MESSAGE, THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY ATTACHE HAS CONFIRMED THAT IRAN HAS SEVERED RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MAY BE GONE FROM TEHRAN BY SATURDAY OF THIS WEEK.

DECL 2 MAY 85

BT

44577

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

USDAO/TEHRAN 4577/83

Department of State
Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

SEC 14-2
4611-3112
JPS

TEL EXT

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE

CHG: CWNAAS

POL: JDSTEMPEL

NONE

CHG POL(3) OR, ECON ICA RF

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECSTATE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 5/3/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.)OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR

SUBJ: HEIGHTENED TENSIONS AFTER MOTAHARI'S ASSASSINATION

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.

2. SUMMARY: ASSASSINATION OF AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI HAS SHARPLY INCREASED ANXIETIES AMONG GOVERNMENT AND RELIGIOUS ~~LEADERS~~ ~~LEADER~~ GROUP HAS CLAIMED CREDIT, SAYS YAZDI, ~~LEADER~~ AND GHOTBZADEH ARE NEXT. SUSPICIONS OF U.S. LIKELY TO INCREASE. END SUMMARY.

3. FROM NUMBER OF SOURCES AND PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF POLOFFS FOLLOWING IS ACCOUNT OF IMPACT AND REVERBERATIONS OF ASSASSINATION OF AYATOLLAH MORTEZA MOTAHARI EVENING MAY 1.

4. PGOI AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAVE BECOME VISIBLY MORE ANXIOUS ABOUT THEIR OWN SAFETY IN WAKE OF ASSASSINATION, WHICH WAS THOROUGHLY PROFESSIONAL JOB CARRIED OUT TO HIT A MAN UNDER SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY PROTECTION. REPORTS THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, AND IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT ~~GOV~~ (AT LEAST TWO WERE INVOLVED) THAT HIT HIM MUST HAVE KNOWN THIS AS WELL. EMBASSY'S OWN MUJAHIDIN GUARDS HAVE PERCEPTIBLY HIGHER EDGINESS THAN BEFORE, AND SHOOTING IN EVENINGS HAS PICKED UP AGAIN IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SECTORS OF CITY. FAR NORTHERN PART OF CITY HAS BEEN LARGELY QUIET, ACCORDING TO TWO OBSERVERS. SOME NEWSMEN REPORT TENSENESS IN OTHER PROVINCIAL TOWNS BUT NOT SUBSTANTIAL VIOLENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

4611

CONFIDENTIAL

5. SECURITY CONCERNS WERE UNDOUBTEDLY HEIGHTENED BY CALLS MORNING MAY 2 TO AYANDEGON NEWSPAPER AND AP BY FARGAN GROUP, WHICH CLAIMED CREDIT FOR MOTAHARI ASSASSINATION (THEY HAD TAKEN CREDIT FOR KILLING OF GENERAL GUARANI JUST OVER A WEEK AGO). CALLER FROM GROUP TOLD MEDIA THAT FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM AND RADIO/TV DIRECTOR GHOTBZADEH WERE NEXT ON THE HIT LIST. WE HAVE HEARD OTHER STORIES THAT GROUP HAS TOTAL OF 16 NAMES IT WISHES TO ELIMINATE TO QUOTE WIPE OUT THE UNHOLY CANCER OF THE MURDERING MULLAHS, UNQUOTE AS ONE PERSIAN SOURCE PUT IT. IDENTITY OF FARGAN GROUP IS SUBJECT OF INTENSE SPECULATION. THERE ARE NO LEADS, BUT BEST GUESS IS THAT IT IS SOMEONE CONNECTED TO OLD REGIME.

6. RESULT OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS, ESPECIALLY IF FARGAN IDENTITY IS FINALLY ESTABLISHED OR ASSASSINS TURN OUT TO BE EX-SHAH MEN, IS LIKELY TO BE RENEWED SUSPICION OF U.S. SMALL INDICATOR OF THIS IS THAT MANY OF OUR RELIGIOUS CONTACTS HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND OVER PAST 36 HOURS (PART OF THIS IS NATURAL INVOLVEMENT WITH FUNERAL). LEFTISTS AND RADICAL MOSLEMS ARE LIKELY TO SEE THIS AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF KHOMEINI THESIS ABOUT U.S. AND OTHERS ARE STILL MEDDLING IN IRAN. IF THIS VIEW GAINS WIDESPREAD CURRENCY (WHICH IT DOES NOT NOW HAVE), MISSION SECURITY SITUATION COULD AGAIN BE TIGHT. FOR MOMENT, HOWEVER, ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON FINDING GROUP INVOLVED.

7. INCIDENT COMES AT A TIME WHEN PGOI IS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH GENERALS PALISBAND AND OVEISSI, BOTH OF WHOM ARE STILL AT LARGE. PALISBAND IS SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN TURKOMAN MINI-REVOLT OF TWO WEEKS AGO. CROSS CURRENTS WITHIN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ARE SUBSTANTIAL ENOUGH TO BOLSTER SUSPICIONS OF FOREIGN INTRIGUE WITH FACTIONS. ONE INTERESTING ACCOUNT INDICATES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS CORPS, FOUNDED BY YAZDI, IS NOW UNDER THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI, AND IS BEING BROUGHT INTO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (KHOMEINI'S PARTY) AS THE PROTECTIVE ARM OF THE PARTY. SHARIAT-MADARI'S ISLAMIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY HAS AS YET NO SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT WITH ANY GROUP TO OUR KNOWLEDGE. IF PARTIES PROCEED TO ORGANIZE IN COMPETITION THIS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BRING MORE FORCE INTO PLAY IN ARMS-RICH IRAN. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINATOR		DATED		CLASSIFICATION		CONTROL NUMBER	
DIA WASH DC LC		8 MAY 79		SECRET NOFORN		78-142	
DATE RECEIVED IN DIA		SUSPENSE DATE		REGISTERED NUMBER		FILE DESIGNATION	
						ADPT 533	
DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL DIA WASH NSC 3290, DEC 061437ZMAY79, SUBJ: USE OF THE RODCA COMMUNICATION CHANNEL (U), 1 PG, 1CM, SECRET NOFORN ////////// //FOLLOWS//////////////////////////////////////							
OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME	SIGNATURE
1	1	7/10/79	7/10/79	4			
2				5			
3				6			
DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box)							
THE MATERIAL LISTED HEREON HAS BEEN <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED <input type="checkbox"/> TORN AND PLACED IN BAG NO. _____ AND COMMITTED TO THE AUTHORIZED DESTRUCTION FACILITY (DIAR 50-2)							
SIGNATURE CERTIFYING OFFICIAL		OFFICE SYMBOL		SIGNATURE WITNESSING OFFICIAL		OFFICE SYMBOL	
		DATE				DATE	

DIAR FORM 13 (1-68) DIA ROUTING & CONTROL RECORD

(Previous Edition is Obsolete)

DIAR 50-2

U.S. G.P.O. 1976-721-484/59

NNNNVV ESA914BRN893

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PP RUQMHR

DE RUEKAAA #2650 1281440

ZNY SSSSS

P 081437Z MAY 79

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC//

TO AIG 7008

RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMI//

RUEAAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC//DNI//

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC//IN//

RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA//CODE J2//

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2//

RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ//SCJ2//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO//

BT

S E C R E T NOFORN 8890

CIA FOR MR. JOHN MCMAHON

SUBJECT: USE OF THE RODCA COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL (U)
1. (S/NOFORN) DIRECTOR, DIA INTENDS TO CHANGE THE RODCA COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL AS IT IS USED BY THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM. ATTACHE OFFICES WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE THE RODCA CHANNEL FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES:

PAGE 2 RUEKAAA 2650 S E C R E T

A. CODING AND/OR REGISTRATION OF NON-U.S. SOURCES WITH THE DEFENSE SOURCE REGISTER (DC-4B/DSR).

B. SENSITIVE OR CLANDESTINE ATTACHE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES INVOLVING NON-U.S. HUMAN SOURCES.

C. FOREIGN MATERIEL ACQUISITION PROJECTS.

2. (S/NOFORN) USE OF THE RODCA CHANNEL BY ATTACHE OFFICES FOR OTHER PURPOSES WILL BE PROHIBITED. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE DIRECTOR INCLUDES:

A. COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO SOURCES WHO ARE U.S. PERSONS, AS DEFINED BY E.O. 12036, WILL BE TRANSMITTED VIA THE "EXCLUSIVE FOR" CHANNEL OR SENT THROUGH CIA OPERATIONAL CHANNELS.

B. COMMUNICATIONS TO DIA CONCERNING ATTACHE SUPPORT TO CIA WILL BE HANDLED THROUGH CIA OPERATIONAL CHANNELS.

C. COMMUNICATIONS TO DIA CONCERNING ATTACHE SUPPORT TO OTHER DOD COLLECTORS WILL BE SENT VIA THE OPERATIONAL CHANNELS OF THOSE COLLECTORS.

D. ALL RODCA TRAFFIC INCOMING TO ATTACHE OFFICES WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM. ALL RODCA TRAFFIC BEING SENT BY AN ATTACHE OFFICE WILL BE REVIEWED BY THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DCM PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ACTION ADDRESSEES.

PAGE 3 RUEKAAA 2650 S E C R E T

3. (U) COMMENTS BY ADDEES CONCERNING INTENDED CHANGES ARE REQUESTED. RESPONSE NLT 11 MAY WILL BE APPRECIATED.

REVW 7 MAY 1999 REAS 2-301C.3

BT

#2650

SECRET

8 MAY 79 15 10z

Handwritten signature/initials

533

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Handwritten: 5-79-142

US 11/11/89
7/8/5
Chon

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: JDSTEMPEL
POL: DMC GAFFEY, ECON: CTAYLOR
CHG POL(3) OR, ECON, ICA RF

C
Mr.
J. S.
Mr.
Ch.

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: RDS 5/8/89 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PGOV, PINT, IR
SUBJ: SELECTED POLITICAL ITEMS

REF: (A) STATE 106426 (B) TEHRAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: BELOW ARE COMMENTS ON POLITICAL DYNAMICS WHICH DO NOT THEMSELVES JUSTIFY SEPARATE TREATMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. OVER PAST MONTH, EMBOFFS HAVE GATHERED NUMBER OF SMALL ITEMS WHICH DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO SEPARATE TREATMENT, BUT WHICH RESPOND TO GENERAL REPORTING REQUESTS CONTAINED REFTEL. THESE ARE OFFERED AS ATMOSPHERICS ON LOCAL SITUATION, NOT FINELY HONED ANALYSIS THAT WE ARE HOPEFULLY RESERVING FOR OUR MORE FORMAL TWELVE VOLUME RESPONSE TO REFTEL. PREVIOUS REPORTING THAT REMAINS RELEVANT TO SUBJECTS AT HAND IS ALSO NOTED. REFTEL PARAGRAPHS ARE SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS AFTER RELATED PARAGRAPH IN TEXT.

4. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS. (PARA ONE). OF THE AYATOLLAHS CLEARLY KHOMEINI, SHARIAT-MADARI AND TALEGHANI DOMINATE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT FRONTLINE. IMPORTANT IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, BUT SECOND LEVEL LEADERS, ARE HASSAN TABATABAI, QOMI (MASHAD), HASHEM RAFSANJANI (DIRECTOR OF NEW REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS), MOHAMMAD MUSAVI GOLPAYGANI (QOM), AND MAHMOUD MONTAZERI. ISFAHAN'S MODERATE AYATOLLAH KHODOMI AND YOUNG FIRE-BREATHING TAHERI AS WELL AS ARAB LEADER AYATOLLAH KHAGANI HAVE REGIONAL IMPORTANCE WHICH COULD GROW. ENTEZAM'S POLITICAL STATURE WAS PARTIALLY COVERED IN TEHRAN'S 4679; HE CLEARLY DOMINATES SABAGHIAN, SINCE HE IS MUCH CLOSER TO BAZARGAN, WHO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

ACCEPTED SABAGHIAN ONLY TO PLACATE THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) LEFT WING. SABAGHIAN HAS A FULL-TIME JOB JUST KEEPING TABS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFER OF ASSETS PROBLEM AND TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE HAS NOT BEEN ACTIVE ON POLITICAL SIDE EXCEPT PERIPHERALLY. YAZDI WAS DISCUSSED IN TEHRAN 4377; JURY STILL OUT ON WHETHER HE HAS ULTIMATELY GAINED OR LOST, BUT IT DOES NOW SEEM THAT HE WILL LOOSE MUCH OF HIS INFLUENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS, WHO ARE FALLING INTO OTHER HANDS -- AYATOLLAH RAFSANJANI AND A SHIITE REVOLUTIONARY FROM LEBANON NAMED CHAMRAN. CHAMRAN'S ARRIVAL HAS SET OFF A WAVE OF CONCERN AMONG LEFT THAT KHOMEINI IS READING NEW GUARDIANS FOR A PURGE OF THE LEFT. YAZDI HAS THUS FAR MADE GENERALLY GOOD IMPRESSION ON SEVERAL MFA PROFESSIONALS WE HAVE TALKED TO, INCLUDING DIVISION CHIEF OF NORTH AMERICAN SECTION. FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, HE HAS BEHAVED WELL, SOUGHT ADVICE FROM HIS PROS AND OFTEN HEEDED IT.

5. BAZARGAN IS REGARDED WITH AFFECTION IF NOT WITH MUCH RESPECT (PARA TWO). RELIGIOUS TYPES APPRECIATE HIM BECAUSE HE IS KHOMEINI'S PRIME MINISTER, SECULARISTS BECAUSE THEY KNOW HE'S REALLY MORE OF A FRENCH-STYLE SOCIAL DEMOCRAT IN PERSONAL BELIEF. GENERAL PERCEPTION IS THAT THERE IS NO ONE ELSE AROUND WHO COULD DO THE JOB RIGHT NOW WITHOUT A MAJOR FIGHT FROM SOME SECTOR OR THE OTHER. MOST OF HIS SENIOR BUREAUCRATS WISH HE WOULDN'T TAKE THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT SO SERIOUSLY. BAZARGAN IS ALSO REPORTEDLY A CLOSE FRIEND OF TALEGHANI'S.

6. TEHRAN'S 4726 GIVES A THOROUGH VIEW OF PRESENT TALEGHANI ORGANIZATION (PARA THREE).

7. SEE TEHRAN 4302 AND 4314, ESPECIALLY LATTER, FOR OUR VIEW OF KEY AREAS TO WATCH (PARA FOUR).

8. WILL DO AN UPDATE ON PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. (PARA FIVE) IN A WEEK'S TIME. SITUATION REMAINS ESSENTIALLY SAME AS IN TEHRAN'S 4158 AND 4069. POINT TO REMEMBER HERE, IS THAT EACH FURTHER BREACH OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SECURITY INCREASES BELIEF THAT U.S. (AND PERHAPS SOVIETS TOO) IS MEDDLING.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3

9. ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF VARIOUS GROUPS (PARA EIGHT) WERE COVERED TO DATE IN TEHRAN'S 4302 AND 4314. SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES OF GROUPS HAVE INVOLVED ORGANIZATION EFFORTS -- SANJABI HAS HEADED FOR THE PROVINCES TO TRY AND GET THE NATIONAL FRONT BACK IN THE BALLGAME. MINLABOR FOROUHAR HAS SAID MAJOR FRONT MOVES WILL OCCUR SOON. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (MATIN-DAFTARY) HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET PAST TWO WEEKS. OTHERS HAVE BEEN SUBJECT OF SPOT REPORTS. WE HOPE TO TAKE MORE IN-DEPTH LOOK AT NDF AND NATIONAL FRONT IN COMING WEEKS.

10. RECENT AND PLANNED VISITS TO TABRIZ, SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN (PARA 9) BY EX-CONSULATE OFFICERS (FOR TABRIZ, TEHRAN 4486) WILL GIVE BEST PICTURE OF PROVINCES. IN GENERAL, BOTH ECONOMIC LEVELS AND LEVELS OF VIOLENCE SEEM TO EXCEED TEHRAN SITUATION.

11. OTHER EMBASSIES GENERALLY SHARE OUR ANALYSIS WITH TWO NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS. JAPANESE AMBASSADOR REMAINS OPTIMISTIC THAT CRISIS HAS PAST AND TEHRAN WILL SLOWLY RETURN TO NORMAL. NEITHER HIS DCM NOR HIS POLCOUNS AGREE WITH HIM, HOWEVER. FRENCH EMBASSY HAS FOCUSED MORE ON FAR LEFT AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT WHILE FEDAYEN AND TUDEH HAVE MUCH BETTER TACTICAL ORGANIZATION THAN MUJAHIDDIN AND LMI, THEY HAVE NOT YET SHOWN THE CAPACITY TO GET EVERYONE IN THEIR IDEOLOGICAL BOAT TO PULL TOGETHER AND KNOCK OFF THE PGOI IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY MAJOR SELF-INFLICTED BREAKDOWN OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OR PGOI. WE WOULD AGREE NOW, BUT SUSPECT THAT MAY NOT BE TRUE IN TWO TO THREE WEEK'S TIME. WE WOULD ALSO RATE CHANCES OF AN UNTOWARD INCIDENT AND SELF-DESTRUCTION HIGHER THAN THE FRENCH DO. ECON HAS SENT IN TWO MEMCONS ON FRENCH ECON TIES AND PERCEPTIONS, AND TEHRAN 4117 ON OECD ECONOMIC RELATIONS. AT NUANCE LEVEL, BRITISH FEEL THAT POTENTIAL FOR TROUBLE IS GROWING AND TEND TO BE JUST A BIT MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROVINCES THAN WE DO, BASED ON COMMENTS FROM MANY OF THEIR LONG-TIME RESIDENTS OUTSIDE TEHRAN. SOVIETS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY TRYING TO MEDDLE; OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES FEEL SOVIETS ARE SHOWING INCREASED ACTIVITY AND INTEREST IN EVENTS, BUT NO ONE CAN PUT FINGER ON ANY SPECIFIC INTERNAL PLOYS THEY ARE WORKING ON. SEVERAL OF OUR AFRICAN AND NORTH AFRICAN COLLEAGUES SUSCRIBE TO THE THESIS THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PUSHING VISIT OF RADICAL LEADERS (JALLUD, ETC) TO TRY AND BREAK DOWN KHOMEINI RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST IDEAS. SEEMS REASONABLE TO US, TOO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4

12. FUTURE SEPTELS WILL COVER MEDIA AND UNIVERSITIES. (PARA TWELVE). CHAOS IS STILL THE ORDER OF THE DAY, PER TEHRAN'S 2748. SOME ADMINISTRATIVE STABILIZATION HAS OCCURRED. FACULTY STRIKES HAVE HIT SEVERAL UNIVERSITIES, BUT MAJOR WALKOUTS HAVE THUS FAR BEEN AVERTED. NIRT REMAINS CHAOTIC AND SUB-PROFESSIONAL; ITS PRINCIPAL ACHIEVEMENT AFTER TWO MONTHS OF REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR IS TO HAVE MADE DIRECTOR SADEQ GHOTBZADEH ONE OF IRAN'S MOST HATED FIGURES. RECENT USICA CABLES HAVE DEALT IN DETAIL WITH SOME ASPECTS OF PRESS AND MEDIA.

13. MOST TIMELY INFO WE HAVE ON CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS (PARA THIRTEEN) IS CONTAINED IN TEHRAN'S 4679. SITUATION IS STILL CONFUSED AND SOMEWHAT DISORGANIZED, AND TIME FRAME FOR ESTABLISHING ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK REMAINS TWO TO FOUR MONTHS.

14. CONCERNING ECONOMIC ITEMS OF INTEREST (PARA 7) -- INFLATION, SHORTAGES, EMPLOYMENT, ETC., WE BELIEVE WE ARE FAIRLY CURRENT. SEE TEHRAN 3962 (UNEMPLOYMENT), 2975 (WRAP UP INCLUDING INFLATION), 4300 (WHEAT AND ITS REFTTEL ON FOOD WRAP UP) AND 4395 (ECONOMIC HIGHLIGHTS).

15. ARRANGEMENTS FOR PROJECTED FETE (PARA FIFTEEN) ARE WELL IN HAND, BUT WE HAVE GIVEN UP ON OLYMPIC STADIUM AS SITE. NO SHORTAGE OF VARIOUS CALIBER NOISE MAKERS IS ANTICIPATED. NAAS##

Incoming

ANNNO

VVV E6A6232RA314

00 RUEHHC

DE RUEHHC 2561 1326336

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 120107Z MAY 79

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 2321

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 120561

E.O. 12065 N/A

TAGS: IR

SUBJECT: STATEMENT ON IRAN

1. FOLLOWING EXCERPT ON IRAN IS TAKEN FROM THE SECRETARY'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MAY 8:

"MR. WOLFE: COULD YOU, MR. SECRETARY, PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT AS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF THIS MOMENT?

MR. VANCE: YES, LET ME DO IT VERY BRIEFLY. THE SITUATION IS A FRAGILE ONE AT THIS POINT AS IS EVIDENT FROM OUR DAILY NEWSPAPERS. THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING ITSELF AND EXTENDING ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT TASK AS IS TRUE WITH ANY REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION.

THERE ARE DIFFERENCES THAT ARE APPARENT. I WOULD SAY THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE MOVING IN WHAT I THINK IS A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY TO SEIZE HOLD AND GOVERN THE COUNTRY UNDER EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PRIME MINISTER IS AN EXTREMELY ABLE MAN. ALL OF US WISH HIM WELL IN WHAT HE IS DOING."

PG01 AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. VANCE

BT

0551

12 MAY 79 11 02Z

Pol
CHG
RF
Chron
D

4969

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: DCMCGAFFEY/BJH
POL: JDSTEMPEL
POL: *Gen*

Chuan

1
C
Roby

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/14/85 (MCGAFFEY, D.C.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJ: SOCIAL NOTES FROM ISFAHAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: STREET VIOLENCE HAS DISAPPEARED FROM ISFAHAN, BUT THE IRANIAN POPULATION REMAINS TENSE DUE TO RELIGIO-POLITICAL RIVALRIES, MASS ARRESTS, AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES. THE SMALL FOREIGN POPULATION IS IGNORED. THE SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES ARE OPEN, BUT FUNCTIONING ERRATICALLY. A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS HAVE HAD MAJOR STATUS CHANGES. END SUMMARY.

3. SINCE MY RETURN TO IRAN, I HAVE BEEN IN DAILY TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH FRIENDS AND CONTACTS IN ISFAHAN. THEY ALL AGREE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO STREET VIOLENCE IN RECENT WEEKS, AND MOST BELIEVE THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF IT RESUMING. THERE ARE CONTINUED ARRESTS, OFTEN CLANDESTINE MIDDLE-OF-THE-NIGHT ACTS, AND DISAPPEARANCES WHICH ARE PRESUMED TO BE ARRESTS. ESTIMATES VARY, UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 700 ARRESTS IN THE PAST MONTH. MANY OF THE ARRESTS AND/OR DISAPPEARANCES ARE OF JEWS AND BAHAI'S, BUT MORE THAN HALF ARE, IN THE WORDS OF ONE CONTACT "SAVAKIS--THAT IS ANYONE WHO WAS RICH, WAS DISRESPECTFUL TO OR SUPPORTED THE WRONG PERSON, OR HAD ENEMIES, PLUS A FEW WHO WORKED FOR THE OLD REGIME." THUS THE GENERAL MOOD IN ISFAHAN IS SOMBER. THE ECONOMY IS AT A STANDSTILL. DESPITE PUBLIC REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, NONE OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIES ARE WORKING--THE STEEL MILL, THE REFINERY, THE TEXTILE FACTORIES--THE BAZAAR IS OPEN BUT MERCHANTS REPORT NO BUSINESS, AND NO PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS ARE ACTIVE OR EVEN CURRENTLY PLANNED. MANY EMPLOYEES ARE RECEIVING SALARIES WITHOUT WORKING, BUT MOST EXPECT THAT TO STOP SHORTLY. ISFAHAN IS UNHAPPY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. A MAJOR REASON FOR THE UNHAPPINESS IS CONTINUED RIVALRY BETWEEN THE ELDER, RESPECTED AYATOLLAH KHADAMI, TO WHOM PEOPLE TURN TO FOR INTERCESSION WITH THE AUTHORITIES, AND THE YOUNG, RADICAL, NEWLY-PROCLAIMED AYATOLLAH TAHERI, WHO IS THE CHAMPION OF DIRECT ACTION. TAHERI'S INFLUENCE APPEARS TO BE ON THE RISE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF HIS SUPPORT AMONG THE SECURITY FORCES--THE ARMY, THE AIR FORCE AND ARMY AVIATION 'MOMOFARS', AND HIS OWN ENFORCERS. HE HAS EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER HALF THE CITY (SOUTH OF THE RIVER); HE IS REPORTED RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE ARRESTS; HE HAS REFUSED TO ALLOW POLICE TO BE ARMED; AND HE APPEARS TO HAVE GOOD CONNECTIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERNOR-GENERAL, WHILE THE OLD GOVERNOR-GENERAL WAS AN ALLY OF AYATOLLAH KHADAMI. REPORTEDLY, TAHERI'S RECENT INFLUENCE STEMS LARGELY FROM AN ARMED MARCH TO GOM LEARNING SOME 2,000 TROOPS, WHERE HE OBTAINED THE ENDORSEMENT OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. BECAUSE HE IS SO YOUNG AND RADICAL, AND THEREFORE UNPREDICTABLE, HIS INCREASING INFLUENCE INCREASES THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE CITY.

5. FOREIGNERS ARE BEING LARGELY IGNORED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO RECENT INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST FOREIGNERS, AND BAZAARS ARE EAGER TO HAVE FOREIGNERS RETURN (OBVIOUSLY), BUT THEIR PRESENCE OR ABSENCE IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE. IN ISFAHAN, THE POLICE AND LABOR OFFICE SOME MONTHS AGO INFORMED ALL EMPLOYERS THAT ALL RESIDENCE AND WORK PERMITS FOR FOREIGNERS WOULD BE CANCELED AT THE END OF KHORDAD (JUNE 21) UNLESS SPECIAL EXEMPTIONS WERE OBTAINED INDIVIDUALLY FROM TEHRAN. WHILE MOST EMPLOYERS ACCEPT THIS, THE IRAN-AMERICA SOCIETY (IAS) HAS REQUESTED A NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS, AND WERE TOLD THAT, FOR TEACHERS, THEIR CHANCES ARE GOOD.

6. THE TWO MAJOR UNIVERSITIES (ISFAHAN AND SENATE SHARIF (HOLY SCIENCE, FORMERLY ARYA MEHR)) ARE OPEN, WITH SOME FACULTIES HARD AT WORK PREPARING FOR EXAMS, BUT MOST STUDENTS DEVOTING THEIR TIME TO POLITICAL DISCUSSION. SENATE SHARIF HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ALL FOREIGN TEACHERS WILL LEAVE AT THE END OF THIS TERM, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE INSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH, BUT HAS NOT DETERMINED HOW AND WHERE TO FIND FARSI TEXTS FOR ITS TECHNICAL CURRICULUM. MANY IN ISFAHAN EXPECT IT TO CLOSE. THE HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS ARE TAKING DOUBLE COURSE LOADS, ATTEMPTING TO MAKE UP TIME LOST IN THE REVOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCEPT IN SOME SCHOOLS WHERE TAHERI HAS PROMISED TO POST "OBSERVERS TO ENSURE THE EXAMS ARE FAIR." IN THOSE SCHOOLS, THE STUDENTS ARE BUSY PROVING THEIR REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS.

6. THE FOLLOWING ARE BIO NOTES ON INDIVIDUALS NOTED IN PREVIOUS REPORTING:

--EX-GOVERNOR GENERAL HAGH-DAN, WAS REMOVED IN EARLY MARCH, MET WITH AYATOLLAH KHADAMI, AND WAS PUBLICLY EXONERATED OF WRONG-DOING IN ISFAHAN. RETIRED QUIETLY TO TEHRAN, BUT REPORTED ARRESTED IN TEHRAN ON MAY 3.

--EX-GOVERNOR-GENERAL DR. MOHAMMAD ALI VAEZI, PERSONAL PHYSICIAN TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, APPOINTED TO REPLACE DR. HAGH-DAN, AN ELDERLY MAN, REPUTED ISLAMIC SCHOLAR, GOOD FRIEND OF AYATOLLAH KHADAMI, RESPECTED BY ISFAHANIS BUT IN POOR HEALTH. HE REQUESTED RETIREMENT FROM KHOMEINI, AND WAS REPLACED ON MAY 11 BY

--GOVERNOR-GENERAL MOHAMMAD KAZEM BOJNORDI, RELEASED FROM PRISON IN THE LAST MONTH BY THE ISLAMIC COURT AFTER THIRTEEN YEARS IN PRISON. HE WAS THE FOUNDER OF THE ISLAMIC NATIONS PARTY IN 1962, WHICH WAS BANNED AS A TERRORIST GROUP UNDER THE SHAH. BOJNORDI WAS ARRESTED IN '66, SENTENCED TO DEATH, AND THEN HAD HIS SENTENCE COMMUTED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT (ISFAHAN RUMOR STATES, AFTER HE PROVIDED THE NAMES OF HIS ASSOCIATES). HIS FATHER WAS A WELL-KNOWN AYATOLLAH, NOW DECEASED. ON ARRIVAL IN ISFAHAN, HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PEOPLE BY AYATOLLAH TAHERI. HE IS PRESUMED TO BE A RADICAL AND DISPOSED MORE TOWARD TAHERI THAN KHADAMI, SO IT IS EXPECTED THAT ARRESTS WILL CONTINUE AND INCREASE UNDER HIM.

--ENGINEER MIR MOHAMMAD SADEGHI, WHO PROVIDED SANCTUARY TO ME AND THE BHI FUGITIVE IN JANUARY, AND LATER TO MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL GHAFARI FOLLOWING AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, HAS REPORTEDLY LEFT THE COUNTRY. AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION, HE WAS AYATOLLAH KHADAMI'S PRINCIPAL AIDE, FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND THE LEADING NON-RELIGIOUS FIGURE IN ISFAHAN. HE WAS AN OPPONENT OF TAHERI, AND PUBLICLY OBJECTED TO HIS ASSUMING THE TITLE 'AYATOLLAH.' REPORTEDLY, HE ALSO GAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SANCTUARY FROM A MOB TO ONE OF THE TWO SAVAK DEPUTIES IN ISFAHAN (BOTH LATER KILLED BY THE MOB), AND TAHERI BEGAN ACCUSING HIM OF SAVAK CONNECTIONS. HE BECAME AN EMBARRASSMENT TO KHADAMI, AND RESIGNED HIS POSITIONS IN LATE MARCH, AND HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN REPORTED TO BE LEAVING IRAN FOR THE U.S. IN EARLY MAY. (HE TRIED TO CONTACT ME, AND WAS INCORRECTLY TOLD I WAS IN WASHINGTON, SO HE MAY CONTACT THE IRAN DESK.) HE IS A CIVIL ENGINEER, SPEAKS FAIR ENGLISH, AND IS (WAS) A DEDICATED REVOLUTIONARY, THOUGH A MODERATE. I DOUBT THAT HE WILL ACCEPT EASILY A PERMANENT DIVORCE FROM IRANIAN POLITICS.

--MR. PARVARISH, A LOW-LEVEL AIDE TO KHADAMI AT THE TIME OF MY RESCUE BY KHADAMI, BECAME HEAD OF THE EDUCATION COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND IS NOW A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE. HE WAS A HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER, AND WAS CENTRAL IN INFLUENCING THE STUDENT STRIKE AND MILITANCY.

--MR. MOSHARAF, ANOTHER TEACHER AND COMPANION OF PARVARISH IN KHADAMI'S TRAIN, BECAME SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO GOVERNOR-GENERAL VAEZI--HIS PRINCIPAL LIAISON TO KHADAMI. HIS FUTURE UNDER GOVERNOR-GENERAL BAJNORDI IS UNCERTAIN.

--DR. SERAJ-UL WAIZI (NO RELATION TO THE GOV-GEN), A MULLAH, TEACHER OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE ISFAHAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, A WELL-RESPECTED RELIGIOUS FIGURE WHO CHALLENGED TAHERI AND PREACHED AGAINST VIOLENCE, HAS BEEN ARRESTED, TRIED FOR "COLLABORATING WITH THE SHAH," SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS IN PRISON, AND DEFROCKED. RUMOR HAS IT THAT FOURTEEN OTHER MULLAHS HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE SIMILARLY TREATED.

--AMIR AMANNULLAH DAREHSHUIE, MAJLES DEPUTY FROM SEMIRON, SON AND HEIR OF THE CHIEF OF THE DAREHSHUIE BRANCH OF THE QASHQAIE TRIBE, IS MISSING AND BEING SOUGHT, ALONG WITH ALL OTHER FORMER MAJLES DEPUTIES, BUT NOT VERY HARD. HE IS IN SEMIRON (ISFAHAN PROVINCE), AND WAS PRESENT LAST WEEK WHEN HIS FATHER HOSTED A FEAST FOR KHOSRU QASHQAIE, WHO WITH HIS BROTHER HEADS THE ENTIRE TRIBE, AND RETURNED FROM EXILE AT THE PEAK OF THE REVOLUTION.

--JAMSHID IRANPOUR, A FRIEND OF THE CONSULATE, CONTRACTOR AND IMPORTER, WHO HAD A FINGER IN EVERY PIE WITH GOOD REVOLUTIONARY AND SAVAK CONTACTS, WAS BEING SOUGHT AS A CIA AGENT. HE REMAINED IN THE U.S. UNTIL HE OBTAINED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5

A LETTER FROM AYATOLLAH KHADAMI, AND HAS NOW RETURNED TO ISFAHAN, WHERE HE IS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

--ZINAT MILCHI, FORMER CONSULATE EMPLOYEE WHO LEFT TO WORK IN THE BHI SECURITY OFFICE, IS CURRENTLY BEING SOUGHT AS A CIA AGENT.

7. THE CONSULATE IN ISFAHAN, WITHOUT GUARDS SINCE I DEPARTED, HAS BEEN ENTERED A NUMBER OF TIMES BY REVOLUTIONARY POLICE. A NUMBER OF THINGS ARE DAMAGED OR MISSING, BUT NEITHER THE CONSULATE OR RESIDENCE HAVE BEEN RANSACKED. NAAS#

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POL
US-IRAN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Manfred Piechottka, Vice President,
J.A. Jones Construction Company
D. C. McGaffey, POL, Tehran *DC McGaffey*

DATE & PLACE: May 16, 1979, American Embassy, Tehran

SUBJECT: Situation in Isfahan; J. A. Jones Commercial
Prospects; Shipping Problems

Mr. Piechottka, who knew me from Isfahan, requested an appointment to obtain advice on prospects in Isfahan. I had little new to offer him, but suggested he contact me on my return from Isfahan. J. A. Jones was the principal contractor for the helicopter co-production plant in Isfahan.

He stated that he had visited Isfahan three times, most recently last week. Each time, he had been held at gun-point when visiting the plant site, and treated with extreme suspicion. He is attempting to obtain financial records to reach a final settlement with the PGOI, but states that all offices at the site were ransacked, making his search very difficult. The site is now guarded both by military and committee guards, with the committee having all authority. A Dr. Kohi (phon.) and an Eng. Nikoui are in charge of the plant site and the BHI housing compound in nearby Shahin Shahr. They are allowing him to remove all personal effects which had been packed and stored in the compound, but he states that everything left in homes or at the site has been taken. He also noted that J. A. Jones funds had been gathered into a single frozen account in Tehran, but were rapidly being depleted by Isfahan Court orders, on the instigation of the Isfahan Labor Office, in favor of individual workers' claims. Most of the claims are improper; according to Piechottka, and he has the documents to prove it, but he has never been notified of any court hearing.

Future Prospects:

J. A. Jones had three projects in Iran--the Isfahan plant, a meat processing plant in Garmsar, near Tehran, and the Foreign Trade Bank Building (FTB) in Tehran,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

near the Embassy. Jones has been requested to resume work on the FTB, but both company and its employees are reluctant to return in any numbers until situation clarifies. The managers of the meat processing project are also eager to see work resume, but are unable to get any money from the Government. On the Isfahan plant, confusion reigns. Piechottka was asked by Deputy Prime Minister Amir Entezam if his company could help find some alternate use for the plant. He submitted two proposals, one for light industrial use (but he saw this as unlikely) and one for another meat processing plant (which he saw as clearly feasible). After a long delay, Amir Entezam sent him to the Military Industrial Organization, where he submitted the proposals to the Director, Dr. Taherzadeh. Taherzadeh asked him to do further work, and bring them back. On his return, he found Dr. Taherzadeh (PGOI appointee) and an unknown mullah (supposedly a Khomeini appointee) fighting over which was supposed to be Director. Eventually he was informed that General Eftakhari had been appointed. He saw Eftakhari, who had no knowledge of any past discussions, and who asked him to submit more detailed proposals. He now hears that General Eftakhari is to be replaced. He states that Jones may not, now or ever, be willing to undertake this project, but he finds himself spending a great deal of time in the attitude of a supplicant on it.

Shipping Problems

Mr. Piechottka mentioned that, while he had gotten 95% of employees' household goods to Tehran, he was facing continuing difficulties in getting them shipped out. He stated that until April 15, he was paying 20 Rls. per kilo under the table to a Committee member at the airport, and his shipments were moving, but that it had now become difficult to find anyone to accept money. He states that the Iranian representative of another U.S. firm (which he declined to identify) had called his head office to request more money, citing this standard payoff to the Committee. The head office, who did not believe him, then called the Central Committee in Tehran, asking if this payoff was authorized. Immediately, the entire airport Committee was sacked, a number of charter cargo flights were cancelled, and the whole system snafzed. He assumed it would straighten out as soon as a new payoff channel was established.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Distribution: AMB/DCM
POL (3)
ECON
MAAG
CONS
RF
Dept. or State: NEA/IRN
INR/RNA

POL:DCMcGaffey/nam

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Spence
Excerpt from U.S. Department of State

Press Briefing - May 21, 1979

Washington, D.C.

In response to a question, the Spokesman stated:

Since the Iranian Revolution we have been seeking to develop a sound relationship with the new Government. We will continue those efforts to the extent that the new Government wishes.

There was much in our past relationship with Iran that makes it difficult to establish new ties. We realize this and believe we should put the past behind us.

The basic friendship between the American and Iranian people is strong.

We share many important interests and we support the Revolution's objectives of freedom, justice and democratic institutions for the Iranian people. It will not be easy to achieve those objectives.

The country is still unsettled. But we wish the new Government well in its efforts to improve the lives of its citizens.

Observations on Contemporary Iran Prepared for Ambassador Walter L. Cutler
and D.C.M. Allan Wendt

Marvin Zonis, University of Chicago
May 25, 1979

The following is a list of observations of the current political situation in Iran which stresses apparently continuous themes in Iranian political life. While the present turmoil in Iran can be aptly characterized as revolutionary, it is a revolution which grows out of the peculiarities of Iranian history, politics, culture and personality.

1. Ayatollah Khomeini and Shah Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi manifest much the same styles of political leadership. They can be characterized as banal, vapid, and authoritarian.

2. The Ayatollah insists on direct control of the same sectors of Iranian public life as did the Shah--security, mass media, foreign affairs, and oil revenues. The remainder of public life in Iran is left to the Government, e.g. economic development and planning, or to committees of clerics, e.g. new legislation.

3. During the entire period of intense revolutionary activities, say from the first riots in Qum on January 8, 1978, to the departure of the Shah on January 16, 1979, the Iranian revolutionaries used almost no violence to accomplish their ends. The last two hundred years of Iranian history manifest a similar pattern. Organized violence, widespread manifestations of violence, are shunned. Thus, for example, during the entire course of the 1905-1907 Constitutional Revolution almost no lives were lost. The Reza Khan coup of 1921 was similarly bloodless. The overthrow

of Mossadegh was accomplished with the use of force but with little violence.

The use of massive violence by the regime against the people first displayed in the June, 1963, riots and more harshly during 1978 were violations of this tradition. Several consequences follow:

a) There is added impetus to the desire for vengeance on the part of Khomeini and his followers against the old regime. There certainly has been a tradition of individual cruelty in Iran. That tradition is fortified by the rage over the use of violence by the regime.

b) The failure of the Revolution to achieve power through the use of violence has left the new regime without the physical means of confronting and defeating its internal opponents. No monopoly of physical force exists and the likelihood of its acquisition seems slight for the foreseeable future.

c) On the other hand, the lessons of history (as tenuous as they may be) suggest that civil war is a distant possibility. The Iranian people are most reluctant to take to arms and with all the ensuing bloody consequences.

4. By no means, however, should it be assumed that the rage so manifest during the Revolution has been spent. To the contrary the anger which served to unite the people against the regime and its supporters, including the United States, is still prevalent and can be expected to be expressed in a variety of forms in coming months.

5. One form which the anger manifests is xenophobia. Iranians have always had an ambivalent relationship to foreigners--ready to borrow and imitate while, nonetheless, insisting on maintaining the "purity" of Iranian culture. The last years of Iranian development have been especially

hard on that "purity" and a renewed sense of the fragility of Iranian cultural authenticity has been experienced. In many ways, the Revolution can be usefully understood not primarily as a religious phenomenon but as a strident assertion of Iranian cultural identity.

6. While the Revolution may not have, in essentials, been religious, it has been captured, clearly, by the religious institutions and clerics loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini. These groups are pushing the country in a direction which they have identified as fundamentally Islamic, in the process repealing much of the progressive legislation enacted in the last decade. In the process these new rulers have alienated or offended virtually the entire middle and upper classes--the westernized, secularized, educated strata of Iran.

7. Included in these groups are the major entrepreneurs of Iran. Their alienation and the current instability of the political order have contributed to the prolonged decimation of the Iranian economy with little likelihood for a resumption in economic activity from the private sector. Massive unemployment and growing economic hardships are widespread with consequent possibilities for additional political unrest.

8. On the other hand, the likelihood that the Government itself will be successful in renewing economic activities is most limited given the bureaucratic and political chaos. In addition, the traditionally cumbersome, wasteful, venal, and incompetent bureaucracies present no comfortable fallback position for the resumption of economic activities.

9. As a result, Iran will be more dependent than ever on oil revenues to maintain political stability. Pressure to increase the international price of petroleum will be intense. To the extent that the prices rise steadily, production need not be increased but should the rate of price

increase slacken, greater pressures to increase output will be experienced. The result will be to increase political difficulties with the oil workers and confront the regime all the more quickly with the need for foreign technicians to service the fields.

10. Difficulties in reconstituting the armed forces as an effective security force will thus become all the more challenging. All signs point to the need to add increased application of force to the charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini in order to control what is likely to be greater political chaos.

① Montazer
○ Taleghani
○ Shariat Madani (Gol. base seen,
ethnic)

RELIGION AND PROGRESS IN IRAN

Michael M.J. Fischer
Department of Anthropology
Harvard University

Briefing Paper, Department of State Colloquium on Iran:
May 25, 1979

- I. Introduction: Islamic Republic as Challenge to Modernization Theory.
- II. Iran, Model or Unique? -- Fundamentalism: Reaction and Redefinition.
- III. Revolutionary Process and the Roles of the Ulama.

I

INTRODUCTION: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AS CHALLENGE TO MODERNIZATION THEORY

Post Mortem on the 1960s and 1970s.

Iran has been a major test case for modernization theory throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It was the case where the constraint of capital was theoretically removed, and therefore the case where transformation from the third world into the first world was expected to be most feasible. Unlike most other oil producers, it had the population to absorb the oil revenues, to man an industrial economy, and to provide a domestic market. What went wrong can be divided into three general categories, of which this paper will focus on the third.

(1) Problems of Coordination. To produce a modern industrial society one needs to balance growth in agriculture and industry so that the industrial labor force provides a market for agriculture, and the rural population is sufficiently affluent to provide a market for industry. Secondly, for a modern technological society, one needs an educational system of both academic and vocational parts, which can supply managers, agronomists, skilled labor, as well as research development. Thirdly, the improvement of public sanitation and nutrition classically produces a population explosion, which requires both education and job development to absorb a young and volatile population. Iran did not score well on any of these problems, in part for reasons which have to do with the second and more basic set of problems.

To cite just a few rough indices: While population increased at 3.2% per year, and food consumption at something like 10% per year, agricultural productivity ran at about 2.5% or less in the mid-70s, and food had to be

imported at the rate of over \$1.5 billion per year. Imports in general ran at well over \$15 billion, while non-oil exports were only half a billion dollars worth. According to the 1966 census, high school graduates had a more severe unemployment rate than did the illiterates; and in 1976, some 300,000 persons competed for 30,000 places in the domestic universities.

(2) Problems of the nature of the state, exacerbated by oil revenues and military spending. A classic dilemma in directed social change is the balance between directing things from the top in order to speed change, and stimulating local level initiative so that change will be self-sustaining and deeply rooted. Not only did Iran err on the side of central control through the over-elaboration of bureaucracy and dictatorial controls, but the funneling of oil revenues to the government helped separate the government from its citizenry; that is, the government was made independent of the interests of its citizenry, and relatively immune to pressure through financial contributions from below. The oil industry generated relatively little direct employment or multiplier effect for domestic industrial development. The revenues were spent in a way which generated a widening of class inequalities, especially through the agricultural and industrial strategies of supporting large-scale investors and not small scale ones. The Khuzistan development project is a major example: four agro-businesses were given enormous tracts of land which they proved incapable of developing properly, while 38,000 peasant families were thrown off the land. (Capitalist relations were thus introduced, but hardly in an efficient manner.) The military build up of the state, and the subordination of domestic development to the role of regional protector of oil for the industrial world exacerbated the separation of the state from its citizenry.

In addition there were two kinds of tactical mistakes. The increased revenues from the 1973 oil price increases were mismanaged, causing high rates of inflation, so that high labor costs priced Iranian industrial production out of international competition, and so that agricultural production experienced price disincentives (food was imported and sold at subsidized prices, while prices to domestic producers were not sufficiently raised), and the recessionary policies of the Amuzegar government (1977), which were intended to damp the inflation, caused unemployment and hardship among especially the urban migrants drawn to the city during the previous construction boom. Secondly, an opportunity was missed during the summer of 1978 to transform the monarchy into a constitutional monarchy, thereby finessing the "bourgeois revolution".

(3) Ideological Response. Concurrent with these severe socio-economic strains, the expansion of a volatile young population, and the tightening of the dictatorship between 1972 and 1977 (symbolized by the abortive and much resented Rastakhiz Party introduced in 1975), was the reinvigoration of Islam as a powerful anti-dictatorial and anti-imperialist ideology. It is this aspect which will be given attention in this paper.

Islamic Republic in the 1980s: Iran as Model

Iran in the 1980s will continue to be a major test case, this time for the ferment in the Islamic world from the Atlantic to the Philippines, and from Indonesia to the Soviet Union. The terms of the test case will be what happens under conditions of demographic explosion and economic strain of peoples feeling themselves oppressed by outside European (or world economy forces), and using Islamic ideologies as a vehicle of righting injustice. Part of what is at issue is the reconstruction and construction of a "meaningful world", a world in which

people do not feel themselves devalued by an alien culture, in which they can feel a sense of continuity with their past as a basis for building a future, and in which they can feel proud of their identity. It is not merely Islam which is at issue, but various ethnic and linguistic identities as well.

The Soviet Union is a possible parallel case, with its Islamic and non-Slavic populations increasing more rapidly than the Russian population, with the army being increasingly non-Slavic, with the decay of Russification attempts (less people in Central Asia speak Russian less well), and with the taking hold of nationalist ideologies, all under continued economic stress. Other examples more completely in the Islamic world come to mind readily: e.g., Turkey and Pakistan.

II

IRAN, MODEL OR UNIQUE -- FUNDAMENTALISM: REACTION AND REDEFINITION.

The press has floated the idea that the winds of fundamentalist reaction are blowing across the entire Islamic world. There are elements of truth in this, but three things must be distinguished and explored: the degree to which the events in Iran affect other countries; the context of current events within the national history of Iran; the degree to which Islam is a flexible idiom or language, that is, the degree to which it is not a reflexive fundamentalism or nativistic hearkening to the past, but rather a culturally sensitive vehicle for progressive ideas.

Regional and Global Factors

(1) Simultaneity of Islamic Movements. The revolution in Iran comes at a time when there is turmoil in Turkey containing Islamic elements, there appears to be somewhat of a resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, General Zia in

Pakistan has introduced a new and more strict legal code, the Taraki regime in Afghanistan is being opposed by Qadariyya and other Islamic elements, and Kuwait has responded to the events in Iran and the wider Islamic call by attempting to set up Islamic banking facilities.

Furthermore, there is an interesting difference in ideological climate between the 1970s and the 1930s. It is no longer as feasible as it was in the 1930s to speak openly as an atheist or to speak of Islam as keeping the Islamic world backwards. This is not the era of such figures as Attaturk in Turkey, Taha Husain in Egypt, or Kaseravi in Iran. This shift in ideological climate has three roots: (a) sophistication: the recognition that it is not possible for men to live without meaningful connections to their traditions and past; (b) tactics: to mobilize the masses you need to use religion; (c) response to dictatorial forms: the suppression of open political discourse forces religious idiom to become an umbrella idiom for a variety of interest groups.

(2) Demonstration Effects vs Actual Contact and Influence. Simultaneity does not prove that currents in different countries are connected. There are, however, clear demonstration effects. Just as Attaturk provided a model for Reza Shah in Iran and Amanullahi in Afghanistan in the 1920s, so today Iran has the potential if it succeeds in establishing a humane and modern Islamic republic in reenergizing Islamic movements elsewhere, in a way which Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya have failed to do. The old ideological split between Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims is downplayed by segments of the Iranian revolution, especially the followers of the late Dr. Ali Shariati. Shariati studied in Paris and seems to have absorbed ideas from liberal Sunni Muslims, and certainly from the Algerian writer Fanon. Despite the contacts with Libya and the breaking of diplomatic relations with Egypt, the old Shiite-Sunni split seems to provide a strong

Pakistan has introduced a new and more strict legal code, the Taraki regime in Afghanistan is being opposed by Qadariyya and other Islamic elements, and Kuwait has responded to the events in Iran and the wider Islamic call by attempting to set up Islamic banking facilities.

Furthermore, there is an interesting difference in ideological climate between the 1970s and the 1930s. It is no longer as feasible as it was in the 1930s to speak openly as an atheist or to speak of Islam as keeping the Islamic world backwards. This is not the era of such figures as Attaturk in Turkey, Taha Husain in Egypt, or Kasravi in Iran. This shift in ideological climate has three roots: (a) sophistication: the recognition that it is not possible for men to live without meaningful connections to their traditions and past; (b) tactics: to mobilize the masses you need to use religion; (c) response to dictatorial forms: the suppression of open political discourse forces religious idiom to become an umbrella idiom for a variety of interest groups.

(2) Demonstration Effects vs Actual Contact and Influence. Simultaneity does not prove that currents in different countries are connected. There are, however, clear demonstration effects. Just as Attaturk provided a model for Reza Shah in Iran and Amanullahi in Afghanistan in the 1920s, so today Iran has the potential, if it succeeds in establishing a humane and modern Islamic republic in reenergizing Islamic movements elsewhere, in a way which Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya have failed to do. The old ideological split between Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims is downplayed by segments of the Iranian revolution, especially the followers of the late Dr. Ali Shariati. Shariati studied in Paris and seems to have absorbed ideas from liberal Sunni Muslims, and certainly from the Algerian writer Fanon. Despite the contacts with Libya and the breaking of diplomatic relations with Egypt, the old Shiite-Sunni split seems to provide a strong

a continuing contradiction within ostensive cooperation with Sunni Muslim groups. There is a similar contradiction in the tactical cooperation with the PLO: on the Iranian side there is traditionally little interest or sympathy for Arab causes or affairs; on the PLO side there is concern with the reactionary step of alliance with a religious force by a movement that aspires to be secular socialist.

More obvious places to look for direct effects are in Shiite populations living outside Iran: in southern Iraq, in eastern Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, in Bahrain, and in Lebanon. The renewed Syria-Iraq alliance and the exclusion of communists from the Baathist coalition in Iraq would seem to be a defensive move (both because Shiites are represented among Iraqi communists, and perhaps as a Syrian move to strengthen positioning vis-a-vis any PLO leverage from Iran). Since the Aramco employees are heavily Shiite, stirrings for more say in the Saudi system may well be a cause for concern in that country. Musa Sadr, the son of one of the supreme mojtaheds of Qum in the 1930s, went from southern Iraq to rally the poor Shiites of southern Lebanon during the civil war; his disappearance after a visit to Libya (presumably to account for funds supplied him) is a continuing source of friction between Iran and Libya. Despite complaints by the Afghan government, there appears to be no direct Iranian aid to Shiite rebels around Herat; however, there is interest and concern in Iran for their fate, expressed publically by Ayatullah Shariatmadari. In Kuwait there were apparently disturbances at the time of Khomeini's return to Iran; and Khomeini apparently received a delegation from Kuwait coldly, reminding them that they had refused him sanctuary when Iraq deported him.

Iran-Specific Factors.

(1) Shiism. Part of the traditional self-definition of Shiism has been through contrasts with Sunni Islam. This has partially been a nationalist process of Iranian identity, but it has rich and multifaceted symbolic implications. When Dr. Ali Shariati first returned from France and wished to play up Islam's progressive potentials, he tried to play down the Sunni-Shiite split and tried to argue that Islam had democratic traditions citing the election of the first four caliphs; he was immediately contradicted by the religious scholars, who insisted that election of the first four caliphs was illegitimate, and that Sunnis had caused the death of many Shiite martyrs. In the revolutionary process of 1977-79, after the victory over the Shah, ethnic divisions finally began to surface: Kurds, most vocally, followed by Arabs, Turkomen and Baluch began to demand not only linguistic and administrative semi-autonomy, but voiced strong concern about their position as Sunnis within a Shiite state. Quite interestingly, the largest ethnic minority, and the minority most vocal under the Pahlavia against the suppression of non-Persian languages in schools and as a literary medium--the Azaris--have remained relatively quiet: they are Shiite.

Shiism has differed somewhat institutionally from Sunni Islam. The Shiite clergy are proud of having remained the only body of *ulama* in the Islamic world independent of the state. Their seats of power tended not to be in the state capitals, and often were outside the state (in southern Iraq). They not only administered religious trusts, but collected religious tithes, giving them a financial base independent of the state. There was, however, a price for this independence, pointed out in 1962 by the recently assassinated Morteza Motaheri: there was often a conservative drag exerted upon their leadership by their constituency. Motaheri pointed to efforts in the 1930s by the religious leadership to send students to Europe to learn European languages so as to better defend

Islam; these efforts were blocked by delegations of merchants who threatened to cut off their financial contributions, should these students be so carelessly sent out into the corrupting world of the unbelievers.

This influence by interest groups on what the spokesmen for Islam say on various issues needs exploration (see Pt. III).

(2) The Unfinished Bourgeois Revolution. The events of 1977-79 cannot be understood unless seen as a continuation of the 1905 constitutional revolution, the 1952 nationalist movement, and the 1963 insurrection against the dictatorially imposed White Revolution. All of these previous attempts to replace authoritarian monarchy included an alliance between the secular liberals and religious leaders. In 1905 and 1952 the secular reformers provided the intellectual leadership; the reason in 1977-79 the clergy seized the leadership is traceable to the success of the Pahlavi monarchy in suppressing open political discourse. Islam became the language of underground politics, and served as an umbrella for many different interests.

One of the potential tragedies of 1978 is that instead of nudging the Shah into abdication or the declaration of a constitutional monarchy, thereby effecting a peaceful transfer of power to the professional and bourgeois classes seeking political participation, the revolutionary process may cause the flight of these classes, and force Iran into a more regimented, and party-organized regime, of perhaps an East European organizational form, if not communist in ideology.

It is the placing of Islam in the context of this long political and revolutionary process which is the most revealing of the sociological dynamics at work. While there may well be similar sociological processes at work in other Islamic countries, the Iranian revolution defines itself in terms of its peculiar national history.

III

REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AND THE ROLES OF THE ULAMA

Revolution as Process

In comparative terms, the Iranian revolution of 1977-79, fits the classic pattern outlined by Crane Brinton (Anatomy of Revolution) for the English, French, American, and Russian revolutions. In all these cases the economic and political causes were not those of absolute suffering (as the Confederation of Iranian Student literature throughout the 1960s proclaimed), but rather of societies which had enjoyed a period of prosperity and rising standards of living, followed by a depression, and in which governments in financial difficulties (the overcommitment of the oil revenues so that Iran became a capital borrower by 1975; and more importantly the inflation and imbalance between military spending and managing the domestic economy) attempted to extract revenue or contributions from leading sectors of the society who refused (the attempts at lowering bazaar prices, the exactions from entrepreneurs, the squeezing of the peasantry off the land). Secondly, equally important to the economic cramping, was an ideological stance of being morally outraged by the demands of the government, which mobilized the population and demoralized government forces. In Iran Shiism provided this moral force. In all these cases, the first phase of the revolution proceeded easily suprising even the revolutionaries (getting rid of the shah). There then followed a Terror, dual sovereignty (public government and a behind-the-scenes government), and a difficult period of economic recovery (Thermidor). The Iranian revolution is in its phase of terror and dual sovereignty.

In more Iran-specific terms, the causes and form of the 1977-79 revolution are analysed in the attached appendix. I will simply add here some additional notes.

Class-Linked Divisions within Islam.

Three styles of religious discourse are identified and discussed in the appendix:

- (a) village and working class communities: communal activity oriented, less intellectual. Use of rauzeh (preachment) as a means of articulation with the discourse of the clergy.
- (b) traditionally educated, urban middle class: merchants, old style landowners, and the ulama themselves. Use of religious discussion meetings (hey'at-e mazhabi) and in the case of the ulama an elaborate scholastic system of debate.
- (c) new middle and upper classes with modern secular education: more individualistic, internalized and privatized religion. Reformers such as the late Dr. Ali Shariati and Engineer Mehdi Bazargan provided the articulation with the discourse of the ulama.

It was pointed out that during the course of the revolution, the tools of the popular religion were effective mobilization devices, but that in the current phase of the revolution the articulation between the discourse of (b) and (c) is critical.

Indeed, it is possible that by focussing on this articulation and its difficulties, one can see an emerging shift in the relative political strength of the class constituencies of the clergy from the landowners of the 1950s and the bazaar bourgeoisie in the 1960s to the modern middle classes in the 1970s.

One can argue that at least until 1978, the ulama's claims that Islam had rules for all aspects of life was but an expressive, generalized stance providing few positive alternative programs to those of the government. The ulama saw themselves as guardians of social morality, as social critics, not as

planners. Nonetheless, on occasion the ulama took specific stands, for instance, against land reform in the early 1960s on the grounds that it would hurt small landowners (Ayatullah Milani), religious endowments (Ayatullah Behbehani), or the bazaar through competition with the proposed agricultural cooperative societies (Ayatullah Khomeini). In his study of the 1963 opposition to the White Revolution, Ahmad Ashraf (1971) divides the ulama into spokesmen for the landowners and spokesmen for the bazaar bourgeoisie. In the former group, he lists Borujerdi, Behbehani, Khonsari, Tonekabuni, and Amuli; in the latter group, Khomeini, Milani, and Shariatmadari. The second group, Ashraf argues, "never attacked the government on the issue of land reform" but only on the dictatorial methods of the shah; he cites in support the call in the clandestine tract of the Council of United Muslims: "The estates and wealth of the majority of the ruling class have been acquired through illegitimate means. Thus, after vigorous investigation their wealth should be confiscated and the shares of public factories should not be transferred to the landowners as compensation for land reform."

The complaints against dictatorship, the feelings against forced changes in male-female relationships, the slogans of right to private property and right to earn an honest living in trade transcended particular land- or bazaar-linked interests. The middle class' desire for political participation and a stable commercial environment not subject to capricious shifts in policy and bribery requirements found expression through these same complaints voiced by the ulama.

If today, Khomeini still seems to represent an older terminology and constellation of interests -- his position on women might be an index here -- other leaders such as Shariatmadari and Taleghani seem to speak out more clearly for interests of the bazaar bourgeoisie, the modern commercial classes, and the white collar professionals. The latter two have their own spokesmen, both secular

and religious: Mehdi Bazargan, the late Dr. Ali Shariati, a large group of younger men, as well as the secular National Front. It is in this ideological space that the revolution is being worked out.

The key figure perhaps is Shariati, for it is he who seems to have set the terms of the idea that Islam and modernity can go together. It is thanks to him, for instance, that Ayatullah Khomeini is accorded the title "Imam". This is perhaps an illustrative, if minor, example. According to the followers of Shariati, an Imam is a charismatic figure who arises out of the people and expresses the general will. For Shariati himself, this was in the 1960s and early 1970s merely a translation of the traditional theological term, Imam, into the Weberian sociological category "charismatic leader". For the revolutionaries of 1977-79, however, a problematic logic allows them to apply the title Imam to Khomeini: he arose out of the people and expresses their will. How far infallible knowledge, an attribute of the theological Imam, is to be accorded Khomeini remains to be seen. Khomeini, himself, while never denying the title Imam has his official portraits carefully captioned, "Nayeb-e Imam" (aide to the Imam, a title which was used in the 19th century as well). Not all Iranians are happy with this revolutionary translation: to many calling Khomeini "Imam" is close to blasphemy: he is not the twelfth Imam.

Khomeini's authority is thus in dispute, and the authority of other ulama currently manning the revolutionary committees is equally or more so: thus the oil workers or the Forghan guerilla group who explicitly tag the ulama with Shariati's denigrating tag "bearers of Safavid [i.e. corrupt] Islam". Until and even during the revolutionary year of 1978, secular middle class or free-thinking Muslims could ally themselves with Shariati by stressing his emphasis on thinking for oneself in contrast to the notion of taqlid. But the ulama also claim that every Muslim should think for-himself (and that if he does so he will

find himself in agreement with what the clergy say), and there are some clearly non liberal strands in Shariati as well:

Does man naturally turn towards justice? No. Man is first an animal and then a person . . . The verse I cited /We send our Prophets with signs and miracles, a book and scales of justice/ is followed by "and we created iron", that is, the sword. Justice without the sword is impossible. Justice and freedom must be forced on people. Islam eased this by basing itself 90% on belief and 10% on force" /1971/.

Indeed the Shariati of the 1960s and early 1970s was a study in attempting to talk to two constituencies at the same time and constantly falling between them. the traditional clergy and the youth with secular educations. Over time his formulations were adjusted more and more to be in accord with formulations of the ulama, while still pressing for making Islam compatible with the modern world. There was little pressure from the secular side, and so Shariati did not perform as much of a bridge with the non-traditional world as would have been desirable. This is perhaps one of the sources of vagueness of the present revolutionaries about their program: few of them ever truly grappled with policy formulation.

Shariatmadari is a second kind of key leader. Newspapers have identified him as a "moderate" relative to Khomeini. Sociologically more accurate perhaps would be a view of him as a pragmatist who accomodates himself to the needs of his constituencies. After all, since 1963, while Khomeini took the strategy of speaking out stridently and going into exile for his statements, Shariatmadari pursued the strategy of playing the good shepherd within the country. He thus has said that women who have never veiled in their lives should not be forced to start doing so no, that banks are necessary to Iran and that international banking interest rates are acceptable, that various interests should be allowed political participation and that there should not be a single party in support of Khomeini, that trials should be public and the accused should have rights to an open defence.

Taleghani is perhaps a figure of similar type as Shariatmadari, although neither of the same rank nor function. Taleghani has the reputation of being a liberal and of providing protection within the religious community for the left. The Shariatmadari style is presumably the style of most of the major provincial ayatullahs who were established in their communities and who maintained genuine support, e.g. the Mahallatis in Shiraz (father and son).

One would like to know more about the non-clergy actors who are trying to formulate policy options: e.g. Bani-Sadr, the director of the central bank, and a "radical" economist; the strategies available to Mehdi Bazargan; Matin-Daftari, whose faction of the National Front issued a twelve point program including calls for wealth redistribution and land reform.

There is a kind of contradiction perhaps in the programs of the National Front in that they can be impugned by competitors as the efforts of the upper class to maintain as much position as possible. In that ideological sense, people within the religious camp such as Bani-Sadr and Mehdi Bazargan have an edge as long as they can claim significant clerical backing. On the other hand, one wonders if the whole social development of Iran over the last sixty years has not seen a shift in the class basis of society towards one which is professional and middle class dominated, and therefore one that could well respond to National Front type leadership. Flight of the middle class from Iran, and the apparent (admirable) ability of at least parts of the industrial labor force (e.g. in the oil fields) to engage in union and cooperative style politics may well affect the kind of political structure which can be established.

All of these factions, it should be clear, can call on Islam. It is a rich language capable of many kinds of statements.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 pol 2
pol/sec report
TEHRAN 05447

03 RUQMA 05447 145 **
ZNY CCCCC 224
O 250827Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1657
RUEKJCS/CIA WASH DC NIACT IMMEDIATE
RUEBIA/CIA WASH DC NIACT IMMEDIATE
RUEBIA/SICA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
IAFO AQOMTI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0032
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0090
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0068
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0094
RUFRHO/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0097
RUEHRC/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0082
RUQMEH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 0067
RUQMOT/AMEMBASSY DORA IMMEDIATE 0069
RUHNET/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 0186
RUEKJCS/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0109
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0100
RUEBIA/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0121
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0055
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0082
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0143
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0069
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0104
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0087
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0119
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0061
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0071
RUQMGU/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0062
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0087
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0071
RUSNAAP/USCINCPAC VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUHQKQ/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUFRSH/USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 5/25/79
APPRV: CH3: CNAAS
DRFTD: POL: VLTONSETH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CHG RSO
RF CHERN

POL ROUTING	
VT	3
JS	
AS	✓
DM	2
JL	
VIS	
MM	
NG	
SEC	

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05447

L.O. 12785: GDC 5/25/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: FGRS, HINT, IR
SUBJECT: ANTI-US DEMONSTRATION MAY 25: SITREP AS 071130
LOCAL TIME

RFF: TEHRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE REPORT)

2. SUMMARY: AS OF 1130 LOCAL TIME LARGE CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS WAS ENCAMPED IN STREETS ON TWO SIDE OF EMBASSY COMPOUND. SPEECHES, WHILE CONDEMNING PRESIDENT, USC AND SENATOR JAVITS, HAVE NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY INFLAMMATORY. INDEED, SPEAKERS HAVE GENERALLY MADE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE OBJECT OF THEIR PROTEST (MAY 17 SENATE RESOLUTION) AND AMERICAN PEOPLE. MIXED SECURITY FORCES WHICH HAVE INCLUDED ISLAMICMOJAHEDIN IRREGULARS INSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPOUND AND NATIONAL POLICE ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE WALL HAVE SO FAR DONE A CREDITABLE JOB. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5447

1. DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN FORMING UP IN FRONT OF THE MASSY COMPOUND AT ABOUT 0900 MAY 25. MOJAHEDIN IRREGULARS INSIDE COMPOUND WERE IN PLACE, AS WAS A SMALL CONTINGENT OF NATIONAL POLICE OUTSIDE THE WALL. WITHIN 10 MINUTES THE CROWD HAD SWELLED TO ABOUT 3,000. A PODIUM WAS SET UP NEAR THE ROOSEVELT AVENUE GATE AND SPEECHES BEGAN. APPEALS WERE MADE TO DEMONSTRATORS BY SPEAKERS NOT TO BURN ANYTHING AND POLICE ENDEAVORED TO GET THEM TO SIT DOWN IN STREET WHILE THEY LISTENED TO SPEECHES. THE CROWD WAS STEADILY AUGMENTED UNTIL BY 1030 BOTH ROOSEVELT AVENUE (EAST PERIMETER) AND TACHTA JAMSHID AVENUE (SOUTH PERIMETER) WERE COMPLETELY FILLED FOR SEVERAL BLOCKS. EXACT ESTIMATE OF CROWD'S SIZE DIFFICULT FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT, BUT IT APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN YESTERDAY'S.

2. MOOD OF THE CROWD HAS NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY HOSTILE. INDEED, A CONCERTED EFFORT SEEMS TO BE BEING MADE TO AVOID AN INCIDENT. SPEAKERS HAVE URGED DEMONSTRATORS NOT TO DO ANYTHING PROVOCATIVE SINCE IRANIAN NATION HAS NOTHING AGAINST THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. CHANTS HAVE INCLUDED SUCH THINGS AS DEATH TO CARTER AND ISRAEL, VICTORY TO ISLAM AND PALESTINE, AND ISRAEL AND AMERICA ARE NOTHING. SEVERAL EFFIGIES OF CARTER AND BEGIN HAVE BEEN SPOTTED, AS WELL AS A PALESTINIAN FLAG AT ABOUT 1045 A MULLAH BEGAN TO READ FROM THE KORAN AND THE CROWD MAINTAINED A RESPECTFUL SILENCE. CHANTS HAVE SINCE RESUMED.

3. OUR SECURITY FORCES, WHILE FRATERNIZING WITH THE CROWD ON THE OUTSIDE, HAVE DONE A CREDITABLE JOB SO FAR. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE MOJAHEDIN IRREGULARS, MASHALLAH KAFANI, HAS WORKED HARD TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THE KIND OF INCIDENT WHICH TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY WHEREIN SEVERAL MOJAHEDIN (WHOM WE WERE FROM THE GROUP WHICH NORMALLY PROVIDES EMBASSY SECURITY) LOWERED OUR FLAG AND PRESENTED TO THE DEMONSTRATORS. SEVERAL SEEMED TEMPTED TO REPEAT THEIR PERFORMANCE, BUT MASHALLAH MOVED QUICKLY TO PREVENT ANY ATTEMPT TO BRING THE FLAG DOWN. OUR MARINES ALSO TOOK THE PRECAUTION TO PUT THE HAYARDS OUT OF REACH FROM THE GROUND AND TO GREASE THE POLE WITH PETROLEUM JELLY AND THIRTY WEIGHT OIL. NAAS

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5447

2

CONFIDENTIAL

\$ POL 2

TEHRAN 5448

pol/sec report

DE RUQMER #5448 1400 **

ZNY-CCCCC ZZN

O 250215Z MAY 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUHQ/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1600

RUEKJCS/NSA WASH DC NIACT IMMEDIATE

RUEAIIA/NSA WASH DC NIACT IMMEDIATE

RUEHIA/USNSA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO RUQBEB/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0083

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0001

RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0009

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0005

RUFROL/AMEMBASSY BONA IMMEDIATE 0000

RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0003

RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DEAHHRAN IMMEDIATE 0008

RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0070

RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 0187

RUSEBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0110

RUQHRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0101

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0122

RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0056

RUQMKV/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0003

RUEHFC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0144

RUQMAN/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0070

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0105

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0000

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0120

RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0062

RUEKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0072

RUQMYA/USIO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0003

RUFERO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0072

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIRINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

RUEHQQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

RUFPSHH/USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05448

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/25/00 (TOMSETH, VL) OR-P

TAGS: PORS, ASFC, PINT, IN

SUBJ: ANTI-U.S. DEMONSTRATION MAY 25: SITREP AS OF 1330 LOCAL TIME

1. 4C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN TO DISPERSE FOLLOWING FINAL HALF HOUR OF HARANGUING AND SLOGANEERING DURING WHICH TENSIONS AMONG PARTICIPANTS APPEARED TO INCREASE MARKEDLY. AS DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN SLOWLY TO DRIFT AWAY, AT LEAST ONE GROUP, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED BY OUR MOJAHEDIN SECURITY FORCE AS "COMMUNIST" AND WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN MADE UP OF MARXIST FEDAYIN-E-KHALQ AND THEIR SUPPORTERS, ATTEMPTED TO MARCH EAST ALONG TAKHTE JAMSHID AVENUE AGAINST THE FLOW OF THE DISPERSING DEMONSTRATORS. BEGINNING ABOUT 1230 THIS GROUP AND PERHAPS OTHERS STARTED SCUFFLING WITH ONE ANOTHER. AFTER SEVERAL MINUTES OF TOLLING AND PROING ALONG THE STREET AND CONSIDERABLE SHOUTING OUR MOJAHEDIN FORCE FIRED APPROXIMATELY SEVEN SHOTS IN THE AIR AND SOON THEREAFTER THE CROWD MELTED AWAY. FYI: WE HAD

POL ROUTING	
VT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
AS	<input type="checkbox"/>
DA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JL	<input type="checkbox"/>
VIS	<input type="checkbox"/>
MM	<input type="checkbox"/>
NG	<input type="checkbox"/>
SEC	<input type="checkbox"/>

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5440

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5448

HEARD EARLIER IN THE MORNING THAT A GROUP OF LEFTISTS AT THE TEHRAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS WAS BEING PREVENTED FROM MARCHING ON THE EMBASSY, BUT WE CANNOT CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF THIS REPORT. END FII. OUR UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATE OF THE CROWD SIZE IS WELL OVER 100,000. FINALLY, WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS THAT WE MAY HAVE YET ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION TOMORROW, THIS TIME BY THE AIR FORCE HOMOPHANS.

3. AREA AROUND EMBASSY IS NOW QUIET. NAAS

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5448

1. 000000Z JUL 84
 2. 000000Z JUL 84
 3. 000000Z JUL 84
 4. 000000Z JUL 84
 5. 000000Z JUL 84
 6. 000000Z JUL 84
 7. 000000Z JUL 84
 8. 000000Z JUL 84
 9. 000000Z JUL 84
 10. 000000Z JUL 84
 11. 000000Z JUL 84
 12. 000000Z JUL 84
 13. 000000Z JUL 84
 14. 000000Z JUL 84
 15. 000000Z JUL 84
 16. 000000Z JUL 84
 17. 000000Z JUL 84
 18. 000000Z JUL 84
 19. 000000Z JUL 84
 20. 000000Z JUL 84
 21. 000000Z JUL 84
 22. 000000Z JUL 84
 23. 000000Z JUL 84
 24. 000000Z JUL 84
 25. 000000Z JUL 84
 26. 000000Z JUL 84
 27. 000000Z JUL 84
 28. 000000Z JUL 84
 29. 000000Z JUL 84
 30. 000000Z JUL 84
 31. 000000Z JUL 84
 32. 000000Z JUL 84
 33. 000000Z JUL 84
 34. 000000Z JUL 84
 35. 000000Z JUL 84
 36. 000000Z JUL 84
 37. 000000Z JUL 84
 38. 000000Z JUL 84
 39. 000000Z JUL 84
 40. 000000Z JUL 84
 41. 000000Z JUL 84
 42. 000000Z JUL 84
 43. 000000Z JUL 84
 44. 000000Z JUL 84
 45. 000000Z JUL 84
 46. 000000Z JUL 84
 47. 000000Z JUL 84
 48. 000000Z JUL 84
 49. 000000Z JUL 84
 50. 000000Z JUL 84
 51. 000000Z JUL 84
 52. 000000Z JUL 84
 53. 000000Z JUL 84
 54. 000000Z JUL 84
 55. 000000Z JUL 84
 56. 000000Z JUL 84
 57. 000000Z JUL 84
 58. 000000Z JUL 84
 59. 000000Z JUL 84
 60. 000000Z JUL 84
 61. 000000Z JUL 84
 62. 000000Z JUL 84
 63. 000000Z JUL 84
 64. 000000Z JUL 84
 65. 000000Z JUL 84
 66. 000000Z JUL 84
 67. 000000Z JUL 84
 68. 000000Z JUL 84
 69. 000000Z JUL 84
 70. 000000Z JUL 84
 71. 000000Z JUL 84
 72. 000000Z JUL 84
 73. 000000Z JUL 84
 74. 000000Z JUL 84
 75. 000000Z JUL 84
 76. 000000Z JUL 84
 77. 000000Z JUL 84
 78. 000000Z JUL 84
 79. 000000Z JUL 84
 80. 000000Z JUL 84
 81. 000000Z JUL 84
 82. 000000Z JUL 84
 83. 000000Z JUL 84
 84. 000000Z JUL 84
 85. 000000Z JUL 84
 86. 000000Z JUL 84
 87. 000000Z JUL 84
 88. 000000Z JUL 84
 89. 000000Z JUL 84
 90. 000000Z JUL 84
 91. 000000Z JUL 84
 92. 000000Z JUL 84
 93. 000000Z JUL 84
 94. 000000Z JUL 84
 95. 000000Z JUL 84
 96. 000000Z JUL 84
 97. 000000Z JUL 84
 98. 000000Z JUL 84
 99. 000000Z JUL 84
 100. 000000Z JUL 84

CLASS: COMMUNIST
CITIZEN: NATURALIZED
APPROV: CANCELLED
TENTID: POLIVERT
CLEAR: NONE
DISCR: POL CHG
OF CRU

POL ROUTING	
VT	<i>[Signature]</i>
S	<i>[Signature]</i>
AS	
DL	<i>[Signature]</i>
JL	
VLS	
MM	
NG	
SEC	

1. C - 1 D R N T I A L T E R R A Y 0544Z
 1. C. 10000: GTS 5/28/85 (TOMSETT, V.L.) CR-P
 TAGS: POIS, ANAC, PINT, IR
 TAGS: ANTI-J.E. DEMONSTRATIONS MAY28 AND 29; SLEEP AS
 OF 1100 LOCAL TIME MAY 28
 1. C: TERRA 0544Z
 1. C - ENTIRE TAXI; REPORT MISSING.

5. DURING THE DISPERSAL OF LARGE GATHERING OUTSIDE EMBASSY
 BUILDING LATER AFTERNOON MAY BE (REPERED) SMALL GROUP OF DEMO I-Q
 PERSONS (APPROXIMATELY 1,000) GATHERED OUTSIDE EMBASSY
 BUILDING AT ABOUT 1700 LOCAL TIME AFTER HOURLY SLOGANS
 DURING THEIR RISES FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES THEY DISPERSED.
 THIS WAS A MIXTURE OF MEN, WOMEN AND YOUNG CHILDREN. SEVERAL
 CARRYING POSTERS OF BOMBING AIR CRASH.

2. MARXIST PEDIY-REXHALD, 708 1/2 W 14TH ST, NEW YORK, NY 10019, 15, DAY STRONG.

CONFIDENTIAL

REF ID: A608

WAS HELD HERE YESTERDAY AND ATTEMPTED TO MARCH ON EMBASSY
WITH OTHER DEMONSTRATORS. ALL BUT A FEW WERE PREVENTED FROM
REACHING THE COMPOUND BY ISRAELI FORCES, HOWEVER.

A DEMONSTRATION BY AIR FORCE SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY SCHEDULED
FOR 1400 THIS AFTERNOON FOR 1000 MARCH.

WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

REF ID: A608

CONFIDENTIAL

\$ page 2
pol/sec report
TEHRAN 5458

DE ~~SECRET~~ 05458 145 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201232Z MAY 76
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHSG/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1065
RUEHJCS/DIA WASH DC NIACT IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC NIACT IMMEDIATE
RUEHRIA/USICA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO RUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 2385
RUOMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0933
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0071
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0097
RUEPOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0130
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0085
RUQMDD/AMCONSUL DHARRAN IMMEDIATE 0070
RUQMDD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0072
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 0189
RUEHQB/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0112
RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY JIIDA IMMEDIATE 0103
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0124
RUOMEM/AMEMBASSY KBARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0058
RUOMEN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0085
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0146
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0072
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0107
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0090
RUEHNP/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0122
RUEHJP/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0064
RUEHET/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0074
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0065
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0090
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0074
RUEHAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEHSG/USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
BT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCE: STATE 5/2
APPROV: CHGICWNAAC
DRAFT: POL:VLTOMSET
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CHG RSO
RF CRRON

POL ROUTING	
VT	3
IS	10
AS	
D	0
J	
V.S	
MM	
NG	
SEC	

0 0 0 P I T E R T L A L TEHRAN 05458

2.0 1200G: GDS 1-10-76 TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, ASER, WNT, IR
SUBJECT: ANTI-U.S. DEMONSTRATION MAY 26: SITREP AS OF 1700
LOCAL TIME

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. CROWD ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY 1,000 STRONG, PROMINENT AMONG WHOM WERE AIR FORCE/ARMY/NAVY INCLUDING A NUMBER WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN PART OF EMBASSY SECURITY FORCE, GATHERED AT ROOSEVELT AVENUE GATE OF EMBASSY COMPOUND. GROUP WAS DISCIPLINED AND SAT QUIETLY LISTENING TO ANTI-AMERICAN, ANTI-SEMI, AND ANTI-ZIONIST SPEECHES. AT APPROXIMATELY 1030 CROWD BEGAN TO BREAK UP WHEN A SINGLE SHOT WAS HEARD. THIS APPARENTLY WAS AN ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE FROM A WEAPON OF A MEMBER OF OUR OWN SECURITY FORCE, BUT THINKING THAT IT MIGHT HAVE COME FROM OUTSIDE, SEVERAL OFFICERS AMONG OUR PROTECTORS FIRED OFF ABOUT A DOZEN SHOTS TO DISPERSE THE REMAINING DEMONSTRATORS. THEY ALSO TOOK SIX 'COMMUNISTS' INTO CUSTODY FOR QUESTIONING.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5458

PERIMETER AROUND COMPOUND NOW QUIET AND TRAFFIC IF FLOWING NORMALLY ALONG TAKHTE JAMSHID AND ROOSEVELT AVENUES. NAAS

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5458

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5492

DE RUQMR #5492/01 147 **
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 @ 271200Z MAY 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1076
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0088
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0093
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0100
 RUMJFG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0065
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0101
 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0087
 RUQMDE/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 0073
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0075
 RUFTFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 0190
 RUQBOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0115
 RUQMRK/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0105
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0120
 RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0059
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0088
 RUBTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0151
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0073
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0110
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0091
 RUFWFS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0126
 RUDEBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0075
 RUQMTA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0066
 RUFWRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0091
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0075
 RUSNAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
 RUEHQQA/GINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
 RUFRSH/USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION #1 OF TEHRAN 5492

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/27/89 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: DETERIORATION OF POLITICAL CLIMATE

REF: (A) TEHRAN 5420 (NOTAL), (B) TEHRAN 5442 (NOTAL),
 - (C) TEHRAN 5447

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: KHOMEINI ATTACKS OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, CALLS FOR CONSTITUTION SOON. CONSTITUTIONAL RATIFICATION MAY NOT INVOLVE ELECTION. GROUPS' REACTION TO KHOMEINI INITIATIVES HAS BEEN NEGATIVE OR MIXED. KHALKHALI TO HEAD ISLAMIC FEBAYEEN. END SUMMARY.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS HAS BEEN BUBBLING ALONG ON LOW BURNER FOR SOME TIME NOW (REFS A AND B), BUT PROCESS HAS QUICKENED RECENTLY WITH KHOMEINI CALL FOR A REFERENDUM ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION COUPLED WITH A CHALLENGE TO THE PGOT TO MOVE FASTER IN GETTING CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC. KICKOFF FOR PRESENT FOCUS ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WAS KHOMEINI SPEECH MAY 23 (THIS LONDON 241830Z NOTAL) ATTACKING VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER GROUPS IN IRANIAN SOCIETY FOR NOT SUPPORTING IDEA OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. HE STRUCK OUT AT LEFTISTS, NATIONAL FRONT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT, AND

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE 5/27/79
 APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
 DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:M
 CLEAR: POL:VLTONSETH

DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR
 ECON ICA RF

φ POC 2-2

POL ROUTING	
VT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JS	<input type="checkbox"/>
AS	<input type="checkbox"/>
DM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JE	<input type="checkbox"/>
VIS	<input type="checkbox"/>
MM	<input type="checkbox"/>
NG	<input type="checkbox"/>
SEC	<input type="checkbox"/>

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5492

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5492

RIGHTIST ISLAMIC GROUPS. ALL BUT LATTER WERE ACCUSED OF IGNORING ISLAM; RIGHTIST ISLAMIC GROUPS WERE CHASTIZED FOR THINKING THAT ISLAM COULD DO WITHOUT CLERGY.

4. MEDIA MAY 27 REPORT KHOMEINI CALL MAY 26 FOR REFERENDUM ON CONSTITUTION, IN MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WHICH ALSO SAID, "DURING A LIMITED PERIOD SPECIFIED BY YOU (BAZARGAN) REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL SOCIAL GROUPS AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO COMMENT ON THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE ITS FINAL APPROVAL BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNMENT." PART OF MESSAGE WHICH WAS NOT PUBLICIZED WAS THAT WHICH INDICATED REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT BE ELECTED, BUT CALLED TO JOIN. WE HAVE HEARD COMMENT FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT POINTS ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM, INCLUDING THOSE CLOSE TO KHOMEINI, THAT CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO MINIMIZE DISSENT AND CHALLENGE TO ISLAMIC IDEAS. THIS HAS MADE SECULARISTS PROFOUNDLY UNEASY.

5. REACTION TO EMERGENCE OF THIS INFORMATION, EXCEPT FROM KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS, HAS BEEN NEGATIVE. LEFTIST FEDAYEEN SEE IT AS EVIDENCE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS REALLY NOT DEMOCRATIC (KHOMEINI'S COMMENT IN MAY 23 SPEECH CASTIGATED "DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC" AS FREEDOM WITHOUT ISLAM). NATIONAL FRONTIERS AND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT SUPPORTERS SEE KHOMEINI ATTACKS ON THEM AS EVIDENCE OF CLERICAL FASCISM AND DICTATORSHIP. KHOMEINI'S CALLS FOR UNITY FALL ON HOLLOW EARS AS HIS TOLERANCE FOR DEVIATIONS FROM HIS VIEW OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SHRINKS. NUMBER OF OUR BETTER SOURCES HAVE EVEN STRONGER FEELINGS NOW THAN IN RECENT PAST THAT KHOMEINI IS GETTING SHRILL AND FEELING PRESSURE FROM HIS COLLEAGUES. EVEN THOSE AROUND HIM SENSE THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IS NOT GOING THE WAY ALL THOUGHT IT WOULD. THIS ATTITUDE EXHIBITS A GREAT DEAL OF NAIVETE, BUT ALSO MARKS SIGNIFICANT DISCONTENT WITH THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM WHICH MOTIVATES KHOMEINI, BUT NOT THE OVERWHELMING MASS OF ARTICULATE IRANIANS, INCLUDING MANY OF HIS OWN SUPPORTERS.

6. MEDIA MAY 27 ANNOUNCED ELECTION OF AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI AS HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC FEDAYEEN, AN UNDERGROUND EXTREMIST GROUP WITH ROOTS THAT GO BACK TO MOSSADEQ'S TIME. GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5492

C O M F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 05492

HAS NOW BECOME PUBLIC, HAS DEVELOPED A NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ITS NEW LEADER SAYS IT WILL CONCERN ITSELF WITH ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES. CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THIS GROUP FOR ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER RAZMARA YEARS AGO, PLUS ATTEMPTS ON SEVERAL OTHER INDIVIDUALS. PUBLIC CONTROVERSY OVER KHALKHALI HAS STILL NOT ABATED--ONE PAPER SAYS HE IS STILL A RELIGIOUS JUDGE, ONE SAYS HIS RESIGNATION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED--AND HIS HARD-LINE ISLAMIC VIEWS ARE NOT RPT NOT COMFORTING TO OTHER GROUPS WHO ASPIRE TO ROLES IN IRAN'S NEW POLITICAL PROCESS.

7. ATTACKS ON U.S. DURING RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS (REFS C AND D) PLUS LAYING OF BLAME FOR ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RAJSANJANI ON U.S. HAVE HEIGHTENED UNCERTAINTY AMONG MANY AS TO WHICH DIRECTION ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WILL TURN. NUMBER OF IRANIANS HAVE ASKED EMBOFFS WHY U.S. IS STILL HERE, GIVEN OUTRIGHT HOSTILITY OF KHOMEINI AND INABILITY OF PCOI TO HAVE ANY IMPACT ON SITUATION. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER RECENT KHOMEINI MOVES, WHICH HAVE HAD EFFECT OF NARROWING HIS BASE, WILL PROVOKE OR ENERGIZE MORE MODERATE FORCES TO WORK TOGETHER AND PLAY ACTIVIST ROLE OR NOT; MOVES HAVE TENDED TO DRIVE LEFT UNDERGROUND. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED OVER PAST FIVE DAYS WITH RESULTANT DETERIORATION IN POLITICAL SITUATION IN TERMS OF COOPERATION AMONG GROUPS ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND WILLINGNESS TO REMAIN NON-VIOLENT AND AVOID DIVISIVENESS. NAAS

BT
#5492

NNNN

C O M F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 05492

00 RUEKMP
 DE RUEKRA #4.17 1471103
 ZNY 000000 ZZZ
 O R 271101Z MAY 75
 FM AMEMBASSY JEDDA
 TO RUEHPC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6172
 INFO RUEHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 699
 RUEHBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 452
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2716
 BT
 CIO N F I D E N T I A L JEDDA 4848

*Pol
 Cfg
 Rf
 Chron*

E.O. 12465: SDS 5/27/75 (BOVIS, H. EUGENE) OR-P
 TAC: THUN, FINT. IR
 SUBJECT: (U) EXECUTIONS IN IRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION ON MAY 26, MFA DIRECTOR FOR
 ASIAN AFFAIRS ARAID SIRAJ TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR THAT HE
 THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF U.S. OFFICIALS, BOTH EXECU-
 TIVE AND LEGISLATIVE, KEPT QUIET ABOUT EXECUTIONS IN IRAN.
 HE SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE ACTIVE FORCES IN IRAN NOW:
 THE RELIGIOUS, THE RADICALS, AND THE MOB. THE RELIGIOUS
 AND THE RADICALS ARE STRUGGLING FOR CONTROL OF THE MOB.
 THE MORE THE MOB IS STIRRED UP, THE MORE OPPORTUNITY THE
 RADICALS HAVE FOR INFLUENCING IT AND GAINING CONTROL.
 STATEMENTS ABOUT EXECUTIONS, ESPECIALLY PUBLIC STATEMENTS,
 AROUSE THE MOB. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AVOID ANY ACTIVITY
 THAT AROUSED THE MOB AND TO LET THE RELIGIOUS FORCES AND
 THE GOVERNMENT PRODUCE STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY.

3. POLITICAL COUNSELOR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SAS REASONING.
 HOWEVER, SAC AND U.S. PUBLIC HAVE VERY STRONG FEELINGS
 ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PREVENT
 EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OF EXECUTIONS IN IRAN WITHOUT
 FAIR TRIALS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THOSE EXPRESSIONS COME FROM
 THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF OUR GOVERNMENT OR FROM THE
 PRESS. HE WOULD HOPE THAT FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS WHO SUP-
 PORT HUMAN RIGHTS, LIKE SAUDI ARABIA, WOULD ASSIST US
 IN GETTING IRAN TO OBSERVE INTERNATIONAL NORMS. AFTER
 ALL, THIS IS GIVING ISLAM A BAD NAME.

4. SIRAJ SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA DEPLORES THE EXECUTIONS
 IN IRAN. HOWEVER, IN THE INTEREST OF ALLOWING STABILITY
 TO BE ESTABLISHED, SAUDI ARABIA IS TAKING THE ATTITUDE
 THAT THE EXECUTIONS ARE AN IRANIAN INTERNAL MATTER AND
 IS TELLING GOVERNMENT OF IRAN THAT IT SUPPORTS EFFORTS TO
 ACHIEVE STABILITY. SIRAJ WENT ON TO SAY THAT AFTER
 STABILITY IS RESTORED, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO EXERT
 PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IN FAVOR
 OF TRIALS OF THOSE ACCUSED OF CRIMES.

POL ROUTING	
VT	<i>5</i>
JS	<i>M</i>
AS	
DM	<i>2</i>
JL	
VIS	
MM	
NG	
SEC	

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5555

DE RUQMRH #5555/01 1491205
 ZNY CCCCC ZZZ
 O 291156Z MAY 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1699
 INFO RUQMI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0090
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0097
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0102
 RUFPOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0103
 RUZREG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0089
 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0075
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0077
 RUFTFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0192
 RUSEBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0117
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0108
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0128
 RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0061
 RUQMKV/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0090
 RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0154
 RUQHAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0075
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0113
 RUSBAK/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0093
 RUFPNS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0129
 RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0007
 RUUKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0077
 RUQMTA/USLO RIYADH 0008
 RUPEHO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0093
 RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0077
 RUSNAA/USCINCPAC VAININGEN 02
 RUHQQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUFRSH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
 BT

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE
 APPRV: CEG: CWRAS
 DRTD: JDSTEMPL/BJH
 CLEAR: POL: VOTOMSETH
 ECON: REASH
 DISTR: CEG POLS OR,
 ECON RF CRU

POL ROUTING	
VT	5
JS	0091
AS	
DM	0
JL	
VIS	
MM	
NG	
SEC	

SDS: POL 5-
 where are
 filing stuff
 the constitution

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 05555

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/29/89 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
 TAGS: PGOV, PINT, IR
 SUBJ: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE TO THE PORE

REF: A. TEHRAN 5492, B. TEHRAN 4314

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: MOPATEH INDICATES THERE WILL BE NO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, THEN MUDDLES REPORT. CONFUSION OVER PROCESS CREATES FEARS AND ANXIETIES AMONG MANY GROUPS, PARTICULARLY SECULARISTS AND LEFTISTS. PROMINENT PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR MOGHADDAM MARAGHEI RESIGNS. RUMORS OF CLASH/COUP GROWING. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE APPEARS LIKELY TO PROVOKE WIDER CONFLICT IN IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESS COMMENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS SINCE REF A DRAFTED HAVE PAINTED EXTREMELY CONFUSED SCENE WITH RESPECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. ON MAY 28, REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBER DR. MOHAMMAD MOPATEH AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR HAJ SEYED JAVADI EACH TOLD PRESS THERE WOULD BE NO CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND POLITICAL GROUPS WOULD BE BANNED FROM RATIFICATION PROCESS. MOPATEH LATER DENIED HE HAD SAID THERE WOULD BE NO ASSEMBLY, AND SAID THERE WOULD BE A

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5555

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5555

LIMITED ONE OF FORTY MEMBERS, CONFIRMING REF A COMMENT THAT MEMBERS WOULD BE APPOINTED.

4. NUMBER OF POLITICIANS ASSERTED, SOME FOR PUBLICATION, THAT KHOMEINI HAD DROPPED PLANS FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO BE ELECTED FROM COUNTRY AT LARGE (AS VIRTUALLY ALL HAD THOUGHT WOULD BE CASE) BECAUSE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION WOULD NOT GAIN A MAJORITY, OSTENSIBLY "FOR ETHNIC REASONS, (I.E., BECAUSE MINORITIES WOULD OBJECT). POLITICAL GROUPS' SUSPICIONS OF KHOMEINI INTENTIONS HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED IN PAST FEW DAYS. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT'S MATIN-DAFTARI HAS CRITICIZED NARROWNESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADER ABDOL HUSSEIN BAGHAI TOLD PRESS CONFERENCE THAT PLACING POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE CLERGY WOULD "CAUSE ARGUMENT." IN ANOTHER SERIOUS DEFECTION FROM GOVERNMENT, RADICAL MOVEMENT LEADER RAHMATOLLAH MOGHADDAM MARAGHEI RESIGNED AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF EAST AZARBAIJAN, CHARGING THAT DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO FUNCTION. PARS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR HAS REPORTEDLY RESIGNED FOR SIMILAR REASONS AS WELL.

5. EVEN WITHIN KHOMEINI CAMP, OPINION IS SHARPLY DIVIDED ON PROPER ARRANGEMENTS TO PRODUCE A CONSTITUTION. MEMBER OF KHOMEINI COMMITTEE FOR MIAVARAN TOLD POLOFF AT DINNER WHICH INCLUDED TWO OTHER SENIOR FIGURES IN NORTHERN COMMITTEE STRUCTURE THAT MOST MODERNISTS IN MOVEMENT FEARED QOM GROUP WAS GETTING READY TO IMPOSE A TRUE SEVENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTION WHICH MIGHT NOT EVEN INCLUDE BASIC MODERN PARLIAMENTARY STRUCTURE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD POSE SEVERE INTERNAL STRESS FOR THE KHOMEINI COMMITTEEMEN, AS WELL AS MANY OTHERS WHO HAVE SUPPORTED KHOMEINI UNTIL NOW. EVEN PM BAZARGAN IN AN INTERVIEW CARRIED ON NIRT MAY 28, IN WHICH HE SET OUT HIS VIEWS ON THE FORM THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD TAKE SEEMED TO EXPRESS

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5555

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 05555

A SENSE OF FOREBODING THAT KHOMEINI IS TRYING TO RAM A DOCUMENT THROUGH THAT WILL NOT CONTAIN THE KINDS OF PROVISIONS BAZARGAN SEES AS ESSENTIAL BOTH FOR THE PROTECTION OF BASIC FREEDOMS AND WORKABILITY. MOST VOCIFEROUS IN OPPOSING SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE THE UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUALS, AND THE LEFTIST PARTIES, WITH THE SECULAR POLITICIANS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND THE SMALLER SOCIALIST-STYLE PARTIES NOT FAR BEHIND. WE SUSPECT PRO-MONARCHIST ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN STIMULATING TALK OF CONFLICT AND WOULD SHARPLY INCREASE THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS.

6. BY-PRODUCT OF THE ABOVE IS INCREASING TALK OF POSSIBLE SHAKE-UP IN PGOI OR, ALTERNATIVELY, A COUP FOR JUNE 5, SIXTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 1963 RELIGIOUS RIOTS BY MILITARY FORCE (EVENT WHICH LED TO KHOMEINI'S EXILE). SO FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THESE ARE JUST RUMORS, BUT THEY ARE SPREADING AS PEOPLE PERCEIVE A PATTERN OF CONFLICT DEVELOPING OVER QUESTION OF NEW CONSTITUTION. EVEN SPEECH BY NIOC HEAD (AND PRESIDENT OF BAR ASSOCIATION) HASSAN NAZIH CHALLENGING PRIME MINISTER'S CLAIM THAT IRAN IS POOR AND CALLING FOR RULE OF LAW IS SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF CONFLICT WITHIN PGOI AND HAS LED TO RUMOR THAT NAZIH MAY BE ON THE WAY OUT. (EMBOFFS HAVE HEARD SAME THING FROM NIOC SOURCES FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS.)

7. COMMENT: POT IS BEGINNING TO BOIL HERE. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTION ITSELF AND ON WAY IT WILL BE RATIFIED AND APPROVED IS LIKELY TO BRING TO THE SURFACE THE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION WHICH HAVE THUS FAR REMAINED LATENT (REF B). IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE U.S. WILL ESCAPE ATTENTION AS THIS PROCESS UNFOLDS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE HARD-LINE ISLAMIC CAMP APPEARS BENT ON MAKING THE U.S. AT LEAST A SMALL PART OF THE ARGUMENT THROUGH CHARGES OF INTERVENTION IN THE IRANIAN POLITICAL PROCESS.

HAIS

BT

#5555

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 05555

243: 4-7, 105, 12

ref: A Tehran 5458, B) Tehran 4069, C) Tehran 5492, D) Tehran 5611, E) Tehran 5420, G) Tehran 5519, H) Tehran (100 cia plot), I) Tehran

3. This and subsequent cable/ ~~shall not include~~ ^{on options, while drafted by an individual, also} ~~shall not include~~ ^{thoughts} ~~shall not include~~ ^{and wording provided by other embassies over a several} ~~shall not include~~ ^{days as well as substantial discussion within mission on subject presented.} ~~shall not include~~ ^{Where there are substantial deviations from positions taken, these should be} ~~shall not include~~ ^{separately.} ~~shall not include~~

→ The past three and a half months, USG has operated on basis of its stated intentions to work ^{to} toward a new beginning in U.S.-Iranian relations which would lead to a new ~~new~~ era in which our ties ~~relationships~~ would not be as extensive ^{as in the past} ~~as in the past~~, but hopefully would be as friendly and cooperative. Events of past ten days have called into serious question assumptions on both sides on which this view of ~~Iranian~~ ^{projected} the evolution of Iranian-American relations is based.

While PGOI recognized ~~importance~~ importance of good relations with us, Ayatollah Khomeini and his entourage do not. Khomeini's views are almost totally dominated by a rejection of all things foreign, and especially American. He would probably welcome a complete break in diplomatic relations with U.S. and almost said as much in his May 22 reaction to the May 17 ~~Senate~~ U.S. Senate resolution on activities of Iranian courts. Weakness of PGOI in dealing with Khomeini is amply demonstrated by its request that Ambassador Cutler not come to Iran and Foreign Minister Yazdi's May 31 remarks ~~in~~ to a Kuwaiti Newspaper (FBIS ~~document~~ Amman 312129Z May 1979) that PGOI would sever

ties with U.S. if it continued interfering in Iranian internal affairs. Ayatollah Taleghani, a Khomeini rival, echoed same thoughts June 2.

4. Khomeini's open hostility to U.S. and PGOI efforts have been accompanied by a sharp rise in Anti-American ^{Rhetoric} ~~sentiment~~, particularly in the wake of anti-U.S. demonstrations of May 24-26 (ref A and previous). Accusations of U.S. 'interference in Iranian affairs are becoming standard currency of both PGOI and the Khomeini movement. In addition to Foreign Ministry, ~~and~~

Ministry, the head of National Iranian Radio and Television, newspapers and the Iranian Lawyers' organization have criticized the U.S. and the CIA. Even Embassy's relatively unappreciated Mujahidin guards have expressed ~~increased~~ increased open hostility over past few days. It is perhaps difficult for those not subjected to it to accurately assess the cumulative impact of hostile media ~~to~~ and public speeches on perceptions ~~not only of~~ Iranians, but foreign diplomats and Americans as well. Example of this

is prominent lawyer Khalil Azer, who told Bar association conclave May 29, that verbal insult to U.S. is not enough, "we have to break off our relations with them. As long as the CIA exists, the world will not be a safe place." ~~Embassy~~ ^{Foreigners} ~~comment~~ ^{as well as private Americans} privately about ~~the lack~~ the lack of U.S. response in unflinching terms.

More disturbing and indicative of increase in Anti-Americanism in potentially dangerous ways from levels indicated several weeks ago (ref 1) is Revolutionary Court charge that Foreign terrorist group is creation of CIA. This and other allusions to "imperialism" frequently stop just short of suggesting action against official American presence in Iran.

5. ~~Some~~ Circumstances of U.S. mission have contributed to situation.

From Security point of view, Embassy has not been secure in normal sense of the word since approximately 20:30 a.m. ~~on~~ Feb. 14. Mujahidin guard arrangement is highly unusual and is noticed by Iranian visitors, U.S. citizens who come to Embassy, ~~as well as foreign diplomatic~~ and foreign diplomatic visitors. ^(Some in each category have been harassed.) From local viewpoint, it is now taken for granted that U.S. ~~will be vilified~~ ^{will be vilified} ~~should be incited and little response expected.~~

carefully and ~~without~~ ^{without} advantage to the U.S. Moreover, an Iranian government

which approached the ~~USG~~ ^{USG} under the mistaken illusion that it would

U.S. tolerate continuing abuse in Iran country than not
tolerate ~~the~~ ^{continuing} ~~insults and~~ ^{insults and} ~~abuse~~ ^{abuse}
and with less historical reason for such a
might well provoke a U.S. domestic pressure to act in ways we could not

~~because of unmanageable domestic political pressures.~~
we might not wish to take

For these reasons, we believe there is some urgency in giving signal to

Khomeini and PGOI as well as ~~other~~ moderate political groups that

present Iranian interpretation of rapprochement is unacceptable and that

~~reconciliation~~ satisfactory relations require a two-sided effort, not simply

limitless tolerance on one side. We ~~do~~ believe this can be done in such

a way to minimize backlash, strengthen our own position, and give some

encouragement to forces within Iranian domestic scene who better mirror

our own commitment to democratic values rather than ~~Iranian~~ ^{Iranian} extremism.

Subsequent telegram will discuss possible U.S. options.

6.0. 3-3 4/31/93 (Stimpel, J.D.) CR-P

TRACS: PGOV, PFOR, IN

Subject: The American Posture in Iran: IIR-Which way to move
Info: A) Tehran (1st cable), D) Tehran 5385

1. S- outline text; reporting cable
2. Summary: U.S. options range from continuing what we have been doing to suspension (not break) of diplomatic relations. While break may be forced upon us, there are ample reasons for not initiating it. Items we could adjust to reflect our understanding of shift in PGOV attitude to U.S. include consular operations, ~~non~~ military presence, commercial relations, ICA operations and our attitude to sending an Ambassador. Size of U.S. mission should be adjusted according to functions reduced, and implicit premise of maintaining full service ~~mission~~ mission should be abandoned until there are more positive signals from ~~the~~ PGOV or a successor.
end ~~summary~~ summary.

3. Ref A described the shifting circumstances which could lead to a

re-adjustment of the U.S. ~~foreign~~ policy toward Iran. Since the collapse of the Pahlavi Regime and the advent of the Islamic Republic, our posture has been that we would resume normal relations as the new PGCI wishes and at the speed it wished. In our conversations with senior PGCI officials, ~~we have~~ ^{we} ~~have~~ ^{have} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~informed~~ ^{informed} that is what the PGCI wished as well. Both sides had seen the arrival of Ambassador Cutler as the ~~new~~ ^{new} ~~symbolic~~ ^{symbolic} ~~beginning~~ ^{beginning} between the extensive cooperative relationship we had for many years with Iran and a new beginning which would lead to less ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~extensive~~ ^{extensive} but hopefully equally cooperative and friendly ties. Events of the past two weeks have demonstrated the Islamic leadership vis-a-vis Khomeini and his entourage, ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~entire~~ ^{entire} ~~group~~ ^{group} anti-American propaganda and other actions (ref 1), ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~we~~ ^{we} ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~leaving~~ ^{leaving} the PGCI's request that Ambassador Cutler not come to Iran ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~leave~~ ^{leave} us with decisions to make regarding our future posture.

4. Our choices now are for continuation of what we have ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~trying~~ ^{trying} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~do~~ ^{do} for the past three months--~~we~~ ^{we} ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~hoping~~ ^{hoping} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~a~~ ^a ~~resumption~~ ^{resumption} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~full~~ ^{full} ~~diplomatic~~ ^{diplomatic} ~~activities~~ ^{activities} ~~as~~ ^{as} ~~soon~~ ^{soon} ~~as~~ ^{as} ~~possible~~ ^{possible} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~absence~~ ^{absence} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~political~~ ^{political} ~~obstacles~~ ^{obstacles} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~complete~~ ^{complete} ~~resumption~~ ^{resumption} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~diplomatic~~ ^{diplomatic} ~~relations~~ ^{relations} until such time as conditions permit their resumption without the kind of obstacles and ~~inconveniences~~ ^{inconveniences} we have put up with since January 24. While it is possible that the choice might be taken out of us if Khomeini and the PGCI choose to break relations, we do not expect that a complete break in relations ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~likely~~ ^{likely} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~occur~~ ^{occur} ~~under~~ ^{under} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~present~~ ^{present} ~~circumstances~~ ^{circumstances} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~ ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~a~~ ^a ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~situation~~ ^{situation} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~Iran~~ ^{Iran} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anywhere~~ ^{anywhere} ~~else~~ ^{else} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~world~~ ^{world} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~anytime~~ ^{anytime} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~there~~

understanding that the APOI has expressed from its earlier desire to normalise relations ^{and to expand appropriately} it also provide healthy signals to domestic political groups that the normalisation of relations is a two-way street; and there are many things we can offer or withhold; we are not prepared to accept anything as the price of doing business in Iran. The latter view is unduly too prevalent for our own good at the present moment.

8. Most usefully, we can view the structure of the U.S. Mission in Iran as a political tool. We have continued to try and keep a small mission in being. We should ^{now} consider selectively cutting down on services and the people that provide them. In the extreme case it is possible to operate this mission and ~~still~~ fulfill all functions vital to us with the following: A charge d'affaires, one admin/consular officer, one pol/econ officer, one secretary, one TCU and one CMU, plus one officer and one enlisted specialist for political and

affairs. We would not favor ^(such an) abrupt ^{reduction} wholesale ~~cuts~~ in the absence of additional but that is the bench mark at which we should aim if conditions continue to deteriorate as he believes there is still some provision already ~~in place~~.

to justify a hard look at the following areas and some concomitant reductions:

a) Consular operations. Mission now provides ~~many~~ American services, notarial services, immigrant visas, student visas, and other limited NEW

services. We believe this could be cut back to American ~~services only~~ ^{with a reduction in open or two positions} WHY? What's the answer? ^{offer} It would be the most highly visible reminder to Iranians that we are doing ^{Because Iranian rhetoric is within}

the U.S. Visa office could still 68

in many cases not issuing visas to Americans without considerable delay. ^{There is no alternative} Difficulty ~~in~~ ^{of} selected visas ~~could~~ ^{could} be issued, but only on the approval of the Charge for demonstrated performance and assistance. For example, it might be communicated quietly to the PSOI that no rpt no in-country visas

will be issued until the matter of IOA employee Fereh Amini's incarceration.

is resolved. ^{Keyserling} Its issuance could be handled gradually; in fact, all the

steps we force would have to be arranged with debt to avoid

During a vibration, Comradialisation will reduce the catch bond of a sharp
the specific.

b) inclusion of military personnel. ~~_____~~

the support of the FBI's subversive...

desire to continue a military relationship. It is doubtful, however, that

at least in the near term, and probably as long as Khosravi exercises his influence.

and therefore that since the BOOT will automatically obtain the appropriate

to conclude any military agreement in the face of public opinion. ^{with the U.S.} Major

Substrat

REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE FACT THAT THE ABOVE IS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE SOURCE.

beginning now to reduce

the IMAC to its statutory six U.S.-funded positions would be a clear

signal that adjustments have to be made. If an eventual deal works out with

the military/COI, more could be ~~have~~ brought in; if conditions deteriorate,

the AA-10 could be combined under one officer and an enlisted specialist.

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methods used in the study.

3. The third part of the report is a discussion of the results of the study.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion.

5. The fifth part of the report is a list of references.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of appendices.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of figures and tables.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of footnotes.

9. The ninth part of the report is a list of acknowledgments.

10. The tenth part of the report is a list of the author's address and contact information.

11. The eleventh part of the report is a list of the author's other publications.

12. The twelfth part of the report is a list of the author's other works.

(some would say) some of the things that are being done to some extent
 This is a very good example of the effectiveness of limited response.
 and the fact that it is a very strong, steady effort

The fact is that the only way to get the most out of the system is to have a
 very strong, steady effort. This is a very good example of the effectiveness of limited response.
 (and the fact that it is a very strong, steady effort)
 The fact is that the only way to get the most out of the system is to have a
 very strong, steady effort. This is a very good example of the effectiveness of limited response.
 (and the fact that it is a very strong, steady effort)

The fact is that the only way to get the most out of the system is to have a
 very strong, steady effort. This is a very good example of the effectiveness of limited response.
 (and the fact that it is a very strong, steady effort)

If steps are taken to...
 They have...
 so and...
 interest...

John Graves
Thursday - 16th
3:00
Sensitive
CONFIDENTIAL

Policy Discussion

Present U.S. policy toward Iran is one of low profile, strict non-involvement, defending our interests in military supply and business contacts in a firm but low-key way, while taking a generally sympathetic stance toward efforts of the present cast of characters in the PGOI leadership to put their house in order.

* * * * *

Questions

1. What are the prospects for the PGOI successfully to carry out its constitutional timetable and plans?

Do we assume that Khomeini's influence will be sufficient and last long enough to put into place something reasonably akin to what we know of his present plans and constitution?

3. If he does, how durable will it be? Are we talking of six to twelve months or two to three years?

4. Is a large clerical role in Iranian politics here to stay awhile?

5. From where will the main challenge come? From another clerical force (Shariatmadari) or from secular forces?

6. Is that challenge generally non-violent and legal?

7. What are the viable alternatives to Khomeini? Is there any real threat? What of Bakhtiar?

8. What opportunities are there for the Tudeh and others on the far left?

9. Can we expect the military to play a very decisive role?

10. How much of a threat is the autonomy issue?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

11. Where is the economy headed? What impact will this have on the political evolution; e.g., will the current industrial/construction mess contribute to any particular direction in politics or the nature of PGOI leadership?

U.S. Policy Objectives

1. Assuming the prospect is for a general muddling through in the short term (i.e., at least the next six to twelve months), with no serious threat to the putting into place of something like Khomeini's constitution, what does that suggest for USG policy?
 - more supportive than we are now?
 - take some policy initiatives?
 - special emissary?
 - Congressional visit?
 - or should we hold to present low-profile posture, waiting to see how things develop and in effect waiting for PGOI to come to us?
2. If outlook is for something much less stable; e.g., increasing political party maneuvering and in-fighting and a gradual undermining and discrediting of the present leadership figures, what would that suggest for U.S. policy?
 - Should our profile be even lower?
 - Should we expand our range of contacts, possibly even begin to show some degree of preference?
 - Should we use the arms supply leverage?

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS
SECSTATE IMMEDIATE
INFO ABU DHABI
CARACAS
JIDDA
KUWAIT
LONDON
PARIS
TOKYO
VIENNA

GDS 6/3/85 (BASH, RICHARD M.) OR-E
ENRG, IR
(C) CALL ON PRIME MINISTER TO DISCUSS IRANIAN OIL POLICY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; ACTION CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND PRUDENT FOR ME TO RAISE WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN THE ISSUE OF IRAN'S POLICY ON CRUDE OIL EXPORT LEVELS AND PRICES AND TO EXPRESS USG CONCERNS OVER PRESENT TREND OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET; AND I REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT'S CONCURRENCE AND GUIDANCE.
END SUMMARY.

3. GIVEN THE EXTREME TIGHTNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET, WHERE CURRENT PRODUCTION IS APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO CURRENT CONSUMPTION LEAVING NOTHING LEFT OVER TO REPLENISH SERIOUSLY DEPLETED STOCKS, AND CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY THAT IRAN COULD WELL DECIDE TO LOWER PRODUCTION AND THUS EXPORTS, I BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUE OF IRAN'S POLICY ON PETROLEUM PRICING, PRODUCTION, AND EXPORTS SHOULD BE RAISED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE PGOI. THE PURPOSE OF THE APPROACH WOULD BE TO: 1) ELICIT AN ELABORATION OF THE PGOI'S POLICY, 2) IMPRESS UPON THE PM THE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES ON THE ECONOMIES

OF IMPORTING COUNTRIES, BOTH DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED, OF A CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT PRODUCTION SHORTFALL AND THE SPIRAL IN PRICES, 3) POINT OUT THAT A FURTHER REDUCTION OF IRANIAN EXPORT LEVELS WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND SEVERE IMPACT ON THE PRICE OF THE MARGINAL BARREL AND WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO A NEW RATCHETING ROUND OF OPEC-WIDE PRICE RISES, 4) POINT OUT THAT OIL PRODUCERS SUCH AS IRAN WOULD NOT BE IMMUNE FROM THE EFFECTS OF A SERIOUS AND POTENTIALLY LONG-LASTING RECESSION WHICH COULD BE TRIGGERED BY A SHORT-SIGHTED DESIRE BY PRODUCERS/EXPORTERS TO REAP MAXIMUM BENEFITS FROM AN EXERCISE OF THEIR DOMINANCE OVER THE MARKET, AND 5) SUGGEST THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH IRAN AND THE OIL IMPORTING WORLD FOR IRAN TO INCREASE, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, ITS CRUDE EXPORTS.

4. I MIGHT ALSO POINT OUT TO BAZARGAN THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE INVIGORATED RESOLVE OF THE MAJOR CONSUMERS/ IMPORTERS, MOST NOTABLY THE U.S., TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY ON CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES, ETC. IS DEPENDENT IN LARGE MEASURE ON THE EXISTENCE OF AN ORDERLY CRUDE MARKET. HOWEVER, ALMOST ALL OF THE IRANIAN EDUCATED ELITE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR SUCCESS TO DATE HAS BEEN LESS THAN OVERWHELMING, THAT A MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESS IS STILL NOT CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO TAKE FORCEFUL ACTION; AND BAZARGAN MAY RESPOND THAT THE CURRENT TIGHTNESS OF THE MARKET AND THE ATTENDANT PRICE INCREASES ARE THE UNITED STATES' AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLDS' BEST HOPE OF

BRINGING ABOUT THE NECESSARY AND LONG OVERDUE SHIFT IN THE BASIC BALANCE OF ENERGY SOURCES AND TOWARDS CONSERVATION.

5. I AM NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF IRAN LOWERING EXPORTS BECAUSE OF ANY INFORMATION OR EVEN HINTS I OR MY STAFF HAVE GOTTEN FROM IRANIAN CONTACTS BUT RATHER BECAUSE IT SEEMS A NOT UNLIKELY DEVELOPMENT. IF THE PGOI WERE TO INSTRUCT NIOC TO LOWER PRODUCTION FROM THE PRESENT LEVEL OF 3.9-4.0 MMBD TO, LET'S SAY, 3.5 MMBD (AND SUCH A DECISION WOULD ONLY BE MADE BY THE PM OR A "HIGHER AUTHORITY"), IT WOULD PROBABLY BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS THAT: 1) OIL IS UNDERPRICED RELATIVE TO ALTERNATES, RAVAGES OF INFLATION, ETC., ETC., 2) SINCE SAUDI ARABIA HAS AGREED TO RAISE PRODUCTION FROM 8.5 TO 9.0 MMBD AND SINCE THE MARKET WAS ALREADY IN APPROXIMATE BALANCE (DISREGARDING THE NEED TO REBUILD INVENTORIES IN ADVANCE OF THIS WINTER), A REDUCTION BY IRAN OF 0.5 MMBD WOULD NOT UPSET THE EQUILIBRIUM, AND 3) IRAN DOES NOT NEED AND CANNOT READILY ABSORB THE INCOME FROM OIL EXPORTS OF 3.4 MMBD (3.2 MMBD OF CRUDE AND 0.2 MMBD OF REFINED PRODUCTS) ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCTION OF 4.0 MMBD. IN REGARD TO THE LAST POINT, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IRAN'S PETROLEUM EXPORTS HAVE FALLEN BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD FROM PRE-REVOLUTION "NORMAL" LEVELS WHILE OFFICIAL CRUDE PRICES HAVE INCREASED BY 43.1 PERCENT SINCE DECEMBER 31, 1978; AND THE EFFECTIVE INCREASE IS

4

CONSIDERABLY GREATER SINCE THE DISCOUNTS PREVIOUSLY
AVAILABLE TO THE CONSORTIUM AND TO JOINT VENTURE SECOND
PARTIES HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED AND SINCE NIOC IS SELLING
MUCH MORE THAN "NORMAL" QUANTITIES ON THE SPOT MARKET
AT PRICES FAR IN EXCESS OF TERM (I.E., OFFICIAL) PRICES.

6. DESPITE MY CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY AND SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF A CONSCIOUS PGOI POLICY DECISION TO LOWER EXPORTS, THERE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A FAR GREATER LIKELIHOOD THAT PRODUCTION/EXPORTS WOULD BE REDUCED BECAUSE OF, IN THE SHORT-RUN, A WORSENING OF THE ETHNIC ARAB PROBLEM IN KHUZESTAN, A POLITICALLY INSPIRED STRIKE, ETC., OR, IN THE MEDIUM-TERM, BY ANY OF THE DANGERS FACING IRAN IN THE SHORT-TERM PLUS TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, THOSE SORTS OF PROBLEMS ARE NOT AMENABLE TO USG INITIATIVES OR SUGGESTIONS AND I SUGGEST THAT THE PROSPECT OF A VOLUNTARY, INTENTIONAL REDUCTION IS REAL ENOUGH THAT WE SHOULD ADDRESS IT HEAD-ON.

7. ALTHOUGH, AS NOTED EARLIER, I HAVE NO SOLID EVIDENCE ON WHICH TO BASE MY CONCERNS (OTHER THAN AN ATTEMPT TO ANTICIPATE THE PERSIAN MIND). I HAVE NOTED THE GRADUAL DECLINE IN PRODUCTION FROM 4.15 MMBD DURING ORDIBEHESHT (APRIL 21-MAY 21) TO 3.9 MMBD OR A BIT LOWER DURING THE 12 DAYS ENDING JUNE 3 (REF B). THE DECLINE MAY OR MAY NOT REFLECT A SHIFT IN POLICY BUT THE TREND IS CERTAINLY IN THE WRONG DIRECTION AND 250 MBD IS NOT AN INCONSEQUENTIAL AMOUNT.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5932

DE RUQMR #5932/01 158 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071325Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1885
INFO RUQMEI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 3121
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0128
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0130
RUQMDR/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0105
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0104
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0150
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0145
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0161
RUQMKY/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0125
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0189
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0099
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0141
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0044
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0158
BT

Scaron
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STATE 6/7/79
APPRV: CHARGE:GWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:MA.
CLEAR: POL:NGARRETT
DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR
EGON DAO ICA
MAAG RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05932/1

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/7/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, SCUL, IR
SUBJECT: WAITING FOR GODOT--IRANIAN STYLE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: THERE IS GROWING UNHAPPINESS IN IRAN WITH KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTION. MANY OF THE DISENCHANTED LOOK TO THE U.S. FOR A SIGN OF APPROVAL FOR THEIR PLOTTING AGAINST KHOMEINI WHICH, THEY MAINTAIN, WILL GALVANIZE THEM INTO ACTION. BUT THEY, AND ALMOST ALL OTHER POLITICAL GROUPINGS POTENTIALLY OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI, ARE SO MESMERIZED BY THE MYTH OF EXTERNAL MANIPULATION OF INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS, SO POLITICALLY BANKRUPT IN TERMS OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS WHICH MIGHT ATTRACT A MASS FOLLOWING, THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO LEAVE THE FIELD TO KHOMEINI BY DEFAULT. KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT SUCCEEDED PRECISELY BECAUSE HE WAS ABLE TO MOBILIZE AN INTERNAL IRANIAN RESOURCE--THE CONTINUING HOLD OF ISLAM ON MUCH OF THE POPULATION--AND BECAUSE KHOMEINI WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE WHEN OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. NONETHELESS, HIS COMMITMENT TO AN IDEALIZED AND UNWORKABLE POLITICAL MODEL, AS WELL AS THE LACK OF HIERARCHICAL DISCIPLINE WITHIN HIS MOVEMENT AND THE SHIA CLERGY, STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT HE WILL NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN CREATING THE KIND OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HE ENVISIONS. ONLY THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL FORCE WHICH, LIKE KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT, CAN ATTRACT A MASS FOLLOWING BUT WHICH ALSO HAS AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE UP TO THE DEMANDS OF ADMINISTERING A COUNTRY AS COMPLEX AS 20TH CENTURY IRAN CAN CHECK THE CURRENT SLOW BUT STEADY SLIDE TOWARD CHAOS. THERE IS, UNFORTUNATELY, NO CANDIDATE FOR THIS ROLE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. WE ARE FREQUENTLY APPROACHED THESE DAYS BY INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTING A VARIETY OF POLITICAL GROUPS, SPECIAL INTERESTS AND CABALS, ALL OF WHOM ASSURE US THAT THEY ARE

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5932

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5932

TOTALLY OPPOSED TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE EXCESSES OF HIS ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. THEY ALSO ASSURE US THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR IRAN TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND, FURTHER, THAT THEY AND THEIR FOLLOWERS ARE DETERMINED TO PREVENT KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC REACTIONARIES FROM DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AFTER THESE STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN MADE, THE CONVERSATIONS INEVITABLY MOVE ON TO THE REAL POINT. OCCASIONALLY, IT IS FOR MATERIAL OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OR FOR SPECIALIZED TRAINING, BUT MORE FREQUENTLY IT IS FOR NO MORE THAN A SIGNAL OF APPROVAL FOR THEIR PLOTTING. "WE ARE READY TO MOVE," THEY SAY, "AS SOON AS YOU GIVE US THE WORD."

4. PROTESTATIONS THAT IT IS U.S. POLICY NOT TO INTERFERE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THAT THE LEGACY OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND WATERGATE WOULD PROVOKE AN IMMEDIATE AND VIOLENT REACTION AGAINST AMERICAN ADVENTURISM IN IRAN EVEN IF OFFICIAL POLICY DID NOT ALREADY PRECLUDE IT, ARE GREETED WITH PROFOUND SCEPTICISM. EVERYONE KNOWS, THEY COUNTER, THAT THE U.S. IS BEHIND EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS IN IRAN. WITH THAT AS A GIVEN, THEY CANNOT UNDERSTAND OUR RELUCTANCE TO SUPPORT THEM, OUR REAL FRIENDS IN THIS COUNTRY.

5. THIS MIND-SET IS THE FUNDAMENTAL REASON WHY THESE CONSPIRATORS, AND EVEN THE LIBERAL MODERNISTS WHO ATTACHED THEMSELVES TO KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT BUT ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISILLUSIONED WITH HIS LEADERSHIP AND VISION OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, ARE NOT LIKELY TO DISPLACE HIM. AS ONE CLOSET ROYALIST RECENTLY LAMENTED, "MY FRIENDS AND I TALK AND TALK AND TALK, BUT WE CANNOT SEEM TO BREAK OUT OF THIS PATTERN AND TAKE ACTION." FOR YEARS MUCH OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM, WHETHER CONSERVATIVE BUT WESTERN-ORIENTED INTELLECTUALS, SOCIAL DEMOCRATS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT SORT OR THE TUDER COMMUNIST PARTY, HAS BEEN CONDITIONED TO APPROACH IRANIAN INTERNAL POLITICS IN TERMS OF STRATEGIES INVOLVING THE EXTERNAL FORCES (THE BRITISH, THE AMERICANS, THE RUSSIANS) PERCEIVED TO BE CAPABLE OF ACTUALLY MANIPULATING EVENTS IN IRAN. OVERWHELMINGLY PRE-
BT

#5932

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5932

OCCUPIED WITH EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THESE EXTERNAL FORCES TOWARD EFFECTING THE CHANGES IN IRAN THEY DESIRED, THESE POLITICAL GROUPINGS SHARED A SINGULAR INABILITY TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE.

6. IT REMAINED FOR KHOMEINI, WHO ADAMANTLY REJECTED THE NOTION OF BRINGING ABOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL CHANGE THROUGH AN EXTERNAL SURROGATE, TO SUCCEED IN BREAKING THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF THE SHAH WHERE ALL OTHERS HAD FAILED. THE KEY TO HIS SUCCESS WAS HIS RELIANCE ON AN INTERNAL IRANIAN RESOURCE, THE CONTINUING HOLD OF ISLAM ON MUCH OF THE POPULATION, AS THE BASIS OF HIS POLITICAL STRUGGLE WITH THE PAHLAVI REGIME. DURING THE LONG COURSE OF THAT STRUGGLE KHOMEINI SUFFERED SETBACKS, BUT AT ALL TIMES HE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AS OPPORTUNITIES MIGHT ARISE AND WITHOUT WAITING FOR A "SIGN" FROM AN EXTERNAL POWER.

7. IT WAS ISLAM, SPECIFICALLY THE SHIA CONCEPT OF THE CONFLICT OF GOOD AND EVIL, THAT GAVE KHOMEINI BOTH A STRUCTURAL CONTEXT IN WHICH TO CARRY OUT HIS OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME AND A SYMBOLIC IDIOM OF REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC IMMEDIATELY COMPREHENSIBLE TO THE MUSLIM FAITHFUL. THE SHAH WAS YAZID AND EACH CASUALTY OF THE BATTLES FOUGHT IN THE STREETS OF IRAN'S CITIES A HOSSEIN TO BE REPLACED BY TENS, HUNDREDS, EVEN THOUSANDS OF OTHERS READY TO SUFFER MARTYRDOM FOR THEIR CREED. THE NON- OR NOMINALLY RELIGIOUS COULD OFFER NO CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO EITHER THE PAHLAVI SYSTEM OR KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVIVAL.

8. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE MARXIST BUT FIERCELY NATIONALISTIC FEDAYIN-E-KHALQ AND THE TRUE FOLLOWERS OF ALI SHARIATI'S THEORY OF RADICAL ISLAMIC SOCIALISM, THERE IS STILL NO POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN IRAN THAT POSSESSES A CAPABILITY--ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL--TO CHALLENGE KHOMEINI AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. AS THE REVOLUTION PROCEEDED, MOST MEMBERS OF THE EDUCATED ELITE, THE TECHNOCRATS AND THE INTELLECTUALS, THE PEOPLE COMMONLY REGARDED AS THE VANGUARD OF POLITICAL AWARENESS AND SOPHISTICATION IN IRAN, EITHER DITHERED IN THE HOPE THAT THE OUTSIDE FORCES THEY KNEW WERE IN ACTUAL CONTROL OF EVENTS WOULD CALL A HALT TO POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION OR JOINED KHOMEINI IN THE CONCEPT THAT THEY COULD CAPTURE CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT BECAUSE ONLY THEY POSSESSED THE SKILLS NECESSARY TO RUN A MODERN NATION STATE. IN BOTH INSTANCES THE BEHAVIOR OF THESE PEOPLE WAS TELLING EVIDENCE OF THEIR POLITICAL BANKRUPTCY. THE DITHERERS, ETERNALLY EXPECTING THE INTERVENTION OF THE DEUS EX MACHINA THAT WILL RESTORE THE IRAN THEY WANT, ARE NOW PLOTTING. THEY ARE BEING JOINED BY THEIR DISILLUSIONED FELLOWS WHO DISCOVERED THAT IT WAS KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT WHICH MANIPULATED THEM RATHER THAN VICE VERSA. BUT ALL, IT SEEMS, REMAIN INCAPACITATED BY A FAILURE OF WILL AND LACK OF VIABLE ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS OF THEIR OWN.

9. NONETHELESS, KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TOO WILL ULTIMATELY FAIL, OR AT LEAST NOT SUCCEED. BUT THIS WILL OCCUR IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BECAUSE OF ITS OWN INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05932/2

DEFICIENCIES RATHER THAN BECAUSE OF CHALLENGES MOUNTED AGAINST IT BY ANY OR ALL OF THE GROUPS WHICH ALSO WERE UNHAPPY WITH THE PAHLAVI SYSTEM BUT PROVED TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE IN DOING ANYTHING ABOUT IT. FIRST, KHOMEINI'S VISION OF AN IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC BASED ON AN IDEALIZED MODEL 1300 YEARS OLD CONTRADICTS THE REALITIES OF 20 TH CENTURY IRAN. THE DUALISTIC SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY OF THE LEADER IN THE MIDST OF OTHERWISE TOTAL DECENTRALIZATION AND EGALITARIANISM IS MORE APPROPRIATE TO A BEDOUIN TRIBE THAN TO AN ETHNICALLY POLYGLOT NATION OF 35,000,000 IN WHICH THERE ARE VAST DISCREPANCIES OF EDUCATION, WEALTH AND CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION. THE LATTER, ALMOST BY DEFINITION, REQUIRES HIERARCHY TO PREVENT COLLAPSE INTO CHAOS. 10. AND THEREIN LIES THE SECOND MAJOR DEFICIENCY OF

BT

#5932

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05932/2

KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT. TRUE TO THE SPIRIT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HE WOULD HAVE, POWER OUTSIDE THE PERSON OF KHOMEINI HIMSELF HAS UNDERGONE A RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN, TO THE EXTENT THAT LOCAL COMMITTEES ARE LITERALLY THE LAW UNTO THEMSELVES. IT IS ONLY THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE INHERITED FROM THE PAHLAVI SYSTEM, ITSELF RAVAGED BY PURGES AND COMMITTEE POLITICS, THAT CONTINUES TO GIVE FRAGILE DEFINITION TO THE NATION OF IRAN. KHOMEINI HAS TOLERATED THIS STRUCTURE, EVEN MANIPULATED IT FOR HIS OWN ENDS BY APPOINTING A PRIME MINISTER TO HEAD IT, BUT IT IS ESSENTIALLY ALIEN TO WHAT HE WOULD CREATE. TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO EXIST IT WILL CONSTITUTE A COMPROMISE TO THE IDEAL OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC A LA KHOMEINI. BUT A TRULY THEOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A VIABLE PROPOSITION. INDEED, THE LACK OF A FORMALIZED HIERARCHY WITHIN THE SHIA CLERGY IS ALREADY PRODUCING STRAINS THAT WILL PROVE FAR MORE DEADLY TO KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT THAN WILL BAZARGAN'S PERIODIC THREATS TO RESIGN, THAN WILL SPEECHES BY HASSAN NAZIH AND OPEN LETTERS FROM HEDAYATOLLAH MATIN-DAFFARI, THAN WILL THE MACHINATIONS OF THE ESLAMINIAS, EQBALS AND SHARIFIS WHO KEEP COMING TO US FOR A "SIGN."

11. PERHAPS COLLAPSE INTO CHAOS AND DISINTEGRATION SHOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY RULED OUT AMONG THE PROGNOSSES FOR IRAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE. AFTER ALL, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT DURING THE PERIOD SINCE THE ARAB INVASIONS OF THE 7TH CENTURY IRAN WAS FRAGMENTED INTO SMALLER UNITS THAN WHAT HAS COME TO BE REGARDED AS THE IRANIAN NATION DURING THIS CENTURY. IT HARDLY SEEMS CONCEIVABLE, HOWEVER, THAT IRAN, WITH ITS STRATEGIC LOCATION AND MINERAL RESOURCES, WOULD BE ALLOWED THE PRIVILEGE OF DOING TODAY WHAT IT FREQUENTLY DID IN THE PAST. GIVEN THE PROSPECT OF ACTUAL DISINTEGRATION, THE TEMPTATION TO INTERVENE IN THE IRANIAN POLITICAL PROCESS WOULD ALMOST SURELY PROVE IRRESISTIBLE TO NATIONS WITH IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE AREA (THEREBY, INCIDENTALLY, CONFIRMING THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF AMONG IRANIANS THAT THEIR COUNTRY IS INDEED NOT FREE TO DETERMINE ITS OWN DESTINY).

12. ONLY THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW POLITICAL FORCE CAPABLE OF COMMANDING WIDESPREAD ALLEGIANCE (OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE) AMONG THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AND POSSESSING AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE UP TO THE DEMANDS OF ADMINISTERING A NATION AS COMPLEX AS IRAN WILL CHECK THE CURRENT SLOW BUT STEADY SLIDE TOWARD ANARCHY WHICH OTHERWISE MIGHT ULTIMATELY LEAD TO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. THE ARMY, WHICH ONCE MIGHT HAVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR SUCH A FORCE, HAS BEEN SHATTERED AND SHOWS NO SIGNS OF EARLY RECOVERY. AN ASSORTMENT OF MODERNIST GROUPINGS RANGING FROM THE NATIONAL FRONT TO THE TUDEH PARTY, ARE CRIPPLED BY DISSENTION WITHIN THEIR OWN RANKS AND LACK EITHER AN IDEOLOGY OR THE INDEPENDENCE (OR BOTH) NECESSARY TO ATTRACT A MASS FOLLOWING. THE FEDAYIN ARE AT LEAST AS NATIONALISTIC AS THEY ARE MARXIST, AND THUS HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO BECOME A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL FORCE, BUT FOR THE MOMENT ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH ORGANIZA-

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05932/3

TIONAL EFFORTS. AMONG THE FOLLOWERS OF SHARIATI, THE INTELLECTUAL WING OF THE MOJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ VAGILLATES BETWEEN ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CLERGY AND FLIRTATION WITH THE FEDAYIN, WHILE POORLY ORGANIZED ELEMENTS OF THE SAME ORGANIZATION HAILING FROM THE MUSLIN UNDERCLASS PROBABLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND HIM: PORGHAN, WHICH MAY UNDERSTAND HIM, HAS CHOSEN THE ULTIMATELY SELF-DEFEATING PATH OF POLITICAL TERRORISM.

13. THUS DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT DAYS--THE GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT OF IRANIAN SECULARISTS AND EVEN THE TENTATIVE DOUBTS OF SOME OF KHOMEINI'S FELLOW CLERGYMEN--HAVE DONE NO MORE THAN TO CLARIFY TO A CERTAIN DEGREE THE NATURE OF THE CONTINUING POLITICAL PROCESS IN THIS COUNTRY. THERE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE A DECISIVE SHOWDOWN BETWEEN KHOMEINI'S MULTITUDES AND THE MODERNISTS OR THE ROYALISTS OR THE MILITARISTS OR THE LEFTISTS OR ANY OTHER GROUP (INCLUDING THOSE AMONG THE CLERGY WHO QUESTION A CENTRAL

BT
#5932

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05932/3

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05032/4

POLITICAL ROLE FOR THEIR PROFESSION) IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT NONE OF THESE GROUPINGS NOW POSSESSES THE WHEREWITHAL TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE TO KHOMEINI. A PROBABLE RESULT OF THIS STANDOFF WILL BE MOUNTING TERRORISM, OFTEN DIRECTED AGAINST THE RADICAL ULEMA, IN THE FASHION OF FORGHAN'S ATTACKS ON SEVERAL OF KHOMEINI'S CLOSEST AIDES IN RECENT WEEKS. IF KHOMEINI HIMSELF WERE TO BECOME A CASUALTY OF SUCH ACTS, OR EVEN IF HE WERE TO DEPART THE SCENE THROUGH NATURAL CAUSES, IT IS NOT BEYOND THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY THAT HIS MOVEMENT WOULD BE CAPTURED BY MORE MODERATE RELIGIOUS FIGURES WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO FORGE AN ALLIANCE WITH THE MODERATE SECULARISTS WHO HAVE THE SKILLS NECESSARY TO ADMINISTER IRAN. SUCH A SCENARIO IS DEPENDENT ON MANY IFS, HOWEVER, AND THE ODDS ON IT COMING TO PASS SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE OVERESTIMATED. IN THE MEANTIME, KHOMEINI IS APT TO EXPERIENCE A CONTINUING EROSION OF HIS POWER AS MORE AND MORE OF THOSE WHO CANNOT ACCEPT HIS NARROW VISION OF ISLAM ARE DRIVEN FROM HIS RANKS AND AS THE LACK OF HIERARCHICAL DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TAKES A GROWING TOLL.

NAAS

BT

#5032

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05032/4

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6208

DE RUOMHR #6208/01 165 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141010Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2235
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06208

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 6/14/79
APPRV: CHARGE: CWNAA5
DRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL: VLTOMSETH
DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR
ECON ICA-2

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 6/14/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-F
TABS: PGOV, PINS, IR
SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN POLITICAL LABYRINTH AND THE U.S.

REF: (A) TEHRAN 4302, (B) TEHRAN 4314, (C) TEHRAN 5932,
(D) TEHRAN 5555, (E) TEHRAN 5993, (F) TEHRAN 6168

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: DISORGANIZATION REMAINS HALLMARK OF IRANIAN, POLITICAL SCENE FROM LEFT TO RIGHT. TENDENCIES TOWARD "ONLY FASCISM" BECOMING MORE MARKED IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. LEFT ARE BEING TEMPERED SOMEWHAT BY SPLITS. ANTI-AMERICANISM REMAINS AN INCREASING FEATURE OF POLITICAL SCENE, KEPT FLEETING BY QOM RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES THOUGH MITIGATED SOMEWHAT BY WEAK ATTEMPTS BY PGOI TO REDUCE ITS IMPACT. U.S. PUBLIC PROFILE SHOULD BE REDUCED AND OUR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES SHOULD REFLECT EXISTING FACTS AND CONDITIONS MORE THAN WORDS. MODESTLY CORRECT U.S. PROFILE IS BEST WAY TO GIVE MODERATE REVOLUTIONARIES BEST CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING ARE BRIEF END-OF-TOUR OBSERVATIONS BY POLOVY STEMPEL, WHO HAS SERVED HERE SINCE MIDSUMMER 1975. COMMENTS HERE ARE BASED ON ANALYSIS DEVELOPED AT LENGTH IN REFS A AND B, WHICH GENERALLY REMAINS VALID, EXCEPT WHERE MODIFIED BELOW. REFS C AND D ARE CURRENT UPDATES ON GENERAL CONDITIONS HERE WHICH FORM PART OF FACTUAL UNDERPINNING FOR REMARKS BELOW.

4. PROBABLY MOST DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF EVOLVING SYSTEM IS FAILURE OF ANY GROUP IN IRANIAN POLITICAL FIRMAMENT TO ORGANIZE BETTER THAN ITS RIVALS TO ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE. LEFT HAS AS YET FAILED TO COME TOGETHER TO PRESENT SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO PGOI, THOUGH ITS MILITARY TRAINING CONTINUES AT A DISTURBING RATE. RIGHTISTS REMAIN COLLECTION OF SMALL, INDIVIDUALISTIC GROUPS WHO POSE NUISANCE VALUE, BUT NO SERIOUS THREAT IN ABSENCE OF ABILITY TO SUSTAIN CONTINUED CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE. PGOI AND OTHERS REMAIN HEAVILY FEARFUL OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION, HOWEVER.

5. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS STILL WALLOWING IN PROBLEMS CREATED BY DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, WITH NO REAL END IN SIGHT. FRUSTRATIONS IN POLITICAL SPHERE ARE BEING REFLECTED IN INCREASED ANTI-FOREIGN, AND SPECIFICALLY ANTI-AMERICAN, OUTBURSTS BY RELIGIOUS WING OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN QOM. THESE ARE TEMPERED SOMEWHAT BY PRIVATE WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS OF INTENT BY PGOI WHICH FINDS ITSELF INCAPABLE OF STANDING UP TO KHOMEINI OR OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO EXPRESS STATEMENTS AT VARIANCE WITH PGOI POLICY. WHILE IT

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6208

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6229

IS TOO EARLY TO SAY DEFINITELY. IT APPEARS THAT DR. MUSTAFA CHAMRAN MAY PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN PEOI, AND THOSE WHO KNOW HIM SAY HE IS A VERY AUTHORITARIAN CHARACTER. THERE ONCE SEEMED A POSSIBILITY THAT PEOI MIGHT GRADUALLY PULL ITSELF TOGETHER AND PRESIDE OVER THE DISSANDING OF THE RELIGIOUS AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, BUT IT NOW SEEMS AT LEAST AS LIKELY THAT "POLY PASCIST" SUCH AS CHAMRAN, AND TO SOME EXTENT YAZDI, WILL PLAY EVER GREATER ROLE IN WHAT MAY BECOME AN INCREASINGLY AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. THIS IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH AUTHORITARIAN NATURE OF KHOMEINI'S RULE TO DATE.

6. REF B PROJECTED A SITUATION WHERE CHAOS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY RESTORATION OF ORDER BY "MAN ON HORSEBACK." AFTER SOME TIME THIS NOW SEEMS SLIGHTLY LESS LIKELY THAN POSSIBILITY THAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL TAKE MORE INITIATORIAL. MISFEUL THINKING IN ALL QUARTERS, INCLUDING MOVEMENT ITSELF, SHOULD NOT BLIND US TO PRINCIPLES OF POWER TODAY AND CONTINUING WITHIN PEOI AND BETWEEN PEOI AND NON-PARTY RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES.

7. THIS AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCY IS OVERSEEN BY SOME ONES BY SPLIT BETWEEN SHARIATADARI AND OTHERS. KHOMEINI. KHOMEINI IS STILL THE POSS. MOVEMENT DECISION BY SHARIATADARI TO CALL OFF ISLAMIC PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY DEMONSTRATION SET FOR FRIDAY, JUNE 15. IT SEEM TO BE ONE MORE CASE WHERE KHOMEINI WAS FIRST OF ANOTHER AVATOLLAN BOILING TO KHOMEINI PRESSURE. THEN IN SPECIFIC REVOLUTIONARY MATTER, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT SHARIATADARI OR ANY OTHER AVATOLLAN HAS EITHER THE STRENGTH OR COURAGE TO TACKLE KHOMEINI HEAD-ON, THOUGH SHARIATADARI SUPPORTERS BELIEVE THEY WILL BE READY FOR CHALLENGE IN A FEW WEEKS' TIME, AND SEE CANCELLATION OF DEMONSTRATION AS TACTICAL MOVE.

8. FOR NOW, SITUATION RUMBLES ALONG WITH PROBLEMS, BUT NO SERIOUS CHALLENGES. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MUST, HOWEVER, MOVE TO ESTABLISH CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, OR SLIDE INTO IMPOTENCE AND CONFLICT. AS IT DOES SO, IT RISKS PROVOKING OTHERS IN POLITICAL SCENE INTO OPPOSED OPPOSITION ALLIANCE AND POTENTIAL SHOWDOWN OR CHAOS. MITIGATING FACTOR HERE

BT

#6229

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6229

3

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5208/2

WILL BE IRANIAN PENCHANT FOR MANEUVER AT EXPENSE OF VIOLENCE AND POPULAR DESIRE TO BE ON WINNING SIDE. POLITICALLY, IRANIANS STILL PREFER FOREPLAY TO CLIMAX. OPPOSITION IS LIKELY TO TRY AND AVOID OPEN CLASH UNTIL KHOMEINI'S VIEWS HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO MAKE THEMSELVES EVEN MORE UNPOPULAR WITH THOSE WHO MIGHT BE INDUCED TO OPPOSE HIM. WHILE KHOMEINI'S LOSS OF POPULARITY/PRESTIGE TO DATE HAS NOT YET SERIOUSLY UNDERCUT HIS DOMINANT POLITICAL POSITION, MANY WHO USED TO SUPPORT HIM NOW OPPOSE HIM, AND THIS DETERIORATION IS CONTINUING. WE IGNORE IT AT OUR PERIL.

9. TRIGGERING FACTOR FOR POLITICAL CHAOS IS LIKELY TO BE ECONOMIC SITUATION. CURRENT SURFACE PICTURE IS STILL PASSABLE, BUT UNDERLYING ECONOMIC FACTORS IN IRAN ARE A DISASTER--PRODUCTION IS OFF, THE BANKING SYSTEM IS IN DISARRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN AND IS CONTINUING TO BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM, AND THE MANAGERIAL SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY IS IN DEEP DISARRAY. BUSINESS EXPECTATIONS CONTINUE TO BE NEGATIVE. WHILE THE PERSIAN POPULACE CAN STAND A LOT OF HARDSHIP, IT WILL NOT DO SO WILLINGLY, AND ESPECIALLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF EXACERBATING POLITICAL CHALLENGES FROM THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT. UNLESS CONDITIONS TURN BETTER PRIOR TO MOSLEM FASTING HOLY MONTH OF RAMIZAN (JULY 26 - AUGUST 23), SITUATION IN THE STREETS COULD TURN VERY UGLY. AN INCIDENT, SUCH AS AN ASSASSINATION, COULD SET IT OFF AT ANY TIME.

10. ESCALATING ANTI-AMERICANISM REMAINS IMPORTANT FACT OF LIFE HERE FOR NUMBER OF REASONS. RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP STILL SEES U.S. AS ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY, AND PERSIAN PENCHANT FOR SEEING FOREIGN HAND BEHIND ALL TROUBLES MEANS THERE IS VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO TO CHANGE THIS. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR FORE-BEARING ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION HAS, THROUGH UNFORTUNATE HISTORICAL INTERPLAY, COME TO BE SEEN AS THUNDERING WEAKNESS AND FORM OF OBEISANCE TO RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM OF KHOMEINI. WEAKNESS OF PGOI FOR PURPOSE OF MODERATING KHOMEINI, DESPITE ITS PROTESTATIONS OF WANTING NORMAL TIES, CAN BE SEEN IN CUTLER BROUHAHA. ACCUSATIONS OF U.S. "INTERFERENCE" IN IRAN ARE BECOMING STANDARD CURRENCY OF BOTH PGOI AND KHOMEINI MOVEMENT. NOT EVEN PGOI MINISTERS ARGUE THAT THERE IS ANYTHING SHORT OF UNREMITTING HOSTILITY OUT OF QOM (REF E AND F). WE HAD BETTER BUILD RESPECT IF WE CANNOT BUILD MEANINGFUL COOPERATION. AT THE MOMENT WE HAVE NEITHER.

11. BEST CHANCE FOR ANY OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO US LIES IN RESTORING MINIMUM AMOUNT OF RECIPROCITY AND RESPECT IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. FROM PERSPECTIVE OF ABOVE, THIS SUGGESTS THAT FOR THE NEAR TERM FUTURE--AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR MONTHS--WE REDUCE OUR PRESENCE HERE TO REFLECT A MODEST, BUT CORRECT POSTURE TOWARD PGOI. ABOUT THE ONLY CHANCE THE MODERATES HAVE IS TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI AND OTHERS THAT U.S. TIES ARE WORTHWHILE AND NECESSARY TO OBTAIN NECESSARY FOODSTUFFS AND MILITARY SUPPLIES AND THEN TO BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT U.S. IS WILLING TO DO THIS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF FAIR DIPLOMATIC TREATMENT. RELEASE OF REZA AMINI SHOULD BECOME AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6229/2

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6288/2

WHETHER PGOI EITHER WANTS TO, OR HAS ABILITY TO, DELIVER ON ISSUE IMPORTANT TO US. PGOI'S ABILITY, OR WILLINGNESS, TO MAKE PMS PAYMENT COULD BE ANOTHER TOUCHSTONE. REPLACEMENT OF MUJAHIDIN GUARDS BY MORE REGULARIZED FORCE SHOULD BE PRIORITY ITEM FOR NEW CHARGE. THE DANGER WOULD BE VERY MINIMAL AND THE GAIN IN FACE (EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO PERSIANS) WOULD BE IMMENSE.

12. MISSION SERVICES SHOULD BE REDUCED. UNTIL AMINI IS RELEASED, THERE SHOULD BE GRADUAL REDUCTION IN CONSULAR SERVICES AND NO RPT NO ISSUANCE OF VISAS OF ANY KIND IN TEHRAN, EXCEPT PERHAPS DIPLOMATIC VISAS FOR SPECIFIC MISSIONS. IMPLICIT PREMISE OF MAINTAINING A FULL SERVICE MISSION SHOULD BE ABANDONED AND CHARGE GIVEN SIGNIFICANT LATITUDE TO REGULATE JUST HOW MUCH EMBASSY WILL DO IN RESPONSE TO SIGNALS FROM PGOI OR A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT. IDEA OF SPECIAL EMISSARY TO KHOMEINI IN FACE OF HIS UNREMITTING INTRANSIGENCE MAKES NO SENSE AND INDEED WOULD PROBABLY EXACERBATE SITUATION. BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL HE IS MORE AMENABLE TO LISTENING, RATHER THAN RECEIVE PROCTORING SUCH AS USSR AMBASSADOR GETS.

13. IN TIME, IF ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC CAN BE REDUCED AND SOME FORM OF STABLE ADMINISTRATION EVOLVES, WE COULD BEGIN TO DO MORE. IN MEANTIME, LOW PROFILE ALSO WOULD LESSEN EFFECTIVENESS OF CHARGES U.S. MAY BE TRYING TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT STRUCTURE FOR COUNTERREVOLUTION. WE NEED NOT EXHIBIT HOSTILITY TOWARD ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND WE SHOULD SHOW SOME SYMPATHY FOR POSITIVE THINGS PGOI IS TRYING TO DO. BEFORE WE CAN BE EFFECTIVE, HOWEVER, WE MUST SIGNAL KHOMEINI AND PGOI AS WELL AS OTHER MODERATE POLITICAL GROUP THAT PRESENT IRANIAN INTERPRETATION OF RAPPROCHEMENT IS

#1288

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6288/2

3

THIS...
GIVE...
SCENE WHICH...
VALUES RATHER THAN AUTHORITARIAN EXTREMISM. NAAS
BT
#6208

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6208/5

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6234

DE RUQMBN #6234/01 165 **
NY SSSSS ZZH
I 141232Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
PO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2043
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0133
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0139
RUHHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0135
RUQMDR/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0110
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0113
RUSBDQ/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0165
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0157
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0172
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0137
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0203
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0110
RUHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0149
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0049
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0169
BT

S E C R E T TEHRAN 06234

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/14/89 (MC GAFFEY, D.C.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PEPR, IR, US
SUBJECT: A FAREWELL TO ALARMS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE FOR A NEAR TERM IMPROVEMENT IN THE IRANIAN SITUATION. MOST LIKELY PROSPECT IS CONTINUED LACK OF GOVERNMENT WITH INCREASING VIOLENCE, FOLLOWED BY THEOCRATIC AUTOCRACY OVER A DIMINISHED IRAN OR A LEFTIST TAKE-OVER WITH RESISTANCE. ALL THREE INDICATE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. VIOLENCE WILL BE INCREASINGLY ALONG CLASS LINES. U.S. HAS CHOICE OF RETREAT OR INTERVENTION. THIS CABLE REPRESENTS A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT BY FORMER ISFAHAN PO MCGAFFEY AT END OF THREE YEARS IN IRAN, MOSTLY IN THE PROVINCES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE OVERRIDING CHARACTERISTIC OF IRANIANS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS SUBLIME SELF-INTEREST, ACCOMPANIED BY A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY. THE DISASTROUSLY SKEWED DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN IN THE LAST TEN YEARS WAS CAUSED TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT BY POOR CENTRAL PLANNING AND VENALITY AT THE TOP, BUT WAS PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE CHOICES BY THE MASSES OF IRANIANS FOR PERSONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT OVER NATIONAL INTEREST. CONVERSATIONS WITH INDUSTRIALISTS, LANDOWNERS, MERCHANTS, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, WORKERS, AND PROFESSIONS OVER THE YEARS ELICITED THE COMMON ADMISION THAT THEY KNEW THEIR ACTIONS SPELLED FUTURE TROUBLE FOR IRAN, "BUT, AS LONG AS EVERYONE ELSE IS DOING IT,..." THIS CHARACTERISTIC CARRIED OVER INTO POLITICAL ACTION AND THE REVOLUTION. CYNICAL SUPPORT FOR CONTRADICTORY POLICIES (E.G., CONSTITUTIONALISTS SUPPORTING ANTI-CONSTITUTION KHOMEINI), IRRELIGIOUS WAVING OF THE BANNER OF RELIGION, ETC., WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE STATEMENT. "WHEN I, THROUGH THIS PROCESS, OBTAIN POWER, I WILL CORRECT THESE INCONSISTENCIES." MOST IRANIANS KEPT THEIR EYE ON

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6234

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6234

THE MAIN CHANCE, WITH ONE FOOT IN THE REVOLUTIONARY CAMP, ONE IN SAVAK, AND BOTH HANDS CLUTCHING A U.S. VISA OR "GREEN CARD," JUST IN CASE."

4. KHOMEINI, THE PGOI, AND THE PROTO-OPPOSITION FIGURES (SHARIAT-MADARI, TALEGHANI, NAZIH, MATINE-DAFTARY, ETC.) HAVE YET TO SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO STAND ON PRINCIPLE. WHETHER KHOMEINI EVER MEANT HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO RULE IS QUESTIONABLE; CERTAINLY HE IS EXERCISING ALL THE POWER HE CAN GET, WHILE COMPROMISING ON ANY PRINCIPLE WHICH ROUSES OPPOSITION (VEILS FOR WOMEN, FROZEN MEAT, EXECUTIONS, CONSTITUTION ELECTIONS) IN SPEECHES IF NOT IN FACT. THE PGOI'S ACCEPTANCE OF ITS EMASCULATION CAN BEST BE EXPLAINED BY THE DESIRE TO HANG ONTO PRESTIGIOUS POSITIONS AT ANY COST. TALEGHANI AND SHARIAT-MADARI BACK OFF FROM CONFRONTATION UNTIL THEY ARE SURE THEY CAN WIN.

5. GIVEN THIS SITUATION, PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN ARE DIM, AT BEST. KHOMEINI AND THE PGOI WILL CONTINUE TO REIGN FOR AS LONG AS THEY CAN, WHILE THE REST OF THE COUNTRY ACCEPTS OR REJECTS THEIR STATEMENTS AS IT SERVES THEM. OPPOSITION GROUPS WILL CONTINUE TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES AS THEY SEE PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED POWER. THERE IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OR MORE "COUP D'ETATS," CATAPULTING DIFFERENT GROUPS INTO POSITIONS OF PROMINENCE, BUT THEY, LIKE THE CURRENT LEADERS, WILL CONTINUE TO LACK EFFECTIVE POWER, AND WILL FACE THEIR OWN COUP WHEN ANOTHER GROUP SEIZES ON A REAL OR PERCEIVED MISTAKE. REGIONAL, POSSIBLY ETHNIC, GROUPS WILL COME INCREASINGLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF REGIONAL POWER-SEEKERS, BUT THESE WILL FACE THE SAME SITUATION IN MICROCOSM (WHO SPEAKS FOR THE KURDS?). SUCH COUPS ARE LIKELY TO BE VIOLENT, AND SPORADIC VIOLENCE RANGING FROM RIOTS TO ASSASSINATION WILL MARK THE PERIODS BETWEEN COUPS.

6. THIS IS ONLY THE MOST LIKELY FUTURE. SECOND MOST LIKELY IS THE CONSOLIDATION OF A RELIGIOUS AUTOCRACY, WITH KHOMEINI AT THE APEX, BUT CHARACTERIZED BY SEMI-INDEPENDENT "DEPUTY-IMANS" AMONG THE RELIGIOUS, COOPERATING BUT JEALOUS OF PERSONAL FIEFDOMS. AS SUCH A THEOCRACY WILL REJECT "SECULAR" ALLIANCES, IT WILL BE MARKEDLY SHORT OF ADMINISTRATIVE TALENT, FACING IRAN WITH A SLOW DESCENT

BT

#6234

NNNN

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6234

1

INTO A FEUDAL ECONOMY. TECHNOCRATS, PROFESSIONALS, AND THE MIDDLE CLASS WILL LEAVE IN PROVES, LEAVING IRAN TO THE MULLAHS AND THE "MOSTAZ'AF" (LITERALLY THE MEER--DEFINED BY KHOMEINI AS IN "...SHALL INHERIT THE EARTH, BY THE OPPOSITION AS "POOR AND WEAK (MINDED)"). THE NEXT MOST LIKELY EVENT IS A MIDDLE-CLASS REJECTION OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, LEADING TO A LEFTIST TAKE-OVER. AS THE LEFT DEMONSTRATE NO GREATER ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE ON PRINCIPLES THAN ANY OTHER GROUP, SUCH A LEFTIST GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO COME UNDER THE "PROTECTION AND GUIDANCE" OF IRAN'S NORTHERN NEIGHBOR, LEADING TO AN AFGHANISTAN-LIKE SITUATION, WITH WIDESPREAD, DISORGANIZED OPPOSITION. RUSSIA IS LIKELY TO INVEST MORE RESOURCES IN PROTECTING A CLIENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT THAN AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, BUT THE VAST POTENTIAL FOR SABOTAGE OF IRAN'S PETROLEUM, POWER, AND INDUSTRIAL ASSETS MAY MAKE THE COUNTRY LESS THAN A GRAND PRIZE.

7. ANY OF THE ALTERNATIVES POINT TO A CONTINUATION AND ACCELERATION OF IRAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC DISRUPTION. WE CAN EXPECT A GRADUAL OR SUDDEN DEGRADATION OF IRAN'S PETROLEUM PRODUCTION CAPACITY, INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, AND PROBABLY AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT (WITH INCREASED OPIUM PRODUCTION AS A FAST CASH CROP). THIS ECONOMIC WEAKNESS WILL ENTAIL MILITARY WEAKNESS, WITH IRAN UNABLE TO DEFEND ITS BORDERS (WHICH COULD THEN MEAN SOMEONE ELSE IS PRODUCING THE OIL), AND A LOSS OF ANY REGIONAL POWER.

8. ANOTHER DISTURBING ELEMENT IS THE INCREASING CLASS ANTAGONISM WITHIN IRAN. THE MIDDLE CLASS DESPISE THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE, PEASANTS ARE FIGHTING WITH LANDLORDS, EMPHASIS ON PERSONAL RANK AND PRESTIGE IS INCREASING, CAPITALISTS AND WORKERS ARE BECOMING IRRECONCILABLE. THE DRAFTING OFFICER SEES POLITICAL PARTIES INCREASINGLY BECOMING CLASS-ORIENTED, WHICH INCREASES THE CHANCES FOR VIOLENCE, AND DECREASES THE CHANCES FOR COOPERATION.

9. U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN--A STRONG, INDEPENDENT, ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPING IRAN BEING A STABLE PRODUCER OF PETROLEUM, A MARKET FOR WESTERN GOODS IN BALANCE WITH ITS SALES, AND ABLE TO EXERCISE A MODERATING INFLUENCE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS--ARE COMPATIBLE, AND IN SOME CASES IDENTICAL WITH IRANIAN INTERESTS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE COSTS OF THE REVOLUTION, THEIR ATTAINMENT BY IRANIANS ACTING ALONE WILL REQUIRE MAJOR SACRIFICES BY THE MAJORITY OF IRANIANS. GIVEN THE IRANIAN CHARACTER AS I SEE IT, THIS IS TOO REMOTE A POSSIBILITY TO WAIT FOR. THE DEVOLUTION OF IRANIAN SOCIETY MAKES IT UNLIKELY THAT IRAN WILL BE ABLE TO ACT SIGNIFICANTLY AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS, EXCEPT IN THE REDUCTION OF OIL PRODUCTION, SO IT IS LIKELY TO BECOME, NOT AN OPPONENT OF U.S. INTERESTS, BUT A NULLITY. THE U.S. MUST DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS (AND IN SUCH CASE SHOULD CONTINUE TO REDUCE ITS EXPOSURE HERE) OR TAKE STEPS TO ASSIST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT STRONG ENOUGH TO RULE IRAN. THIS WILL REQUIRE GUARANTEEING, TO A LARGE ENOUGH GROUP, PERSONAL BENEFITS SUFFICIENT TO GET THESE LARGE NUMBERS TO COOPERATE. THIS WILL ALSO BE COSTLY, BUT GIVEN THE DEEP BELIEF AMONG

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6234/2

IRANIANS IN THE OVERWHELMING POWER OF THE U.S. OVER IRANIAN AFFAIRS, IT IS POSSIBLE. WE WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE ACTING WHETHER WE DO OR NOT, AND IF THE COUNTRY CRUMBLES IT WILL BE BELIEVED THAT WE ARE EITHER CAUSING IT, OR ARE INCOMPETENT IN OUR ACTIONS. WE WILL NOT, HOWEVER, SAFEGUARD U.S. INTERESTS BY WAITING FOR IRANIANS TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS.

10. THIS CABLE IS ADMITTEDLY PESSIMISTIC, BUT THE DRAFTING OFFICER BELIEVES THAT IT ACCURATELY PRESENTS THE MOST LIKELY FUTURES. NONE OF THESE THINGS IS GOING TO HAPPEN OVERNIGHT. THE GASSES IN THE CORPSE OF DEVELOPING IRAN WILL GUARANTEE ENOUGH MOTION TO CARRY IRAN THROUGH MONTHS OR EVEN YEARS OF APPARENT LIFE. HOWEVER, THREE DAYS HAVE PASSED, AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THIS CORPSE TO RISE FROM THE DEAD. NAAS

BT

#6234

NNNN

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6434/2

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323

NODIS
EXDIS
ROGER
OTHER

(C&P TO FILE)

AMB
DCM
ADN
CHW

CHG
✓

Handwritten notes:
meet the
- [unclear]
- [unclear]
[unclear] 4

GLASSIFIED



AMERICAN EMB

TEHRAN

O 181953Z JUN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3039
BT
SECRET STATE 156933

MODIS
FOR CHARGE

E.O. 12065 GDS 6/15/75 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS:

H

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE ACTING SECRETARY HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR YOUR GENERAL GUIDANCE IN DIRECTING THE WORK OF THE EMBASSY DURING THE COMING WEEKS.

-- WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVELOPING A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOI. UNTIL THE GOI HAS A BETTER GRIP ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT WE CAN DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE LEADERSHIP ON THE MANY PROBLEMS ON OUR AGENDA.

-- IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE TO TRY TO PUSH THE IRANIANS FASTER THAN THEY WISH TO MOVE WITH US. OUR ATTITUDE OUGHT TO BE CORRECT AND READY TO RESPOND, INTERESTED AND FRIENDLY, BUT ALSO FIRM IN DEFENDING U.S. POSITIONS, E.G., ON HUMAN RIGHTS OR AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENT. IRANIANS MUST CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT A BETTER RELATIONSHIP CAN COME ONLY THROUGH RECIPROCAL PROCESS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES DEMONSTRATE AN INTEREST IN COOPERATION AND IN WHICH THERE IS RESPECT ON BOTH SIDES.

-- WHILE TAKING NO ACTION TO ENDANGER U.S. PERSONNEL, WE SHOULD NOT FEEL INHIBITED ABOUT SEEKING CONTACTS OR MAKING OUR VIEWS KNOWN. WE SHOULD TAKE CARE NOT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROBLEMS THAT INTRODUCE NEW AGGRAVATIONS AND, WHERE POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE DIFFICULT ISSUES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. TO THE EXTENT PRACTICAL, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE STRENGTHENED COMMERCIAL AND OTHER PRIVATE CONTACTS.

-- ALTHOUGH YOUR ASSIGNMENT IN IRAN WILL BE QUITE LIMITED IN DURATION, YOU SHOULD VIEW IT AS A STAGE TOWARD OUR GOAL OF ACHIEVING A BETTER RELATIONSHIP. YOU SHOULD DIRECT THE EMBASSY'S WORK TO THAT END, TAKING ACTIONS OR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO WASHINGTON THAT WILL ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF IMPROVED RELATIONS.

3. WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIC MEASURES YOU SHOULD ADDRESS DURING YOUR STAY IN IRAN, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS:

-- EMBASSY SECURITY. THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT FOR PROTECTION OF THE EMBASSY IS CLEARLY INTOLERABLE ON A PROLONGED BASIS. AFTER CONSULTING WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES AND SURVEYING THE LOCAL SCENE, WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO REGULARIZE THE PROTECTION FOR THE EMBASSY BY REPLACING THE PRESENT MUJAHEDIN GUARDS WITH A UNIFORMED FORCE.

-- DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. WE SUGGEST YOU GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO A COMPREHENSIVE ATTEMPT TO REMOVE THE THORNY ISSUES THAT WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RESOLVE, E.G., DETENTION OF ICA EMPLOYEE, CLOSING OUT OF MILITARY FACILITIES, OBTAINING PAYMENT FOR TEHRAN-AMERICAN SCHOOL, SECURING EXIT VISAS FOR CERTAIN U.S. CITIZENS PREVENTED FROM LEAVING IRAN.

-- ~~MILITARY SUPPLY.~~ AFTER A SHORT TIME, WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ~~ASSESSMENT~~ AS TO WHETHER WE SHOULD INITIATE A LIMITED SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS FOR THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE AND POSSIBLY OTHER SERVICES. WE WILL WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND WHETHER IT IS PRACTICAL TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER MILITARY TIES.

-- CONSULAR OPERATIONS. WE WILL WANT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD WITH VISA OPERATIONS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, TO THE EXTENT ADEQUATE SECURITY CAN BE PROVIDED, WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO RESUME NORMAL NIV OPERATIONS IN TEHRAN. SIMILARLY, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER REGULAR PERIODICAL VISITS BY CONSULAR OFFICERS TO OUR THREE CONSULAR POSTS.

-- PERSONNEL. WE WILL WANT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF DEPENDENTS AND ANY PERSONNEL CHANGES YOU THINK PRUDENT FOR THE EMBASSY.

-- MINORITIES. PLEASE CONTINUE TO REPORT FREQUENTLY ON THE SITUATION OF JEWS AND OTHER MINORITIES.

-- PUBLIC AFFAIRS. PLEASE GIVE US YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM, INCLUDING EXPANDED USE OF FARSI VOA BROADCASTS, WHICH MIGHT HELP TO STRENGTHEN THE U.S. POSITION.

-- CONTACTS. IF A VISIT TO KHOMEINI IS SUGGESTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. YOU AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS, HOWEVER, SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPAND THE EMBASSY'S CIRCLE OF CONTACTS IN SIGNIFICANT SECTORS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY.

4. WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN STRENGTHEN THE AMERICAN POSITION IN IRAN DURING THE WEEKS THAT THE EMBASSY IS UNDER YOUR DIRECTION.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#6833

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

[illegible]

RECEIVED: 1964 JAN 21

1997

112

1 AME, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840,

70-101 SSF 121-24242-147

7 MAY 1954 JILA 1242

... ..

7-14-58 10:00 AM

11

... ..

...the

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

COUNT: 100 TOTAL: 71.2

100-12657-117-1 (2/2/57, 100-12657-117-1) GR-F

THC P₀ = 10, 1. - %

1990: 1847 11 17 1931285

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

... CLAIMS THAT IRAQI HOSTILITY SUBSISTED
... THE SITUATION HAS NOT A SINGLE STEP
... NORTHERN IRAQ AND AMONG THE ARAB
... THAT IRAQ HAS REFUSED
... TO SUPPORT DISSENTING POLITICAL OPINIONS
... AND THAT UNTIL THE SUPPORT
... THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL NOT IMPROVE
... SITUATION

[illegible]

3

44-38861-2921

Schwein

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 11/11/11
PAGE: 11

REFID: POL:477345874/BJ

0742: 4047

41 42: P2L 2W

THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SAID IT IS NOT INTERESTED IN THE
 THIS WAS SAID BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IN A STATEMENT
 SAID THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN THE
 ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
 WHICH HE CLAIMED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED
 DOWN. IT WAS IRIS INTEREST, HE SAID, WHICH PROMPTED
 AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR ALI
 SADEH AND NOT AN IRANIAN DESIRE TO INTERFERE IN IRAQI
 INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

4. YAZDI SAID THAT IT IS PGOI POLICY TO HAVE, TO A
 MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL
 IRAN'S NEIGHBORS. THIS INCLUDES IRAQ, AND IRAQ HAS BEEN
 SATISFIED BY IRAQI ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
 BOMBING ATTACKS ON SEVERAL IRANIAN VILLAGES DURING
 THIS MONTH. HOWEVER, IRAQ STILL HAS SERIOUS COMPLAINT
 AGAINST IRAQ, YAZDI SAID, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT'S SUP-
 PORT FOR SEVERAL DISSIDENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
 KHUZESTAN. YAZDI CLAIMED THAT THIS SUPPORT DATES BACK
 TO THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN
 WHEN THESE ORGANIZATIONS WERE REFERRED TO AS THE
 THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF ARABISTAN. HE AL-
 LOWED TO ESTABLISH OFFICES IN BASRA AND BAGHDAD. YAZDI
 SAID THAT THE PGOI HAS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
 THESE ORGANIZATIONS CO-OPERATES AND IN RELATIONS WITH
 THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT IMPROVE UNTIL IT CHANGES.
 YAZDI ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE MARXIST CHARAKA-PEDAYIA-
 KHALQ AND IRANIAN ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN GIVING THEM
 POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN KHUZESTAN SUPPORT AS WELL.

5. COMMENT: YAZDI IS PROBABLY RIGHT ABOUT THE ACTIVI-
 TIES IN IRANIAN KHUZESTAN HAVING A SPILLOVER EFFECT IN
 IRAQ. HE IS CERTAINLY RIGHT ABOUT THE PGOI'S LACK OF
 ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THESE ACTIVITIES ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.
 REPORTS FROM THE REGION ALMOST INvariably SUGGEST THAT
 OR NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY ALL ALONG THE IRAN-
 BORDER IN KURDISTAN. SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
 HAS APPARENTLY ALSO HAD CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN
 SHIRAZ, BUT IN THIS INSTANCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SAY
 PGOI IS ACTUALLY INADEQUATE OR NOT. PARTICULARLY
 SINCE THE RECENT DISTURBANCES IN KURDISTAN, THE
 GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED RADIO'S AND NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEEN
 AT
 60202

60202

CONFIDENTIAL

T-100-1

3

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6420

DE RUMMHE #6420 171 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZR
R 221324Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2139
INFO RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0012
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05420

Seheron
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 782
APPRV: CHG: CWN: AAS
TRFED: POL: VITO: SETH,
CLFAR: NONE
DISTR: POL: REF

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/20/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR, RP
SUBJ: IDENTITIES OF FILIPINO MUSLIM DELEGATION MEMBERS
REF: A. TEHRAN 4844, B. STATE 148101, C. MANILA 11817

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE)

2. OTHER THAN DELEGATION LEADER NUR MISAURI, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY MEMBERS OF DELEGATION WHICH VISITED TEHRAN. PER PARA 9 REF C, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PGOI IS CAPABLE OF CONSCIOUS CYNICAL MANIPULATION OF POLITICAL RHETORIC. RATHER, THE RECEPTION OF MISAURI'S DELEGATION AT THE SAME TIME RELATIONS WITH GOP OTHERWISE APPEAR TO BE NORMAL IS, IN OUR VIEW, PRIMARILY A FUNCTION OF THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT IN THIS COUNTRY. ON THE ONE HAND, THE PGOI IS ATTEMPTING TO ADMINISTER THE NATION'S AFFAIRS--INCLUDING ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS--IN A NORMAL MANNER WHILE, ON THE OTHER, THE REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT UNDER AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S GUIDANCE OPERATES ON A DIFFERENT PLANE. THE LATTER FREQUENTLY INVOLVES AT LEAST LENDING MORAL SUPPORT TO OTHER ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. THE PGOI FREQUENTLY IS CAUGHT IN A POSITION OF PLAYING CATCH-UP TO KHOMEINI'S POLICY DIRECTIVES. IN THE PROCESS ITS BEHAVIOR CAN BE SCHIZOPHRENIC IN THE EXTREME. NAAS

BT
#6420

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6420

2

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6563

DE RUQMR #6563 175 **
ZNY CCCCC
R 241353Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI-
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA-
RUZHAD/USINT BAGHDAD
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA
RUZHHO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUQMNT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS

Chron
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STATE 5/24
APPRV: CH7:LBLAINGEN
DRTD: POL:VLTOMSETH/I
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CH3 POL-3 ECON
OR ICA RF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6563

E.O. 12865: GDS 6/24/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, IR
SUBJ: WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 5759

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN REVOLUTIONARY AND ISLAMIC IRAN CONTINUES TO ERODE. EFFORTS TO SQUEEZE WOMEN OUT OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PERSISTS. THE RECENTLY PUBLICIZED DRAFT CONSTITUTION CONTAINS SEVERAL PROVISIONS THAT IMPLY CONSIDERABLE CIRCUMSPECTION OF THE AREA OF ACTIVITY WHICH WILL BE LEGITIMATELY OPEN TO WOMEN. DESPITE THEIR RELATIVELY FEW NUMBERS, THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF IRANIAN WOMEN WHO MAY BE PREPARED TO RESIST RESTRICTION OF THEIR RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. END SUMMARY.

3. THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN CONTINUES TO ERODE. RECENTLY, A GROUP OF FEMALE TRAINEES FOR THE JUDICIARY WAS BARRED FROM A SWEARING-IN CEREMONY AT THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. THE WOMEN, ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS, IMMEDIATELY LAUNCHED A SIT-IN, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE FIGURED IN JUSTICE MINISTER ASSADOLLAH MOBASHERI'S RESIGNATION JUNE 26. BEFORE HE DEPARTED THE MINISTRY, HOWEVER, MOBASHERI "UNOFFICIALLY" INFORMED THE WOMEN THAT THEIR SIT-IN WOULD BE IN VAIN, SINCE THE CIVIL JUDICIARY ITSELF WOULD SOON BE OUT OF BUSINESS. IN OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, TOO, THERE APPEARS TO BE A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN AT LEAST TO REDUCE THE PROFILE OF WOMEN EMPLOYEES IF NOT FORCE THEM OUT COMPLETELY. AS REPORTED IN REFTEL, A FAVORITE TECHNIQUE IS TO SHIFT WOMEN INTO LESS IMPORTANT JOBS, PRESUMABLY IN THE HOPE THAT MOST WILL ULTIMATELY RESIGN IN FRUSTRATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6563

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6563

4. THE NEW CONSTITUTION HAS ALSO CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CONSTERNATION. SEVERAL PROVISIONS IMPLY A DRASTIC CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF THE AREA OF ACTIVITY WHICH WILL BE LEGITIMATELY OPEN TO WOMEN. ARTICLE 11 DEFINES THE FUNDAMENTAL UNIT OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC SOCIETY AS THE FAMILY AND STATES THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE FAMILY AS A UNIT WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THOSE OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF IT. ARTICLE 12 GOES ON TO ENSHRINE THE PRIMACY OF THE MOTHER IN REARING CHILDREN AND ENJOINS THAT FAMILY LAWS SHOULD PROVIDE MOTHERS WITH MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL OPPORTUNITIES SO THAT THEY CAN CAN ATTEND...TO THE HIGHLY VALUED MATERNAL DUTIES THAT ARE ENTRUSTED TO THEM... ARTICLE 28, WHICH STATES THAT "EVERY PERSON HAS THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE PROFESSION HE WISHES, PROVIDED IT IS NOT IN CONTRAVENTION OF ISLAM OR THE PUBLIC INTEREST," ALSO SEEMS AN OPEN-ENDED INVITATION TO LIMIT THE FREEDOM OF WOMEN TO CHOOSE CAREERS OTHER THAN THOSE OF MARRIAGE AND MOTHERHOOD.

5. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT'S DETERMINATION TO CONFINE IRANIAN WOMEN TO THE NURSERY AND THE KITCHEN WILL BE LIMITED IN SCOPE SINCE THE VAST MAJORITY OF IRANIAN WOMEN HAD NEVER LEFT THOSE PLACES. HOWEVER, A SIGNIFICANT MINORITY APPEARS DETERMINED TO RESIST THE IMPOSITION OF RESTRICTIONS ON ITS MEMBERS' FREEDOM. THEIR STRENGTH SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. IT WAS, AFTERALL, WOMEN WHO FORCED KHOMEINI TO MAKE HIS FIRST SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CONCESSION BACK IN MARCH OVER THE ISSUE OF REJAB OR THE WEARING OF THE VEIL. LAINGEN BT #6563

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6563

[illegible]

7. 1955-1956 VAL-INCH GERMANY 114 CJ-511

453 274

• 2011

— 232 —

7. LINEAR ALGEBRA

7 1158 700 112405 VNY L.

[illegible]

SECRET

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

107

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2006 BY 60322 JAS FOR MKS.

STANDARD TIME WARS - (2015 ET/UTC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. (SEE

• *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 2000; 283: 2639-2645

4. STATUS: NO CHANGE. (P)

(SECRET/NOFORN - ALL PARAS)

HAVE BEEN SOME SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CONFLICTS IN AFRICA. THESE SAYS
ARE IMPORTANT INDICATORS OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL TRENDS ON THE
CONTINENT, AND ILLUSTRATE THE PROLIFERATION OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN AFRICA. THEY PROVIDE US WITH SOME LESSONS
TO BE LEARNED, BOTH ON THE SOVIET ROLE IN AFRICA, AND ON THE
CHANGING NATURE OF AFRICAN WARFARE.

PORT, THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR (1975), AND THE OGADEEN WAR BETWEEN
SOMALIA AND SOMALIA (1977) WERE WATERSHEDS OF SOVIET POLICY IN
AFRICA. THEY SET THE PRECEDENT OF INTERVENTION BY SOVIET SURROGATES,
IN THE FORM OF GUERRILLA COMBAT TROOPS, INTO LOCAL CONFLICTS WITH THE
FULL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

LIBYANS AND HAWANS HAVE BEEN OPPORTUNISTIC, BUT SELECTIVE IN THEIR MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN ERITREA, THEY PROVIDED LOGISTICAL, ADVISORY, AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO ETHIOPIAN FORCES, BUT DENIED REQUESTS TO COMMIT OMAN GROUND TROOPS.

4. KROMA AND HAVANA APPEARED PUZZLED BY THE TANZANIA-UGANDA WAR, AND SAID NO INCLINATION TO INTERVENE ON EITHER SIDE. THE SOVIETS WERE

INFLUENCED BY THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE

THE APPARENT STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES. IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT, THE ANGLO-BOERS WAR WAS SIGNIFICANT, BECAUSE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AFRICAN HISTORY, ONE AFRICAN STATE INVADDED, DEFEATED, AND DEPOSED THE LEADERSHIP OF ANOTHER. IN ADDITION, IT SHOWED THE WEAKNESS OF THE BOERS IN DEALING WITH INTER-STATE CONFLICTS.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IS THE TREND TOWARD MORE CONVENTIONAL WARFARE. OF THE NINE WARS, THREE (ANGOLA, OGADEN, TANZANIA-UGANDA) WERE FULLY CONVENTIONAL IN NATURE, WITH THE USE OF MODERN HEAVY WEAPONS AND LARGE MANEUVER UNITS (RM, BDE, DIV). FOUR OTHERS (SHABA, C. I. CAD, ETHIOPIA) WERE SEMI-CONVENTIONAL, GROWING OUT OF INSURRECTIONS TO BECOME CONFLICTS FOR CONTROL OF TERRITORY. THREE WARS (BURUNDI, RECONVENTIONAL AND GUERRILLA TACTICS BY THE FORMER GOVERNMENT. ONLY TWO (RWANDA AND BOLESERIO) OF THE WARS REMAIN. FULLY GUERRILLA STRUGGLES.

THE VARYING NATURE OF SUPPORT IN AFRICA CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE
RELATIVE SOPHISTICATION OF SOME OF ITS MILITARY ESTABLISH-
MENTS, AND THE RESULTANT EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL POWERS. THE ARMS

MANPOWER OF LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE INCREASING IN SIZE, AND USING

PAGE 4 RUENAA22844 S E C R E T NOFORN

MORE MODERN WEAPONS, HAVE IN SOME CASES, DEMONSTRATED A RAPID MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY, AND HAVE EVIDENCED GROWTH IN OVERALL SKILL LEVELS, WHICH MAKE THE CONDUCT OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE POSSIBLE. THE SAHARAN AFRICA'S LARGEST ARMIES ARE LISTED BELOW: NIGERIA 195,200; SUDAN 15,000; ETHIOPIA 210,000; SOMALIA 38,000; TANZANIA 48,000; SOUTH AFRICA 12,000 (PLUS 240,000 READY RESERVES).

THIS TRENDS TOWARD MORE MODERN AND SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY FORCES PROVIDES THE SOVIETS WITH A CONTINUING ROLE TO PLAY IN AFRICA, AS THE PRIME SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE VALUE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, HAS INCREASED FROM \$5.4 BILLION IN 1973, TO \$1.7 BILLION IN 1977. THE EVOLVING MILITARY SITUATION IN AFRICA, WITH EXPANDING MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ARMED CONFLICT, WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE FERTILE GROUND FOR SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT. THE TRENDS TOWARD MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS, AS IS EVIDENCED BY THESE RECENT AFRICAN WARS, WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET EXPLOITATION. (SOURCE: USFUCOM J2, VARIOUS)

4. (CONFIDENTIAL ALL PARAS) IRAN: WE WERE CONCERNED THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WOULD ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF GROWING DESTAB-

PAGE 4 RUENAA22844 S E C R E T NOFORN

ILIZATION THAT WE ARE DEVELOPING. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPARENTLY WEATHERED THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, A STEADILY DEGRADATING SITUATION IS STILL EXPECTED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WHILE THE CURRENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP HAS FAILED TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POWER, SINCE THE REVOLUTION IN JANUARY, OPPOSITION GROUPS HAVE ALSO FAILED TO ORGANIZE OR SIGNIFICANTLY EXPAND THEIR POWER. THE BASIC REASON HAS BEEN AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S MASS APPEAL. DESPITE THIS, KHOMEINI'S DICTATORIAL AND INCONSISTENT ACTIONS ARE BEGINNING TO ERODE HIS SUPPORT WHICH WILL NOT ONLY WEAKEN HIS OWN POSITION, BUT WILL FUEL THE GROWING DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE OPPOSITION GROUPS ARE ALSO EXPERIENCING DISSENSION WITHIN THEIR RANKS. THERE IS, THUS, A FRACTIONALIZATION OF ORGANIZED GROUPS BOTH IN AND OUT OF POWER, COUPLED WITH A GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT AMONGST THE PEOPLES WHO ARE COMING TO REALIZE THAT THEIR LIVES ARE WORSE NOW THAN THEY WERE BEFORE. UNEMPLOYMENT REMAINS A SERIOUS PROBLEM, EXECUTIONS, NOW OVER 300,

DISCRIMINATE ARRESTS REMAIN UNSETTLING FACTORS, AS DOES GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE STREETS.

PROBABLY THE STRONGEST GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY ARE THE ETHNIC

PAGE 4 RUENAA22844 S E C R E T NOFORN

MINORITIES. OF THESE GROUPS, THE KURDS ARE BEST ABLE TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERESTS. THE ARABS IN KHUZESTAN, HOWEVER, COULD CAUSE THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS. THE GROWING DESTABILIZATION WILL ENCOURAGE THESE GROUPS TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN REGIONAL AUTHORITY, WHICH IN TURN WILL WEAKEN THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. IRAN'S SEEMINGLY IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR TOWARDS OTHER COUNTRIES HAS RESULTED IN EVEN FURTHER TROUBLES FOR THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP HAS LAUNCHED A STRIDENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALLEGED IRAQI SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS IN KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. TEHRAN CAN ONLY LOSE IN THIS DISSENT BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S ABILITY TO PROMOTE SEPARATIST ARAB GROUPS IN THE HOIL FIELD REGION, DENY ACCESS TO SHIITE RELIGIOUS SITES IN IRAQ, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE IRANIAN ARMY DEPLOY A SUPERIOR MILITARY FORCE. KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO COSTING IRAN VITAL ASSISTANCE BOTH IN THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FIELDS. HIS SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN REBELS MAY

BACKFIRE IN FURTHER SUPPORT FOR BALUCHI SEPARATISTS.

IN SUMMARY, WE EXPECT THE IRANIAN SITUATION TO DEGRADATE OVER THE NEXT MONTHS, TO A POINT WHERE KHOMEINI WILL EVENTUALLY NO LONGER BE IN CONTROL. (SOURCE: USFUCOM J2)

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7053

DE RUQMRH #7053 139 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081013Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE #ASHDC 2504
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 3165
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANTARA 0164
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0169
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DEHRAN 0139
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY Doha 0142
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0198
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0191
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0206
RUQMEW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0169
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0241
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0140
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MSCOW 0191
RUQMNT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0074
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0210
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 07053

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STATE 7/9
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
PRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH/BJF,
CLEAR: POL:CLEMENT
DISTR: CHG POL-2 ECON
DAO MAAG ICA
RF CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/6/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJ: IRANIAN CONSTITUTION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: DEPOFF CLEMENT AND POLCOUNS TALKED THIS
PAST WEEK WITH MINISTER OF STATE FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROJECTS
SAHABI AND MINISTER OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE MINACHI ABOUT
IRAN'S DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND PLANS FOR ITS PROMULGATION.
END SUMMARY.

3. SAHABI SAID THAT IT HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN THE PGOI'S
PLAN TO HAVE A FULL-FLEDGED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF
SEVERAL HUNDRED DELEGATES DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, BUT
THAT, AS WEEKS DRAGGED INTO MONTHS DURING THE DRAFTING
PROCESS, IT CAME TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT TIME WAS OF IN-
CREASING IMPORTANCE. THE SMALLER ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS
(SHORA-YE-KHEBREGAN) WAS CONSEQUENTLY HIT UPON AS THE BEST
MEANS OF GETTING THE DRAFT QUICKLY REVIEWED AND TO THE
PUBLIC FOR APPROVAL. MINACHI, WHO WAS A MEMBER OF THE
COMMITTEE WHICH PREPARED THE INITIAL DRAFT, ESTIMATED
THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY A MONTH TO DO
ITS WORK. ELECTIONS ARE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR THE
END OF JULY WHICH, IF MINACHI'S SCHEDULE HOLDS, WOULD
MEAN THAT THE DRAFT WOULD BE READY TO BE PUT TO A REFER-
ENDUM SOMETIME AROUND THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER. THIS
ACCORDS WITH MINACHI'S ESTIMATE OF EARLY AUTUM FOR COM-
PLETION OF THE ENTIRE PROCESS, I.E., APPROVAL AND PROMUL-
GATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, MAJLES AND PRESIDENTIAL ELEC-
TIONS AND INSTALLATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT.

4. WHEN ASKED IF THE DRAFT RECENTLY PUBLISHED WAS CLOSE
TO THE INITIAL DRAFT HIS COMMITTEE HAD PREPARED, MINACHI
SAID THAT KHOMEINI HAD MADE ONLY "A FEW MINOR CHANGES."
SAHABI STRESSED THAT THE DRAFT IS JUST THAT, I.E., A

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7053

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7053

WORKING DOCUMENT WHICH MAY BE AMENDED BY THE ASSEMBLY WHEN IT TAKES IT UP FOR DEBATE. ALL IRANIANS THEORETICALLY HAVE A RIGHT TO COMMENT UPON THE DRAFT AND THE ASSEMBLY IS SUPPOSED TO TAKE THEIR VIEWS INTO CONSIDERATION. MINACHI SAID THAT SAHABI'S OFFICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLATING THESE VIEWS AND PRESENTING THEM TO THE ASSEMBLY IN SOME FORM THAT WILL ALLOW IT TO MAKE APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS.

5. WE HAVE GOTTEN THE IMPRESSION IN RECENT DAYS THAT THE PGOI, IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING FRUSTRATIONS IN ITS ATTEMPT TO BRING THE INFORMAL GOVERNMENT UNDER SOME DEGREE OF CONTROL, HAS FIXED UPON PUTTING ITSELF OUT OF BUSINESS AS THE BEST MEANS OF DEALING WITH THE MANIFOLD PROBLEMS IRAN PRESENTLY CONFRONTS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE HAS BECOME GETTING A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT IN PLACE AND THE MINOR TECHNICALITIES OF DOING SO BE DAMNED. LAINGEN

BT
#7053

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7053

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 2127

RUQMUR #7127 190 **
 ZNY CCCCC ZZE
 R 001202Z JUL 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2351
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0173
 RUQMQU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0178
 RUHQAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0193
 RUQMDR/AMCONSUL DEHRAN 0153
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0156
 RUHQBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0213
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0205
 RUSBLE/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0220
 RUQMKV/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0133
 RUQDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0255
 RUQMAN/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0153
 RUQRMQ/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0194
 RUQMHT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0087
 RUQFNS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0224

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 PAGE: 0001
 APPR: CDT:LBELINGEN
 CRFTR: PSN:ATORABI
 CLEAR: POL:VITOMSETH
 JMBIRIN 0
 IISTR: POL:RF CHARGE
 CHRON

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 07127

E.O. 12065: DTS 7/9/85 (METRINKO, M.J.) OR-P
 TAGS: PKPR, PINS, IR
 SUBJ: NOTES ON EVENTS IN TABRIZ

REF: TEHRAN 07057

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE FOLLOWING TEXT CONSISTS OF NOTES WHICH THE PSN PROXIMAL/ ADVISOR (PROTECT) FROM AMCONSULATE TABRIZ WROTE ON RECENT EVENTS IN TABRIZ.

3. "EXCEPT FOR SOME SEVERE CLASHES BETWEEN THE KHOMEINI AND SHARIATMADARI GROUPS, TABRIZ HAS BEEN COMPARATIVELY QUIET FOR THE PAST MONTH. THE T.V. STATION WAS OCCUPIED TWO TIMES FOR A SHORT WHILE BY AN ARMED GROUP FOR THE PARTY OF "JOMHURI-E-KHALQ MOSALMAN-E-IRAN" (SUPPORTERS OF SHARIATMADARI) WHO WERE PROTESTING THAT THE T.V. DOES NOT SHOW THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS PROPERLY (THE T.V. DOES NOT DO IT BECAUSE SEVERAL THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS WOULD RAISE SHARIATMADARI PICTURES, BUT NONE FROM KHOMEINI). A BIG RIVALRY GOES ON BETWEEN AYATOLLAH GAZI AND MADANI (KHOMEINI'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN TABRIZ) ON ONE HAND AND MANY IMPORTANT LEADING MULLAHS ON THE OTHER. THERE WERE ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SOME OF THEIR COMMITTEES. THE MORE PEOPLE GET FRUSTRATED THE BIGGER GETS SHARIATMADARI AND LEFTIST GROUPS. THEY SHOW MORE SENSITIVENESS TO ANY DISRESPECT OR INSULT TO SHARIATMADARI. THE CITY OF TABRIZ WAS JUST ABOUT TO EXPLODE AFTER THE OPPOSITIONS AND INSULTS TO SHARIATMADARI ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO IN QOM. PEOPLE FROM QOM AND CLOSED THEIR SHOPS AND CAME TO JOIN TABRIZ'S IN "DESTROYING THE WORLD FOR AN INSULT TO THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADER" AS SOME OF THEM SHOUTED; BUT THEY WERE QUIET AT SHARIATMADARI'S TELEPHONE ORDER.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7107

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7127

4. "THE NEW GOVERNOR GENERAL IS BELIEVED TO BE GOOD-FOR-NOTHING. FRUSTRATION PREVAILS EVERYWHERE: PEOPLE DO NOT SHOW SAME ENTHUSIASM IN PARTICIPATING IN MARCHING GROUPS AS BEFORE. THE SHOPKEEPERS ON THE MAIN STREET LAUGHED WHEN THEY SAW GAZI WITH A GROUP OF LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED MARCHING IN SUPPORT OF ISLAMIC JUSTICE TRIBUNALS. ONLY SOME PARTIES COULD ORGANIZE A MARCHING OF ABOUT 12-22 THOUSAND PEOPLE FOR THE PURPOSE.

5. "THE TOP NEWS FOR THE PUBLIC IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS HAS BEEN THE UNIVERSITY PURGE. THE FIRST LIST OF DISMISSALS INCLUDED 12 PROFESSORS, 10 EMPLOYEES AND 10 STUDENTS; THE SECOND LIST WHICH CAME OUT LAST WEEK INCLUDES 11 PROFESSORS (THREE FROM ENGLISH DEPARTMENT), 40 STUDENTS AND A FEW EMPLOYEES. THE THIRD LIST WILL COME OUT THIS WEEK. THE UNIVERSITY IS PREPARING FOR A STRIKE. THEY THINK THAT THE "PURE" MEMBERS OF THE PURGE COMMITTEE WANT TO CREATE A VACUUM IN THE UNIVERSITY EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

6. "RECENT ARRESTS INCLUDE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF LAYHAN AND AYANDAGAN (DR. VAFAI').

7. "ALTHOUGH A FEW PAPERS (DAILY OR WEEKLY) ARE PUBLISHED IN TURKISH (MOSTLY WITH COMMUNISTIC AND TURKISH NATIONALISTIC IDEAS) AND THAT PARTIES LIKE AZARBAIJAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY ARE REORGANIZING THEMSELVES, TURKISH NATIONAL FEELING IS NOT STRONG IN TABRIZ. LEFTIST GROUPS ARE WELL ORGANIZED EVERYWHERE; A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF INTELLECTUALS AND LABORERS SUPPORT THEM.

LAINGEN

BT

#7127

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7127

3

11 Jun 79 02 20z

NNNNVV ESBS07BRA403
OO RUQMR
DE RUEHIA #6052/01 1911704
ZNY CCCCC
O 101702Z JUL 79
FM USICA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
BT
C O N F I D E N T : A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USICA 16052

USICA

NO 12065 GDS 6/5/85

SUBJECT: COUNTRY PLAN PROPOSAL

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 4806

CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD H. CURTISS, DEPUTY DIR., NEA

1. (C) APPRECIATE YOUR BCR SUBMISSION AND BELIEVE A WORKING DOCUMENT IMPORTANT AND USEFUL. TOWARD THAT END, AND BASED ON YOUR THOUGHTS AND INPUT OF SNOW AND MCAFEE, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING AS RECOMMENDED BCR, ISSUES AND PROGRAM PLANS. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE FEASIBLE PROJECT PROPOSALS AND SUGGEST THAT THIS PART OF CP BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. IN THE MEANTIME, BCR AND PROGRAM PLANS SHOULD OUTLINE EFFECTIVELY YOUR NEEDS AND PROBLEMS AS A BASIS FOR WHATEVER WASHINGTON SUPPORT SEEMS INDICATED AND WHATEVER POST ACTION SEEMS PRUDENT AND POSSIBLE. AT SUCH TIME AS YOU BELIEVE AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS CAN BE DRAWN WITH SOME VALIDITY, PLEASE FORWARD THAT TO NEA.

2. BCR

A. IRAN CONTINUES TODAY IN THE AFTERSHOCK OF THE REVOLUTION WHICH BROUGHT DOWN THE GOVERNMENT OF SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI. ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS CONTINUE, UNEMPLOYMENT IS ESTIMATED AT OVER THREE MILLION, TRIBAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES ARE AGITATING FOR AUTONOMY, MINORITY RELIGIONS ARE FEARFUL, AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUPS WRESTLE WITH WAYS AND MEANS TO PROMOTE THEIR INTERESTS AND THWART THE POLITICAL ASCENDANCY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM.

B. AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY IS DIFFUSE WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN STRUGGLING TO ESTABLISH CONTROL AND WREST EFFECTIVE POWER FROM A WELTER OF LOCAL "KOMITHEHS" WHICH SPANG UP DURING THE REVOLUTION. REAL POWER IN IRAN CONTINUES IN THE HANDS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WITH THE CHARISMATIC HEAD OF THE REVOLUTION, AYATOLLAH KHOMENI, THE CENTRAL FIGURE.

C. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITHIN IRAN REMAINS LARGELY PARALYZED. APART FROM THE OIL INDUSTRY WHICH IS ONCE AGAIN PRODUCING AND REFINING SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO MEET DOMESTIC NEEDS AND RESUME EXPORTS ON A REDUCED SCALE, VIRTUALLY ALL INDUSTRIAL

ICA

Chorge

Chion

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1976-486-344

ACTIVITY REMAINS AT A STANDSTILL. THE SPEED AND VIGOR WITH WHICH IT WILL EVENTUALLY REVIVE REMAINS UNCERTAIN GIVEN POLITICAL VICISSITUDES, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, THE FLIGHT OF CAPITAL PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION, AND THE DEPARTURE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ESSENTIAL MANAGERS AND TECHNOCRATS (BOTH IRANIAN AND FOREIGN). RESULTANT UNEMPLOYMENT, ESTIMATED AS HIGH AS 3.5 MILLION OF A TOTAL POPULATION OF ONLY ABOUT 35 MILLION, COULD EFFECTIVELY THWART THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S RESTABILIZATION EFFORTS AND SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE FRAGILE POLITICAL EQUATION COUNTRYWIDE.

D. THE PROMISED NEW CONSTITUTION AND REFORMS TO REDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN HAVE BEEN SLOW INCOMING. ALTHOUGH A DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN PUBLISHED, ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER IT HAVE BEEN POSTPONED. THE SAVAK PRISONS, WHICH WERE EMPTIED DURING THE REVOLUTION, HAVE BEEN REFILLED WITH PRISONERS ACCUSED OF A VARIETY OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEOPLE DURING THE SHAH'S REIGN, OFTEN TO BE SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOLLOWING CLOSED TRIALS CONDUCTED BY "REVOLUTIONARY COURTS" OUTSIDE THE IRANIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SUCH TRIALS IS SUBSTANTIAL AND THE VEHEMENT REACTION TO THE U.S. SENATE'S RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THEM SUGGESTS THE DIFFICULTY WE WILL ENCOUNTER IN PRESSING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS.

E. CULTURALLY IRAN IS IN FERMENT. PART AND PARCEL OF THE REVOLUTION CAME A REJECTION OF WESTERN, AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, CULTURE. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO RESTRUCTURE THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ALONG ISLAMIC LINES AND PURGE IT OF "DECADENT WESTERN INFLUENCES." IMPORTANT CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN CLOSED OR CONVERTED INTO SHOWCASES OF "REVOLUTIONARY CULTURE." IRAN'S HARD-WON SUCCESSSES IN ADVANCING WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE BEING ERODED AS WOMEN ARE PRESSED

BT

#6052

11 JUL 79 02 20z

NNNNVV ESB008BRA480
30 RUQMER
DE RUEHIA #6052/02 1911716
ZNY CCCCC
O 101702Z JUL 79
FM USICA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 USICA 16052

USICA

EO 12065 GDS 6/5/85

TO RETURN TO THE TRADITIONAL VEIL OR "CHADOR" AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS AFFORDED THEM UNDER THE SHAH ARE THREATENED WITH RESCISSION. FOREIGNERS OF ALL SORTS ARE BEING EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY AS THE TIDE OF XENOPHOBIA RISES. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY IRANIANS CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE THE INDISPENSABILITY OF SOME FORM OF FOREIGN CONTACT, AND MANY, PARTICULARLY THE WESTERN EDUCATED, OPPOSE THE MORE RIGID STRICTURES OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. INTEREST IN STUDYING FOREIGN LANGUAGES, PARTICULARLY ENGLISH, REMAINS HIGH AND LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIAN STUDENTS CONTINUE TO ASPIRE TO WESTERN AND U.S. EDUCATIONS.

F. IRAN'S FORMERLY CLOSE TIES TO THE UNITED STATES ARE CURRENTLY STRAINED ALMOST TO THE BREAKING POINT. EVEN THOSE TRADITIONALLY WESTWARD ORIENTED IN IRAN MUST, FOR THE PRESENT, ESCHUE VISIBLE CONTACT WITH US. IN A COUNTRY WHERE A "HIDDEN HAND" (GENERALLY THE U.S., THE SOVIETS, OR THE ISRAELIS) IS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING, THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISTRUST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE SUSPICION PREVAILS THAT THE U.S. IS ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION IN A VARIETY OF WAYS RANGING FROM EMPLOYING FORMER SAVAK AGENTS AS ASSASSINS AND EXPLOITERS OF DISCONTENT AND FOMENTERS OF INSURRECTION AMONG MINORITIES TO THROTTLING IRAN'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE THIS AND EVEN IN THE FACE OF DENUNCIATIONS BY THE MOSLEM CLERGY, THINGS AMERICAN CONTINUE TO BE VALUED BY SECTORS OF THE IRANIAN POPULATION PARTICULARLY THE YOUTH AND MIDDLE CLASS. AMERICA, HAVING SPAWNED MANY OF THE LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION, AND NOW HOME FOR MANY THOUSANDS OF IRANIAN STUDENTS IS VIEWED IN GENERAL TERMS SYMPATHETICALLY, BUT WITH THE DISTINCTION OFTEN DRAWN AS BETWEEN "THE PEOPLE" AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

G. DESPITE THE FEARS, DISAPPOINTMENTS AND FRUSTRATIONS ABOUT WHAT THEY SUSPECT OR MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED FROM THE U.S., LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIANS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BOTH THEIR RECENT PAST AND THEIR DESTINY ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO THE UNITED STATES. COMMUNICATION ON A ONE TO ONE BASIS IS STILL

SPONTANEOUS, CANDID AND OFTEN EVEN CORDIAL. BUT PUBLIC RHETORIC AS CONVEYED BY AN UNFORGIVING, OFTEN VITRIOLIC MEDIA, IS UNRELENTINGLY HOSTILE.

V H. U.S. MISSION GOALS IN IRAN AT PRESENT ARE TO MAINTAIN AS OPEN AND COOPERATIVE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AS POSSIBLE DESPITE INVECTIVE FROM THE MEDIA, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND EXTREMISTS. ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE WHEREIN THE USG (IN LEAGUE WITH THE U.S. MEDIA) IS ALLEGED TO BE AT THE ROOT OF ALL OF IRAN'S TROUBLES IS CONJECTURAL AT BEST, AND FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE IMAGE IRAN PROJECTS INTERNATIONALLY. THE U.S. MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS TENDED TO BE NEWS AND NOT ANALYSIS-ORIENTED, FOCUSING UNSYMPATHETICALLY ON WHAT IS WRONG. CLOSELY MONITORING SUCH COVERAGE LEADS RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES IN IRAN TO CONCLUDE THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH THEM WELL, AND, CONVERSELY, TENDS TO CONFIRM IN AMERICAN MINDS THAT IRAN IS A DISASTER IN EVERY SPHERE.

I. OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SHAH AND LONG-TERM SUPPORT OF HIS REGIME HAS NOT AND WILL NOT SOON BE FORGOTTEN. ITS LINGERING EFFECT IS TO CAST THE USG IN AN INTERVENTIONIST ROLE WHOSE PRACTICES BELIE ITS PRINCIPLES AND WHOSE PAST ACTIONS DENY IT THE MORAL AUTHORITY TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

J. WHILE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN DWARFED BY IRAN'S DOMESTIC CONCERNS, ITS FOREIGN POLICY CAN BE EXPECTED TO REFLECT THE BIFURCATED STATE OF IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THAT IS TO SAY, THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO MOVE AT A POLITICALLY FEASIBLE PACE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WESTERN COUNTRIES AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO REFLECT THE POLICIES OF THE AYATOLLAH AND BE SUBJECT TO HIS INTERFERENCE AT WILL. STATED AND EXPECTED POSITIONS INCLUDE:

-- DEEP ANTIPATHY FOR ISRAEL, CLOSE TIES WITH THE PLO, AND SUNDERING OF IRAN'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATE ARAB STATES.

BT

#6052

NNNNVV ESE009BRA499

00 RUQMFR

DE RUEHIA #6052/03 1911728

/NY CCCCC

101702Z JUL 79

FM USICA WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 USICA 16052

USICA

10 12065 GDS 6/5/85

- SUPPORT FOR POLICIES FAVORED BY THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORA, INCLUDING PARTICIPATING IN THE NAM.
- HAWKISH POSITION IN OPEC
- ANTI-PATHY TOWARD THE PRO-SOVIET REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN (SEEN TO BE ANTI-ISLAM).

K. IRAN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES, ASIDE FROM RESPONDING TO IMMEDIATE SHORT TERM NEEDS, AND REJECTING THE GOALS AND EMPHASIS OF THE SPAH'S GOVERNMENT, ARE NOT YET FULLY CLEAR. IT IS EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN ADDITION TO FAVORING THE POSITIONS OF THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S AND BEING HAWKISH ON OIL PRICES, THAT THEY WILL BE PARTICULARLY SUSPICIOUS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN IRAN, THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE RELEVANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY IS LIKELY TO EMPHASIZE AGRICULTURE AND THE RURAL SECTORS WITH CONCENTRATED EFFORTS TO SHIFT ELEMENTS OF THE UNEMPLOYED URBAN POPULATION TO RURAL AREAS, INCREASE

IRAN'S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND DECREASE THEIR LARGE FOOD IMPORTS. HOW THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IS YET UNCLEAR.

L. IRAN'S ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS ONE YEAR AGO HAD SCORES OF AMERICANS TEACHING, CONSULTING, ADVISING, RESEARCHING. NO MORE THAN A HANDFUL ARE LEFT AND THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES IN THE AGGREGATE ARE FOR THE MOMENT ESCHewing IMPORTED LECTURERS. WITH THE LARGE SCALE EXODUS OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL, BOTH IRANIAN AND AMERICAN, THIS SITUATION MAY BE REVERSED, BUT CERTAINLY NOT UNTIL ANTI-FOREIGN, AND PARTICULARLY ANTI-AMERICAN SENSITIVITIES BECOME LESS ACUTE.

M. ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH IRANIANS, BOTH IN TEHRAN AND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION WAS THE BINATIONAL CENTER (IRAN AMERICAN SOCIETY). BOTH THE ISFAHAN AND TEHRAN CENTERS EMERGED FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE UNSCATHED (QUITE DE-LIBERATELY, ONE MUST PRESUME), AND HAVE RESUMED ENGLISH TEACHING AND LIBRARY OPERATIONS (THE USICA LIBRARY IN TEHRAN

IS LOCATED IN THE BNC). WHILE REVOLUTIONARY CADRES STILL OCCUPY THE SHIRAZ BUILDING, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN EFFECT ITS RETURN SOON AND THAT ENGLISH TEACHING CAN ALSO RESUME THERE. WE CONSIDER THE CONTINUANCE OF THESE INSTITUTIONS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS EXTREMELY TENSE PERIOD OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. THEY BECOME ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT WITH THE NECESSITY TO MOVE USICA OFFICES INTO THE HIGH SECURITY CONFINES OF THE CHANCERY GROUNDS. THE BNCS ARE NOW OUR ONLY WINDOWS TO IRANIAN AUDIENCES.

3. ISSUES AND CONCERNS

ISSUE ONE: IRANIANS HAVE A WIDESPREAD DISTRUST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE SUSPICION PREVAILS THAT THE U.S. IS ACTIVELY ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION, INTERVENING BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. THE AMERICAN MEDIA, WITH THEIR UNSYMPATHETIC TREATMENT OF IRAN CONTRIBUTE TO AN IRANIAN PERCEPTION THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH IRAN WELL. FOR IRANIANS, LONG-TERM U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH HAS CAST THE U.S. IN AN INTERVENTIONIST ROLE WHOSE PRACTICES BELIE ITS PRINCIPLES AND DENY IT THE MORAL AUTHORITY TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

ISSUE TWO: WITH MANY IRANIANS, AND PARTICULARLY THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP, THERE IS A REJECTION OF THE "MATERIALISM" AND "DECADENCE" OF THE WEST INCLUDING AMERICAN SOCIETY, CULTURE, THOUGHTS AND VALUES. PARTICULARLY SUSPECT IN VIEW OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE SHAH IS U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.

ISSUE THREE: THE PGOI IS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE SHAH'S

BT

#6052

11 JUL 79 02 21z

NNNNVV ESB010BRA525

00 RUQMER

1E RUEHIA #6052/74 1911739

ZNY CCCCC

0 101702Z JUL 79

FM USICA WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 USICA 16052

USICA

EO 12065 GDS 6/5/85

ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PRIORITIES, WHICH EMPHASIZED URBAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, CONSUMER GOODS, ARMS PURCHASES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN EXPERTISE. THE U.S. AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER IN THESE SECTORS WILL ENCOUNTER SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN ATTEMPTING TO NORMALIZE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONALS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT, IF CONFUSED BEFORE, WILL BE FURTHER CLOUDED BY THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE ECONOMIC EXCESSES OF THE SHAH'S REGIME. IRANIAN HAWKISHNESS ON OIL PRICES AND REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICING ON AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ARE SERIOUS ISSUES FOR THE U.S.

ISSUE FOUR: WHILE DOMESTIC CONCERNS PREDOMINATE OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN TODAY'S IRAN, STATED AND EXPECTED POSITIONS OF THE IRANIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL FURTHER AGGRAVATE ALREADY TENSE U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, IRAN WILL REFLECT A DEEP ANTI-PATHY TOWARD ISRAEL AND U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS (SEEN TO BE IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS). THE GOVERNMENT WILL BACK THE PLO AND HAS SUNDERED TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. THE REGIME CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE POLICIES OF MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORA, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION IN THE NAM.

4. PROGRAM PLANS

PRIORITY NO. 1. ISSUE: THE U.S. AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

(1) THE U.S. SEEKS A COOPERATIVE AND OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. IT WILL NOT BE PARTY TO ANY ACTIONS WHICH ARE DISRUPTIVE OR INTRUSIVE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN.

(2) THE U.S. ACKNOWLEDGES THE DEEP DESIRE OF THE IRANIAN MAJORITY FOR CHANGE. BORN OF A REVOLUTION OURSELVES, WE SYMPATHIZE WITH THOSE WHO LABOR FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AND JUST SOCIETY.

(3) U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES REFLECT THE ESSENTIAL FABRIC OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND THE CORE OF OUR BELIEFS. OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE AND MUST SUPERCEDE SHORT TERM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, EVEN AT THE

RISK OF ACCUSATIONS OF INTERVENTIONISM.

(4) THE AMERICAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF IRAN HAS TENDED TO BE NEWS AND NOT ANALYSIS ORIENTED RESULTING IN PERCEPTIONS OF A LESS THAN POSITIVE IMAGE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION IN THE U.S. NONETHELESS, U.S. MEDIA HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ADHERE TO FACTS AS THEY SEE THEM AND HAVE SOUGHT TO REPORT EVENTS OBJECTIVELY.

(5) THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SYMPATHY FOR IRAN'S REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE CASE, BUT SYMPATHY, BOTH IN THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONALLY, HAS BEEN ERODED BY IRAN'S ON-GOING SECRET TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. PRIORITY NO. 2. ISSUE: AMERICAN SOCIETY, CULTURE AND VALUES; RELEVANCE TO IRAN

(1) RELIGION AND SPIRITUALISM IS A PART OF THE WEAVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY. AMERICA HAS A HISTORY OF RESPECT AND TOLERANCE FOR ALL RELIGIONS. ISLAM, IF LESS WELL KNOWN TO MOST AMERICANS, ENJOYS EQUAL RESPECT AND IS THE SUBJECT OF SCHOLARLY INTEREST IN OUR PREMIER ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS.

(2) U.S. ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE A POSITIVE FORCE IN AMERICAN LIFE. THEY HAVE FREED THE INDIVIDUAL FROM MUCH THAT WAS DRUDGERY, AND ELEVATED THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ALL SECTORS OF OUR POPULATION.

(3) AMERICAN CULTURE IS RICH IN CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, THE ARTS.

(4) AMERICAN EDUCATION IS EGALITARIAN AND WORKS TO SERVE ALL SECTORS OF OUR POPULATION. ITS PREMISE AND INNOVATIONS HAVE RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WORKING TO IMPROVE THEIR EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS.

(5) U.S. SCHOLARSHIP IN IRAN IS EQUAL TO THE BEST IN ANY COUNTRY OUTSIDE IRAN.

(6) THERE IS IN IRAN WIDESPREAD IGNORANCE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHICH IS BASED ON FEDERALISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, CHECKS AND BALANCES, AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IS AN EFFORT TO PRESERVE THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND BALANCE PRIVATE INTERESTS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD.

BT

#6052

11 Jun 79 07 22z

NNNNVV ESB011BRA540
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHIA #6052/05 1911753
ZNY CCCCC
O 101702Z JUL 79
FM USICA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 USICA 16052

USICA

EO 12065 GDS 6/5/85

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-484-444

(7) BASIC AMERICAN VALUES INCLUDE A BELIEF IN HARD WORK, HONESTY, OPTIMISM CONCERNING MAN'S ABILITY TO IMPROVE HIS LIFE AND THE WORLD AROUND HIM, A COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY AND FAIR PLAY, LOYALTY TO FRIENDS AND FAMILY, BELIEF IN THE WORTH OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE, CHARITY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE. THESE ARE NOT VALUES UNIQUE TO THE UNITED STATES, NOR ARE THEY ALWAYS FOUND IN EQUAL MEASURE IN ALL AMERICANS, BUT THEY SUGGEST DIMENSIONS OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER BEYOND AND ABOVE "DECADENCE" AND "MATERIALISM".
PRIORITY NO. 3. ISSUE: U.S.-IRAN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

(1) OIL IS A CRITICAL COMMODITY WORLDWIDE AND OIL PRICES HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON A RELATIVELY FRAGILE WORLD ECONOMY. HIGH OIL PRICES AFFECT MOST SEVERELY THE ECONOMIES OF POOR AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

(2) FOREIGN INVESTMENT CAN BE A VERY POSITIVE FORCE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS CENTRAL TO U.S. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL GROWTH. SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. CONTINUES TODAY AND IS WELCOME FOR THE CAPITAL AND EMPLOYMENT IT PROVIDES AND FOR THE INVESTMENT IN U.S. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY IT REPRESENTS.

(3) MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ARE A VERY EFFICIENT AND COST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY AND STIMULATING INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT.

(4) ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE SECTORS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY IS AGRICULTURE. THE U.S. IS VERY WILLING TO SHARE WITH IRAN BOTH ITS EXPERIENCE AND ITS TECHNOLOGY.

PRIORITY NO. 4. ISSUE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

(1) THE U.S. IS STRONGLY COMMITTED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS TO A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INVOLVING ALL OF THE PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

(2) THE U.S. SUBSCRIBES TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL COUNTRIES IN WESTERN ASIA. OUR CONCERN IS FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY.

(3) THE U.S. IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE SENSITIVITIES AND NEEDS OF LDC'S AND ACTIVELY SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND A MORE EQUITABLE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER.

5. ADVISE CONCURRENCE.

REINHARDT

BT

#6052

NNNNVV ESA2200000000

RR RUCMNR

DE RUEKJCS 22136 1920644

ZNY 55536

RULVITZ T USS NIMITZ

RUCMSS T USS ELMER MONTGOMERY

RUCLEA T USS TALBOT

RULYUSA T HELANTISUBRON TWELVE

RULYOSA T CG FOURTH MAB

RUCLEA T USS SARATOGA

RUNGZFF T AIRANTISUBRON TWO ONE

RULYHOV T USS SAIPAN

RUMPHS T USS BLUE RIDGE

RUMPHL T USS CONSTELLATION

RUMFAA T AIRANTISUBRON THREE SEVEN

RUELSA T USS JOHN F KENNEDY

RUMZMLL T USS NEW ORLEANS

RUMHHA T USS TARAWA

RUMFMA T USS ENGLAND

RUMDXA T USS TUSCALOOSA

RULYIK T USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER

RUNGZFF T USS KITTY HAWK

RUCLEA T COMCRUDESQU TWELVE

RULYUSA T CTG SIX TWO PT TWO

RUMHLL T CTG SIX TWO PT ONE

RUMGBA T CTG SEVEN SIX PT THREE

RUMPAYN T CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMGBA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT THREE

RUMHJA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

RUMGBA T CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMGBA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ONE

RUMGBA T CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX

RUMGBA T CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUMSDPT T CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMHHA T CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR PT ONE

RUMFAA T HELANTISUBRON LIGHT THREE ONE

RUMFAA T HELANTISUBRON ELEVEN

RUMFAA T HELANTISUBRON TWO

RUMZMLL T USS ANCHORAGE

RULYSDO T USS AUSTIN

RUMHWA T USS ENTERPRISE

RUMGIIV T USS MIDWAY

RUMOHUA T USS MOUNT WHITNEY

RUMHNG T USS RANGER

RULYKA T CTF SIX TWO

RUMDFA T COMPHIBGRUEAST PAC

RULYUSA T USS AMERICA

RULYOSA T COMCARGU SIX

RUMZMLL T USS JOSEPH STRAUSS

R 110641Z JUL 79

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DN-26//

TO DIACURINTEL

AIG 7011

AIG 7033

BRUCKH/USDAO TERRAN IR

BT

SECRET NOFORN 1747

SUBJ: DIA INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL 139-79 11 JUL 79 (U)
THE SUMMARY PORTION OF THIS APPRAISAL IS PROVIDED HEREWITH
AS AN ADVANCE SYNOPSIS OF THE HARD-COPY REPORT, WHICH IS
BEING PUBLISHED TODAY.

)

IRAN: KHOMEINI'S OPPOSITION. (U)

)

(S/NOFORN) AS THE REVOLUTIONARY EUPHORIA SUBSIDES, MANY ELEMENTS
OF IRANIAN SOCIETY ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISILLUSIONED AS
THEY BEGIN TO PERCEIVE THAT ONE DICTATOR HAS BEEN REPLACED BY
ANOTHER. SOME GROUPS NEVER DID WANT AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC BUT

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 2136 SECRET

SUPPORTED AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AS AN EXPEDIENT MEANS TO OUST THE
SHAH. OTHER GROUPS WANTED AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, BUT THEY HAVE
NOW DECIDED THEY DO NOT WANT KHOMEINI'S DICTATORIAL INTERPRETATION,
WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE THE DESIRED GUARANTEES OF EXPRESSION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS. ALTHOUGH MANY EDUCATED AND POLITICALLY ASTUTE
IRANIS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISGRUNTLED WITH THE REVOLUTION,
THE MASSES APPARENTLY REMAIN STEADFAST IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR KHOMEINI.
EVEN THOUGH KHOMEINI'S OPPOSITION CONTINUES TO GROW AND BECOME
MORE VOCAL, THERE IS STILL NO GROUP THAT CAN SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGE
KHOMEINI OR MODERATE HIS VIEWS AT THIS TIME. AS LONG AS HE COMMANDS
THE SUPPORT OF THE MASSES, THE AYATOLLAH WILL CONTINUE TO DETERMINE
THE FORM AND DIRECTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. (REVW 26 JUN

99)

BT

#2136

NODIS
EXDIS
ROGER
OTHER

(R TO FILE)

AMB _____
DCM _____
ADM _____
CRU _____

CHG
POL
CHG

CLASSIFIED



AMERICAN EMBASSY

TEHRAN

NNNNITX

Charg

EOA382BRA217

11 JUL 79 1122

1) 6

TO RUEGMR
DE RUEHC #8863 1922020
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 112000Z JUL 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3408
BT
SECRET STATE 178863

— ROGER CHANNEL —

C.O. 12045: RDS-, 7/2/79 (PACKMAN, MARTIN)

TAGS: PINT, PINR, IR

SUBJECT: POLITICAL REPORTING

REF: STATE 157433

1. (SECRET: ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS POST IS AWARE AN INTERAGENCY GROUP (THE AARON/NEWSON/CARLUCCI GROUP) HAS BEEN FORMED TO REVIEW ON A CONTINUING BASIS THE SITUATION OF SOME 20 COUNTRIES ON THE "CRITICAL COUNTRIES WATCHLIST," INCLUDING IRAN.

3. THIS PROCESS OF REVIEW WILL BE A CONTINUING ONE, AND WE SEEK A DIALOGUE WITH EACH EMBASSY ON THE LIST. NOTWITHSTANDING THE RECENT PERSONNEL CHANGES IN TEHRAN, CHAOTIC CONDITIONS, ETC., DEPARTMENT WISHES TO RECEIVE A DRAFT OF EMBASSY'S POLITICAL REPORTING PLAN IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT AARON-NEWSON-CARLUCCI MEETING. WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THIS BY JULY 20. IN THIS CONNECTION, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO COMMENT ON ANY RELATED PROBLEM AREAS WHICH YOU EXPERIENCE WITH WASHINGTON.

4. WE ARE REPEATING FYI THE FOLLOWING JOINT CIA/INR "VULNERABILITY" ASSESSMENT REGARDING IRAN:

QUOTE: IRAN'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE, OF COURSE, IMMENSE. THE POWER STRUCTURE REMAINS DECENTRALIZED, SPLIT PRIMARILY BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. HEAVILY ARMED LEFTIST GROUPS AND THE SECULAR MIDDLE CLASS ARE IDEOLOGICALLY OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC UTOPIA. THERE ARE ALSO FRACTURES WITHIN THE ISLAMIC ESTABLISHMENT BETWEEN MODERATE AND RADICAL LEADERS. THE ECONOMY HAS NOT RECOVERED AND THERE MAY BE AS MANY AS THREE TO FOUR MILLION UNEMPLOYED. FINALLY, IRAN'S ETHNIC MINORITIES WANT AUTONOMY AND APPEAR WILLING TO USE FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR DEMANDS.

UNQUOTE. VANCE

BT

#8863

10/10

Econ

Here is that ref
to the "Business Council."
B

NNNNVV ES9073BRA495
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #8957 1941813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131739Z JUL 79
FM SECRETARY WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3451
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 180957

E.O. 12065 GDS, 7/12/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: BDIS, IR

SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IF IRANIAN BUSINESS CLIMATE CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE LEGAL DIFFICULTIES FACING GTE COULD BE EXTENDED TO OTHER COMPANIES WITH DAMAGING EFFECTS ON A BROAD SPECTRUM OF US COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS AS TO STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE TO LIMIT SUCH DAMAGE FROM COMMERCIAL DISPUTES. IT SEEMS PROBABLE--AND PREFERABLE--THAT MOST DISPUTES BEST BE HANDLED ON A COMPANY-TO-PCOI BASIS WITH USG INVOLVEMENT ONLY ON REQUEST. IN ANY EVENT, OUR INFLUENCE IS CLEARLY VERY LIMITED. WE WONDER, HOWEVER, IF WE MIGHT NOT BE HELPFUL IN SEEKING TO REACTIVATE OR CREATE NEW CHANNELS THAT COULD REDUCE PROBLEMS THAT RESULT FROM COMMUNICATIONS FAILURES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS -- DIFFICULTIES THAT HAVE APPARENTLY COMPLICATED GTE CASE.

3. SPECIFICALLY, WE WONDER IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO SEEK TO REVITALIZE IRAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND THE BUSINESS COUNCIL. (WE ASSUME THE JOINT COMMISSION CONVEYS TOO MUCH OLD REGIME FLAVOR.) EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS COULD PROVIDE A FORUM IN WHICH THE PCOI COULD EXPLAIN ITS POLICIES ON CONTRACT REVIEW, PERFORMANCE BONDS, WORK PERMITS, PROTECTION OF EXPATRIATES, ETC. IN TURN, REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN FIRMS COULD EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS AND QUESTIONS RELATING TO RESUMPTION OF ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. OWING TO ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT US BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN, MEETINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED MAINLY BY VISITORS, PRESUMABLY DELEGATIONS COMING TO TEHRAN. MEMBERSHIP OF US GROUP COULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIETY OF BUSINESS INTERESTS, A LAWYER AND PERHAPS AN ACADEMIC OR OTHER NEUTRAL PERSON. AGREED MINUTES OF MEETINGS COULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO LARGER

We need to answer this
JUL 19 1979
what about RT.7
ECON
CHG
POL
RF
Chron
meeting w/ Sahr

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-25-323

BUSINESS COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP.

4. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE ROLE FOR A REACTIVATED CHAMBER OR BUSINESS COUNCIL IN HELPING TO SMOOTH DIFFERENCES IN SPECIFIC DISPUTES, ESPECIALLY WHERE EMBASSY EFFORTS HAVE BEEN UNAVAILING. WE EXPECT THAT PGOI WOULD WISE TO HAVE LEADERSHIP IN EITHER ORGANIZATION REFLECT NEW REALITIES IN IRAN AND THAT PGOI ITSELF MIGHT WISE TO BE REPRESENTED IN SOME FASHION. PGOI AND USG COULD CONCEIVABLY BE ASSOCIATED AS OBSERVERS.

5. RESTARTING CHAMBER OR BUSINESS COUNCIL COULD HAVE ADDED BENEFIT OF AGAIN SIGNALING TO PGOI OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL IN RESUMING NORMAL COMMERCIAL TIES THAT WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

6. IF YOU THINK FOREGOING-WORTHY OF EXPLORATION, WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS RE REFINEMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED. OUR IDEA WOULD BE TO PUT IDEAS IN FIRST INSTANCE TO COMMERCE MINISTER REZA SADR FOR HIS GUIDANCE. IT MIGHT ALSO BE WORTH- TAKING SOUNDINGS WITH AHMAD LAJAVARDI, OTHER WELL-PLACED BUSINESSMEN, OR SOMEONE FROM IRANIAN CHAMBER, E.G., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DONAKDAR.

7. WE HAVE ALSO GIVEN TENTATIVE THOUGHT TO ORGANIZING (OR ASKING PRIVATE GROUP TO ORGANIZE) A CONFERENCE OF BUSINESS FIRMS INVOLVED IN IRAN FOR 1) REVIEW OF DIFFERING COMPANY EXPERIENCES IN IRAN BY PANELS ADDRESSING SPECIFIC ISSUES, 2) DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL SITUATION AND US POLICY BY SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, AND 3) GENERAL REVIEW OF ECONOMIC SITUATION. ONE-IDEA ALSO ADVANCED WAS TO INVITE REZA SADR OR OTHER QUALIFIED PGOI SPOKESMAN TO ADDRESS GROUP IN ONE OR MORE SESSIONS.

8. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT INDEPENDENTLY--WHILE THIS MESSAGE WAS IN PREPARATION--WILLIAM LEHFELDT AND WALTER SURRY HAVE ASKED DON WEADON TO INQUIRE QUIETLY INTO REACTIVATING CHAMBER AND COUNCIL WHILE WEADON IS IN TEHRAN. WE DO NOT

PLACE MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THIS APPROACH AND DO NOT WISH TO CROSS WIRES WITH IT. WE HAVE ASKED WEADON, HOWEVER, TO KEEP EMBASSY AND DEPARTMENT INFORMED OF HIS INQUIRIES. VANCE
BT
#0957



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 20, 1979

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

L. Bruce Laingen, Esquire
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
American Embassy
Tehran, Iran

Dear Bruce:

I will try to summarize in this letter my conversation with Andy Sens. and earlier talk with Victor on Embassy reporting. At the outset like a good Foreign Service Officer -- and also quite honestly -- let me say that I think the Embassy does a superb job in the face of horrendous obstacles. Now to move quickly into the meat of this letter...

I think we need several things in reporting:

First, we need fast alert reporting on significant events. For example, when Bazargan installs clerics in the Cabinet, when General Rahimi is fired, when the unity march occurs, when nationalization is decreed or there is significant sabotage in the oil fields, we need a quick, brief Embassy message with your best analysis. I may have to do an evening reading item the same day. Although I am willing to rely on my own judgments, it would serve the national interest better if we had your authoritative input.

Second, we need the building blocks which will help us to construct a better knowledge of revolutionary Iran. Victor's reporting plan is exactly what I mean. We simply do not have the bios, inventory of political groups or current picture of daily life as it evolves at various levels in Iran. Ignorance here of Iran's events is massive. The U.S. press does not do a good job but in the absence of Embassy reporting, we have to rely on inexperienced newsmen. We need particularly to track constitutional developments.

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS 7/20/85

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Third, we need reporting on significant conversations that you and others have in the Embassy. For example, you are the only official who has seen Mr. Nazih and your appreciation of this key personality and his views towards the U.S. will be read with interest at the very highest levels here, I am sure. In fact anything you send in as your impressions or reporting significant conversations is guaranteed wide readership among those people in our government who have not been fired. Beyond that I hope Victor and others in the Embassy can, despite the odds against you, stimulate conversations with intelligent political observers in Iran. We really need the kind of reporting we have had in the past in which an Embassy officer takes nourishment from someone like Matin-Daftary, some of the better newsmen or other Iranians who have no particular chip on their shoulders but who are sensible political observers. Be sure to identify these persons when you report so that we can evaluate on our own terms the validity of their opinions.

Finally, the excellent reporting on minority groups has been a real plus in political terms for this administration. I think we have handled the problem of Jews in Iran in a very successful way (ignoring the Javits Resolution) and much of the credit is due to you all for the continuing stream of reporting. I would suggest two slight changes. First, I would avoid rumors, questionable opinions or speculation that is likely to set off an alarm when there is no real need to do so. Don't talk about a holocaust unless you really believe that one is coming. Don't repeat someone's charges about people in jail or being executed without attempting to verify it first. In other words keep the reporting coming but be careful that it is accurate and reliable. Secondly, I hope the Embassy will continue to expand its field of contacts on this subject. Has anyone, for example, attempted to see the leaders of the left-wing Jewish movement for their perspectives on events?

We may send you a cable of comments on Victor's reporting plan, making a few suggestions. I hope you will let me know when you think Washington is not reacting properly to what you send us either by showing appreciation or by adjusting our policies to changed conditions. As I told Victor earlier,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

I would like to maintain a continuing flow of informal communications between the desk and the Embassy so that we both know that what you are doing remains on target.

Sincerely,

Henry F.echt
Director
Office of Iranian Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

22 JUL 79 07 55Z

NNNNVV ESB003BRA392
OO RUQMER
DE RUEHC #9711 2022237
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 212213Z JUL 79 ZFP6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3589
INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2426
BT
SECRET STATE 199711

NODIS

Chg
Chlon

NODIS
FOR CHARGE FROM NEWSOM

E.O. 12065 GDS 7/19/85 (NEWSOM, DAVID D.)

TAGS: APER, IR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIAL NOMINATION

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS THE SECRETARY HAS TOLD YOU, ALL OF US DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO REMAIN IN TEHRAN A REASONABLE TIME LONGER IN ORDER THAT WE MAY MAKE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR. WE WILL BE MONITORING THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN CLOSELY DURING THE COMING WEEKS IN PREPARATION FOR ADDRESSING THIS QUESTION. WE WILL BE LOOKING FOR SIGNS THAT THE PGOI SINCERELY WISHES TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH US AND THAT WE WILL NOT EXPERIENCE A REPETITION OF THE REJECTION OF WALTER CUTLER. WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY ON THE LATTER POINT. IN ADDITION, WE WILL WANT TO BE SURE THAT WHEN WE SEND A NEW AMBASSADOR, HE WILL BE ABLE TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY. THUS, WE WILL BE CONCERNED THAT CONDITIONS SHOULD NOT DETERIORATE FURTHER IN THE COMING WEEKS AND THAT EMBASSY'S SECURITY SITUATION SHOULD IMPROVE.

3. THE ATTITUDE OF THE AYATOLLAH TOWARDS US WILL BE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. IN THIS CONNECTION IT SEEMS THAT HIS RHETORIC HAS BEEN RELATIVELY FREE IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS OF THE ATTACKS ON THE U.S. THAT CHARACTERIZED HIS

REMARKS IN THE SPRING. FINALLY, IT WILL SIMPLY BE NECESSARY TO ALLOW A SUFFICIENT PASSAGE OF TIME BEFORE WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PUT FORWARD THE NOMINATION OF A NEW AMBASSADOR TO THE SENATE.

4. ASSUMING THAT OUR CONDITIONS ARE MET AND NO UNTOWARD

PROBLEMS DEVELOP, WE THINK IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO BEGIN PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AFTER THE AUGUST RECESS. IF OUR SOUNDS ARE FAVORABLE AND AGAIN ASSUMING THAT THERE ARE NO SERIOUS DISRUPTIVE EVENTS IN IRAN THAT WOULD MAKE INAPPROPRIATE THE NOMINATION OF AN AMBASSADOR, WE COULD BE IN A POSITION TO SEND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT IN SEPTEMBER WITH A VIEW TO COMPLETING THE NOMINATION PROCESS WITH THE SENATE BY THE END OF OCTOBER.

5. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GIVING US YOUR VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION, INCLUDING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE UTILITY AND THE IMPORTANCE FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN OF ASSIGNING AN AMBASSADOR IN THE TIMEFRAME SUGGESTED. VANCE

BT
#9711

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/1

DE RUQMER #7635/01 203 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221124Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2740
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0190
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0186
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0195
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0164
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0167
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0227
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0221
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0232
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0195
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0276
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0162
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0204
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0092
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0236
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 07635

Fclw
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 7/19/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LELAIN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH
CLEAR: 1.DAO:TSCHAFER
2.ECON:RBASH
3.ICA:JSHELLEN
4. A/MCCAST
5. POL:TAHERN
DCM EGON
DAO MAAG ICA
RF
DISTR: POL2 DCM EGON
DAO MAAG ICA
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/19/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: QUARTERLY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, AT LEAST IN A CRUDE WAY, THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS MADE SINCE THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF THE ANOMALY OF A DUAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE REVOLUTION'S SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED VICTORY. WE CONCLUDE THAT, DESPITE AN APPEARANCE OF A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF NORMALITY, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI) HAS BEEN GENERALLY UNSUCCESSFUL IN ASSERTING ITS POLITICAL AUTHORITY. THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE--THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AND THEIR ADJUNCTS--CONTINUES TO THRIVE, AND INDEED HAS STEADILY BECOME MORE ENTRENCHED AS A PARALLEL SOURCE OF AUTHORITY. A CONCOMITANT FEATURE OF THIS ABNORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS HAS BEEN GROWING POLITICAL DISSIDENCE. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE PGOI HAS FOCUSED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND THE PROSPECT OF A POPULARLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT BEING IN PLACE BY EARLY AUTUMN AS THE SOLUTION TO THE CONUNDRUM IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE BY OTHER MEANS. END SUMMARY.

3. THIS REPORT ATTEMPTS TO ASSESS IRAN'S CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN TERMS OF QUANTIFIABLE INDICATORS. TO DO THIS POSES SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL DATA WHICH MIGHT BE APPLIED TO A MODEL FOR MEASURING TRENDS. GIVEN THE GREAT SUSPICION IN PRESENT-DAY IRAN OF USG ACTIVITIES OF ALL KINDS, AS WELL AS THE GENERAL INSECURITY IN MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR EMPLOYEES TO GATHER THE NECESSARY DATA THEMSELVES EXCEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/1

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/1

ON AN EXTREMELY SELECTIVE BASIS. NONETHELESS, THERE ARE PHENOMENA WHICH CAN BE QUANTIFIED AT LEAST IN A CRUDE WAY, AND WE HAVE ENDEAVORED TO APPLY THESE TO A MODEL WHICH HOPEFULLY CAN BE USED OVER TIME AS A MEASURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

4. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION LEFT A LEGACY OF A DUAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, THE FORMAL STRUCTURE HEADED BY PM BAZARGAN AND THE INFORMAL ONE HEADED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. OUR MODEL ASSUMES THAT THIS IS AN ABNORMAL SITUATION, AND, THEREFORE, THAT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT MUST BE DEFINED AS PROGRESS TOWARD A UNIFIED GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE CAPABLE OF ADMINISTERING THE NATION'S AFFAIRS. IT IS ALSO ASSUMED THAT THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL DISSIDENCE WILL BE INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO DEVELOPMENT TOWARD A UNIFORM STRUCTURE. AREAS EXAMINED INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE FORMAL GOVERNMENT

- - - THE CABINET
- - - PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
- - - LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUSTICE
- - - EDUCATION
- - - ECONOMIC POLICY AND PLANNING
- - - PUBLIC WELFARE
- - - THE MEDIA
- - - NATIONAL DEFENSE

B. THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

- - - THE LEADERSHIP
- - - THE COMMITTEES
- - - THE MILITIAS AND IRREGULAR FORCES
- - - THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT SYSTEM

C. POLITICAL DISSIDENCE

- - - LEFT WING ORGANIZATIONS
- - - MODERATE GROUPS

BT

#7635

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/1

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-211-321

- -- RADICALS/TERRORISTS
- -- ETHNIC MINORITIES

USING THESE SAME CATEGORIES, WE INTEND TO REPEAT THIS EXERCISE AT QUARTERLY INTERVALS.

5. THE GOVERNMENT

A. THE CABINET

- --WHEN PM BAZARGAN AND HIS CABINET TOOK OFFICE THEY APPEARED TO SEE THEIR JOB AS ONE OF OVERSEEING THE NATION'S AFFAIRS WHILE CARRYING OUT A PROCESS OF FORMULATING A NEW CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH A NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD ULTIMATELY BE ELECTED. TWO THINGS INTERFERED: FIRST, THE TASK OF CREATING A NEW GOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PGOI INITIALLY ENVISIONED IT PROVED TO BE FAR MORE COMPLICATED THAN THE NEW AND INEXPERIENCED LEADERS HAD ANTICIPATED. SECOND, AND MORE IMPORTANT, THE PGOI SOON FOUND ITSELF SPENDING AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME TRYING TO SORT OUT THE ANOMALIES AND CONFLICTING SOURCES OF AUTHORITY CAUSED BY A DUALISTIC SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION. THE CONSEQUENCE WAS THAT PROGRESS TOWARD THE GOAL OF ELECTING A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT WAS SLOW AND HAPHAZARD (AS THE MAR(H) REFERENCE ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC BORE WITNESS).

- --AS SPRING WORE INTO SUMMER BAZARGAN AND HIS COLLEAGUES FOUND THEMSELVES INCREASINGLY BOGGED DOWN IN INEFFECTUAL EFFORTS TO ASSERT THEIR PRIMACY IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AT ALL LEVELS. WHILE BAZARGAN HIMSELF MORALE WITHIN THE CABINET BEGAN TO FLAG. JUSTICE MINISTER MOBASHERI WANTED OUT BECAUSE THE INDEPENDENT REVOLUTIONARY COURTS MADE HIS FUNCTION LARGELY SUPERFLUOUS. FOREIGN MINISTER SANJABI QUIT. DEFENSE MINISTER MADANI MOVED ON TO GREENER POLITICAL PASTURES IN THE NAVY AND KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AMIR-ENTEZAM LEFT FOR SCANDINAVIA.

- --FOR THE RECORD, THE EFFORTS TO CURB THE POWERS OF THE INFORMAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT CONTINUE. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THIS HAS BECOME A HOLLOW EXERCISE. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO HAVE REDIRECTED ITS FOCUS BACK TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, AND IS PRESENTLY CONCENTRATING ITS ENERGIES ON PUTTING ITSELF OUT OF BUSINESS AT AN EARLY DATE. THE ATTITUDE INCREASINGLY SEEMS TO BE THAT ONLY A POPULARLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH IRAN'S MANIFOLD PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE ONE OF ITS INFORMAL PARALLEL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

B. PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

- --THE PGOI MOVED RELATIVELY RAPIDLY TO APPOINT GOVERNORS GENERAL TO MOST OF IRAN'S 22 PROVINCES. AS EARLY AS MARCH, HOWEVER, IT WAS APPARENT THAT THESE CHIEF EXECUTIVES AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL WERE HAVING CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN ASSERTING THEIR AUTHORITY.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 07635/2

BY THE END OF JUNE EIGHT GOVERNORS GENERAL IN SEVEN PROVINCES HAD EITHER QUIT IN THE FACE OF THEIR INABILITY TO FUNCTION DUE TO THE INTERFERENCE OF LOCAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES OR HAD ACTUALLY BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF THE PROVINCES BY THESE SAME COMMITTEES.

- --BELOW THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME WAS LEFT IN PLACE FOR THE MOST PART. THIS INFRASTRUCTURE ACCOUNTS FOR THE ABILITY OF MOST LOCAL JURISDICTIONS TO RESUME QUICKLY SUCH BASIC SERVICES AS GARBAGE COLLECTION AND TO PROVIDE UTILITIES VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. URBAN LIFE, CONSEQUENTLY OFTEN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ONLY marginally AFFECTED BY THE REVOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, REAL AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT LIE WITH PGOI OFFICIALS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE POWER OF THE COMMITTEES INCREASES THE LOWER THE ADMINISTRATIVE BT
#7635

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TEHRAN 07635/2

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-215,373

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/3

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 07635

LEVEL.

C. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUSTICE

--THE TRAFFIC POLICE WERE THE FIRST ELEMENT OF IRAN'S FORMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT APPARATUS TO REAPPEAR FOLLOWING THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION. MUCH MORE SLOWLY, REGULAR POLICE HAVE BEGUN TO REOCCUPY PRECINCT STATIONS. THEY OFTEN SHARE THESE FACILITIES WITH IRREGULAR MILITIAS. HOWEVER, AND ORDERS FROM COMMANDING OFFICERS FREQUENTLY ARE SUBJECT TO VETO BY STATIONHOUSE COMMITTEES WHOSE MEMBERSHIPS ARE NOT INFREQUENTLY DOMINATED BY NON-OFFICIAL PERSONNEL. REGULAR POLICE, AND EVEN GENDARMERIE, HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CARRY ARMS ONLY ON A LIMITED BASIS AND USUALLY UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES (E.G., PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO SECURITY DUTY AT SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICES).

--THE SITUATION MAY BE SLIGHTLY BETTER IN THE PROVINCES THAN IN TEHRAN, ALTHOUGH THERE APPEARS TO BE GREAT VARIATION FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER. IN THE CASPIAN SEA TOWN OF CHALUS, FOR EXAMPLE, ENBOFFS NOT LONG AGO OBSERVED THAT BOTH THE CITY'S POLICE FORCE AND THE LOCAL GENDARMERIE POST SEEMED TO BE FUNCTIONING IN A NORMAL MANNER, WHEREAS THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLICE IN KHORRAMSHAHR IN CURBING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL MILITIAS HAS BEEN A MAJOR ELEMENT IN ETHNIC UNREST IN THAT CITY.

--THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE IS ESSENTIALLY MORIBUND. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN CASES OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE PUBLIC IS THE EXCLUSIVE DOMAIN OF THE OFFICE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THE FORMAL PCOI BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND ACT TOTALLY INDEPENDENT OF IT. OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS WILL BE REPLACED BY A SPECIAL SYSTEM OF FORMAL TRIBUNALS TO TRY COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSES AND THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION WHICH ENVISIONS A REVITALIZED CIVILIAN JUDICIARY NOTWITHSTANDING, THE PCOI HAS BEEN SINGULARLY UNSUCCESSFUL IN ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. NOW, DESPITE THE GRADUAL REAPPEARANCE OF THE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE, HAS THE PCOI BEEN ABLE IN ANY MEANINGFUL RESPECT TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE POWER OF ARREST FROM THE COMMITTEES AND IRREGULAR MILITIAS. EVEN WHERE THE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR POSTS, THEIR ROLE IS ESSENTIALLY AN AUXILIARY ONE TO THE COMMITTEES AND MILITIAS.

D. EDUCATION

--PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS REOPENED SHORTLY AFTER THE FALL OF THE BAKHTIAN GOVERNMENT IN FEBRUARY. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS IMPOSED BY AN ABBREVIATED SCHOOL YEAR AND STUDENTS POLITICIZED BY THEIR EXPERIENCE OF THE PRECEDING MONTHS, THE PCOI CAN BE REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH ITS ABILITY TO REACTIVATE THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, A PROCESS WHICH HAS JUST CULMINATED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF YEAR-END EXAMINATIONS. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/3

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/3

EXAMINATIONS HAD TO BE POSTPONED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES BECAUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS.) THERE ARE MASSIVE PROBLEMS (SHORTAGES OF TEACHERS, INADQUATE FACILITIES, A MEDIOCRE CURRICULUM) TO BE FACED IN THE FUTURE, BUT THESE WOULD HAVE BEEN THERE IN ANY EVENT.

- --AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL, HOWEVER, THE RECORD IS MUCH MORE MODEST. CAMPUSES IN THE CAPITAL, ESPECIALLY THE UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN, REMAIN HOTBEDS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY WHERE LITTLE CLASSROOM INSTRUCTION IS CARRIED OUT. EVEN IN THE PROVINCES, WHERE SEVERAL INSTITUTIONS WERE ABLE TO RESUME CLASSES AT A FAIRLY EARLY DATE, THE TREND OF RECENT WEEKS HAS BEEN OMINOUS, WITH GROWING DISSATISFACTION AMONG BOTH STUDENTS AND FACULTY MEMBERS. THERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE PURGES OF FACULTY MEMBERS AND STUDENTS, AS WELL AS FIGHTS BETWEEN RIVAL GROUPS ON SEVERAL CAMPUSES.

BT

#7635

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/3

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/4

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 07635

F. ECONOMIC POLICY AND PLANNING

--THE PGOI'S ABILITY TO GET THE OIL INDUSTRY OPERATIONAL AND TO RESUME PRODUCTION HAS TO BE REGARDED AS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE PETROLEUM SECTOR IS FAR FROM TROUBLE-FREE AND THE PGOI HAS EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY IN CONVERTING ITS SUBSTANTIAL OIL REVENUES INTO USUABLE ECONOMIC ASSETS, AN INABILITY TO REACTIVATE THE OIL INDUSTRY ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE MEANT THE EARLY LEMISE OF THE PGOI. AS IT IS, THE PGOI HAS BEEN CUSHIONED TO A DEGREE FROM THE FULL FORCE OF THE REPERCUSSIONS OF RADICAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC UPHEAVAL.

--ELSEWHERE, HOWEVER, THE PGOI'S ECONOMIC RECORD IS GENERALLY POOR. IT HAS BEEN SINGULARLY INEFFECTIVE IN PRODDING INDUSTRY BACK INTO PRODUCTION OR IN PROTECTING THE NATION'S OWN LONGER TERM INTERESTS BY MOVING EXPEDITIOUSLY TO RATIONALIZE AND REGULARIZE THE MYRIAD CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS ESTABLISHED BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE ENTITIES. INDEED, IN THE LATTER AREA THE PGOI HAS USUALLY PROVEN POWERLESS TO PREVENT THE INTRUSION OF PAROCHIAL INTERESTS INTO CONTRACT RELATIONSHIPS IN WAYS THAT ARE HIGHLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE COMMON WEAL. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, IN RECENT DAYS THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS IN DEFINING PRIORITIES, AND A NUMBER OF FOREIGN FIRMS RETURNING TO IRAN HAVE BEEN PLEASED WITH THE RECEPTION THEY HAVE RECEIVED. IN THIS REGARD THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT EASING IN THE POLICY OF GRANTING WORK PERMITS TO FOREIGN PERSONNEL. THE PGOI HAS FINALLY GIVEN BIRTH TO A BUDGET, BUT IT IS LESS THAN INSPIRED, AND IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT RESPECTS ACTUALLY CONTRADICTS STATED POLICIES (E.G., AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION, SOCIAL WELFARE AND ROADS). THE ASSUMPTION MUST BE THAT THE SLAP-DASH MANNER IN WHICH THE BUDGET WAS PUT TOGETHER REFLECTS THE STILL TENUOUS GRIP PGOI ECONOMIC PLANNERS AND MANAGERS HAVE ON THE AREAS THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR. FINALLY, DECISIONS TO NATIONALIZE BANKS, INSURANCE, AND CERTAIN INDUSTRIES, WHILE PERHAPS UNAVOIDABLE UNDER PREVAILING CONDITIONS, REPRESENT LESS A CLEARLY DEFINED ECONOMIC POLICY ON THE PGOI'S PART THAN THE ABSENCE OF ONE.

F. PUBLIC WELFARE.

--THE PGOI'S PUBLIC WELFARE PROGRAM HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC ACTIONS TAKEN IN OPPOSITION TO THE PREVIOUS REGIME AND A CONCOMITANT FLIGHT OF CAPITAL AND TECHNICAL, MANAGERIAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS. UNEMPLOYMENT, UNDEREMPLOYMENT AND UNPRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT ARE ENDEMIC, PERHAPS AFFECTING AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY OF THE WORKFORCE. THE PGOI'S RESPONSE HAS BEEN PALLIATIVE RATHER THAN CURATIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PGOI HAS NO PROGRAM TO SOLVE ITS MASSIVE LABOR PROBLEMS, PREFERING INSTEAD TO DEAL WITH THEM THROUGH DOLES TO THE UNEMPLOYED AND PRESSURES ON EMPLOYERS TO KEEP AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE ON THE

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/4

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/4

PAYROLLS WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS WORK FOR THEM TO DO. AT BEST, THIS APPROACH MAY BUY TIME IN ANTICIPATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE POLICY; AT WORST, IT SIMPLY POSTPONES THE ULTIMATE DAY OF RECKONING.

G. THE MEDIA

--THE PGOI IS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM QOM TO CURB THE POWER OF THE PRESS. SINCE THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION INDEPENDENT AND LEFTIST NEWSPAPERS SUCH AS AYANDEGAN AND PEIGHAM-E-EMRUZ HAVE BEEN THE TARGETS OF THREATS, BOYCOTTS AND OUTRIGHT VANDALISM, THE MOST RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVING AN ATTACK ON AYANDEGAN'S OFFICES IN KHORRAMSHAHR AND ABADAN. ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY PAPERS WERE ROUNDLY CONDEMNED AT THE JULY 17 SOLIDARITY RALLY SPONSORED BY BACKERS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. AS A RESULT OF THESE PRESSURES, THE PGOI THROUGH ITS MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE HAS BEEN PUT IN THE AWKWARD POSITION OF HAVING HAD TO DRAFT A PRESS

BT
#7635

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/4